Madison v. Harford Cnty.
| Decision Date | 02 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-12-1120 |
| Parties | ANTHONY MADISON, et al. Plaintiffs v. HARFORD COUNTY, et al. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT/DISMISSAL
The Court has before it Defendants', Jason Flemmens, Todd Johnson, Jennifer Huey, Emma Virginia Courtney, Christopher Jones, Sherman Kirk, Theresa Pounds, and Rickey Harper, Second Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment [Document 35] and the materials submitted relating thereto. The Court has held a hearing and had the benefit of the arguments of counsel.
On the evening of June 11, 2009, Dwight Jerome Madison ("Madison"), a navy veteran suffering from mental illnesses, was arrested for trespassing by Harford County Sheriff Office Deputies Todd Johnson ("Officer Johnson") and Jason Flemmens ("Officer Flemmens"). Madison was transported and delivered to the Harford County Detention Center Processing Center (the"Detention Center") where he was held for processing. After arriving at the Detention Center, Madison interacted with several Detention Center personnel - Jennifer Huey ("Huey"), Emma Virginia Courtney ("Courtney"), Christopher Jones ("Jones"), Sherman Kirk ("Kirk"), Theresa Pounds ("Pounds"), and Rickey Harper ("Harper") (collectively referred to as the "DC Defendants"). There was an incident, during which Huey fired a taser, striking Madison who then fell to the floor and was severely injured. Madison was taken to the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Center and died as a result of his injuries the next day.1
In the Amended Complaint2 [Document 14], Plaintiffs presented claims against the Harford County Council, the Harford County Executive, Sheriff Jesse L. Bane, Officer Johnson, Officer Flemmens, and the DC Defendants in seven Counts:
Consistent with the Court's rulings in MJG-10-197, all claims against Sheriff Bane, the Harford County Council Members, and the Harford County Executive have been dismissed [Documents 53, 63].3 With respect to the remaining defendants, fact discovery has been completed.4
By the instant motion, Defendants move for dismissal of all claims in the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure5 12(b)(6) or alternatively for summary judgment under Rule 56.
The Defendants have captioned their motion as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The parties have, however, submitted extrinsic evidence in support of their respective positions. If, on a12(b)(6) motion, "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Therefore, the Court shall utilize the summary judgment standard in regard to the instant motion except, as indicated herein, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard7 shall be applied to certain of the state law claims that were not adequately pleaded.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and supporting documents show that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. 56(a).
The well-established principles pertinent to such motions can be distilled to a simple statement. The court may look at the evidence presented in regard to the motion for summary judgment through the non-movant's rose colored glasses, but must view it realistically. After so doing, the essential question is whether a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the non-movant or whether the movant would, at trial, beentitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert federal claims against:
All claims have been dismissed against the Inactive Defendants. See [Document 21]. The claims against the Arresting Officers and the DC Defendants shall be addressed in turn.
At the hearing, Plaintiffs clarified their federal claim against Officers Johnson and Flemmens as based upon the arrest of Madison without probable cause and not upon any theory that unlawful force was used.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits a person acting under the color of law from depriving another of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees against unreasonable seizures of persons and an arrest without probable cause is unreasonable. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979). The Fourth Amendment permits an arrest without a warrant if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime. United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073 (4th Cir. 1993). "An officer has probable cause to believe a suspect has committed a crime if the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, in the circumstances shown, to conclude that the suspect has committed an offense." See, e.g., United States v. Ashley, 490 F. App'x 512, 513 (4th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 391 (U.S. 2012). In determining whether probable cause existed for an arrest, a court must look at the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the arrest. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32 (1983).
The evidence of record establishes that Officer Johnson, alone, responded to complaints of a person banging on apartment doors and, upon his arrival at the scene, encountered Madison. Johnson Aff. [Document 22-4] ¶ 4-7. Because Madison was not aresident of the apartment complex, Johnson informed Madison he was trespassing and told him to leave. According to Johnson's Affidavit, Madison then left and Johnson did not arrest or place Madison in custody. Id. ¶ 9-17. Later that evening, Officer Flemmens responded, alone, to another complaint of a person banging on doors at the same apartment building. Flemmens Aff. [Document 22-5] ¶ 3-4. Officer Flemmens stated in his affidavit that Officer Johnson had informed him of his prior interaction with Madison at that apartment building and Johnson's request to Madison that he leave the premises. Id. ¶ 5. Upon arrival at the apartment building, Officer Flemmens encountered Madison who informed Officer Flemmens that he was homeless, was looking for a friend, had nowhere to go, and that Flemmens should just arrest him for trespassing because he would at least "have three squares and a cot." Id. ¶ 6-9; Flemmens Dep. [Document 37-1], Ex. 2 at 50. Flemmens then arrested Madison for trespassing and transported him to the Detention Center.
Plaintiffs present no evidence indicating, much less adequate to prove, that Officer Johnson arrested or seized Madison, participated in Madison's arrest, or was even present during Madison's arrest. Moreover, there is no evidence that could establish that Officer Johnson's communication to OfficerFlemmens about Madison was false or in any way improper. Hence, there is no evidence adequate to establish that Officer Johnson could be held liable even if Flemmens had wrongfully arrested Madison.
Plaintiffs contend that Officer Flemmens lacked probable cause to arrest Madison because trespassing is a misdemeanor offense and Officer Flemmens did not witness Madison commit the offense prior to making a warrantless arrest.
"It is well established that the warrantless arrest of an individual who has committed a misdemeanor in the arresting officer's presence is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if supported by probable cause." Lee v. O'Malley, 533 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (D. Md. 2007). As explained by the Supreme Court, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (). The question of whether probable cause existed, justifying a suspect's arrest, is ultimately a question of law. See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Reddy, 882 F. Supp. 497,500 (D. Md. 1995) aff'd, 101 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiffs have produced no evidence contradicting Officer Flemmens' affidavit that, prior to encountering Madison, Officer Johnson had informed him that...
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