Madrid v. Gomez
| Decision Date | 02 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-17277,97-16237,s. 96-17277 |
| Citation | 150 F.3d 1030 |
| Parties | 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5249, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7389 Alejandro MADRID, Carlos Lutz, Ronnie Dewberry, Steven Villa, Bruce Vorse, and Moses Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James GOMEZ, Steven Cambra, Susan Steinberg, M.D., Robert Ayers, Defendants-Appellants. Alejandro MADRID, Carlos Lutz, Ronnie Dewberry, Steven Villa, Bruce Vorse, Moses Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Salvador Garcia, Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. James GOMEZ, Steven Cambra, Susan Steinberg, M.D., Robert Ayers, Defendants-Appellants, and T.K. Boyll, Sgt., Mark Bray, Correctional Officer, John Hagar, Special Master, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
William Jenkins (argued), Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for defendants-appellants.
David S. Steuer, Susan A. Creighton, and Ellen Solomon (argued), Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, CA; Donald Specter and Steven Fama, Prison Law Office, San Quentin, CA, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Thelton E. Henderson, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-90-03094-TEH.
Before: WOOD, ** HALL, and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
We must decide whether the attorney's fee-limitations provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 apply to cases which were pending at the time of its enactment.
This case arose as a prisoner civil-rights class action challenging the conditions of confinement at the Pelican Bay State Prison in California. Plaintiffs-Appellees Madrid and others ("prisoners") alleged a multitude of constitutional violations, including a pattern and practice of excessive force against them, provision of inadequate medical and psychiatric care, and failure to maintain humane housing conditions. After a three-month trial, the district court verified many of the prisoners' complaints. Finding numerous constitutional infirmities, and concluding that Defendants-Appellants California Department of Corrections Director Gomez and others ("prison officials") would not rectify these problems on their own, the court ordered the parties to collaborate in developing and implementing a remedial plan.
Anticipating that the district court would also order the prison officials to pay the prisoners' legal expenses during the remedial phase--and seeking to minimize the procedural burdens associated with periodic fee awards--the parties stipulated to, and on September 21, 1995, the district court authorized, an "informal process" of expediting the payments of attorney's fees. Pursuant to this stipulation, which reflected the law at the time, see Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), the prison officials were to pay fees at the current market rate for all legal services that were useful and necessary to ensure compliance. 1 If the prison officials ever disputed an amount and refused to pay, the prisoners could seek an order from the district court to resolve the dispute.
Subsequently, on April 26, 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), limiting the amount of attorney's fees that can be awarded to prisoners' counsel, and thereby reducing the burden that prisoners' suits have on the public fisc. Among its restrictions on fee awards, the PLRA caps the maximum hourly rate 2 and prohibits payment of fees that are not "directly and reasonably" incurred in proving a violation of prisoners' rights. 3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).
In October 1996, six months after the effective date of the PLRA, the district court made an award of attorney's fees for legal services performed prior to the enactment of the PLRA. In the following June, the district court ordered payment of fees for services performed subsequent to the enactment of the PLRA. In neither case did the district court invoke the PLRA's limitations. According to the court, applying the attorney's fee provisions to a case which was pending at the time of the statute's enactment would produce a "retroactive effect," violative of "basic notions of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations."
The prison officials have appealed both district court orders. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 Two of our sister circuits have already reached opposing conclusions on the legal question before us. The Fourth Circuit held that the PLRA's attorney's fee provisions do apply to pending cases, and thus to all post-enactment awards, 5 see Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1385-88 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 880, 139 L.Ed.2d 869 (1998), whereas the Sixth Circuit concluded that they do not, see Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246, 249--55 (6th Cir.1998). 6 We must now enter the thicket.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have outlined a three-step process for determining the temporal reach of new civil statutes. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). First, a court must determine "whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach"; a statute can operate retroactively only with a clear statement to that effect. Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Second, in the absence of such an express command, a court must engage in a broader examination of "normal rules of construction," which requires a study of statutory canons and legislative history; these rules "may apply to remove even the possibility of retroactivity (as by rendering the statutory provision wholly inapplicable to a particular case)." Lindh, 521 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 2063. Finally, if the first two steps shed no light on the temporal scope of the statute, it is necessary to fall back on a judicial default rule: Statutes are not to be applied so as to create a "retroactive effect." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483.
Applying this three-part test, we must first determine whether § 803 of the PLRA, the section limiting attorney's fees, contains a clear statement on its temporal reach. If it does, then--notwithstanding any perceived unfairness--we are obliged to give that statement its intended effect (assuming, of course, there is no constitutional violation). See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (). To qualify as a "clear statement," the statutory provision must be unambiguous. See id. at 263, 114 S.Ct. 1483. As with waivers of sovereign immunity, there cannot be any "plausible" alternative interpretation of the statute. 7 See Lindh, 521 U.S. at ---- n. 4, 117 S.Ct. at 2064 n. 4 (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34-37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992)).
Although this standard is a rigorous one, § 803 satisfies it. Apparently overlooked by the Sixth Circuit, see Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246, 1998 WL 177343, * 6 (6th Cir.1998); Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 249-50 (6th Cir.1998), the attorney's fee provisions unmistakably apply to "any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility." PLRA § 803(d)(1) (emphasis added). In any action, attorney's fees "shall not be awarded" unless directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation; in any action, "[n]o award of attorney's fees" shall exceed the prescribed hourly rate. Id. § 803(d)(1), (3) (emphasis added). Thus, regardless of when the case was filed, § 803 applies; the statute, by its terms, targets any post-enactment award. 8 The text is simply not susceptible to another meaning.
The only way to foster an alternative meaning would be to add language to what Congress has written. The attorney's fee provisions operate in "any action," not in "any action filed after the effective date." 9 We may not, and shall not, alter a statute's effect by reading into the text words which Congress chose to omit. Being judges--interpreters, not authors, of the law--we are powerless to do so. Nor can we disregard the plain meaning of the word "any." In its conventional usage, "any" means "ALL--used to indicate a maximum or whole." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 93 (1st ed.1986). It certainly does not mean "some." We find no ambiguity.
In Lindh, the Supreme Court acknowledged, albeit in dictum, the force of categorical language such as "all" and "any." See Lindh, 117 S.Ct. 2064 n. 4. Stressing the word "all"--and noting its "absolute" nature--the Court quoted the unenacted precursor to the statute addressed in Landgraf as an example of language that might qualify as a clear statement: "[This Act] shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act." Id. (emphasis added in Lindh) (alteration in Lindh) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also cited, by way of analogy, the unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity at issue in United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531-32, 115 S.Ct. 1611, 131 L.Ed.2d 608 (1995), and emphasized the word of the moment: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction [over] ... [a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected." Lindh, 521 U.S. at ---- n. 4, 117 S.Ct. at 2064 n. 4 (emphasis in Lindh and Williams) (alteration in Lindh) (citation...
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