Walker v. Bain
| Decision Date | 03 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-CV-76273-DT.,95-CV-76273-DT. |
| Citation | 65 F.Supp.2d 591 |
| Parties | William WALKER, Plaintiff, v. Thomas BAIN, and Janice Metzger, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Deric J. Bomar, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Lamont M. Walton, Leo H. Friedman, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, MI, for Defendants.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .............................................................. 595
II. Attorney Fees Under § 1988 & the PLRA Generally ........................... 596
A. Section 1988 Generally ................................................ 596
B. The PLRA Attorney Fee Provisions ...................................... 596
C. Application to Pending Cases Generally ................................ 598
III. Plaintiff's Vagueness Challenge ........................................... 598
IV. Plaintiff's Equal Protection Challenge .................................... 599
A. Generally ............................................................. 599
B. Illegitimate Governmental Interests ................................... 600
C. Legitimate Governmental Interests ..................................... 601
D. Rational Relationship Between Interests and Distinction ............... 602
1. Deterring Frivolous Filings ........................................ 602
2. Protecting the Public Fisc ......................................... 603
E. Conclusion ............................................................ 605
V. Order ..................................................................... 606
Plaintiff William Walker, a state prisoner, commenced this action against defendants Thomas Bain and Janice Richter (also referred to as Janice Metzger), corrections officers, alleging that defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances and lawsuits. The case was tried to a jury before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On April 23, 1999, the Court entered an amended judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants jointly and severally in the amount of $1.00; in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Bain in the amount of $300.00; and in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Richter in the amount of $125.00.1
On May 7, 1999, plaintiff filed this motion for attorney fees2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and FED.R.Civ.P. 54(d). Plaintiff seeks $36,046.25 in fees. Defendants filed a response on June 9, 1999, arguing that, pursuant to section 803 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), plaintiff is entitled to a fee of only $629.00. Plaintiff filed a reply brief on July 16, 1999, arguing that the PLRA's attorney fee cap is unconstitutional both on vagueness and equal protection grounds. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the provision of the PLRA limiting attorney fees to 150% of the monetary judgment awarded violates the right of prisoners to the equal protection of the laws, and thus is not applicable here.
Before addressing the constitutionality of the PLRA fee cap provision, it is appropriate to discuss, in some detail, the attorney fee structure of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, both in general and as amended by the PLRA.
Section 1988 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The purpose of this provision "is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights claims, and to encourage litigation to enforce the provisions of the civil rights acts and constitutional civil rights provisions." Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Ortiz v. Regan, 980 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.1992). Thus, although the decision to award fees is left to the trial court's broad discretion, which is given substantial deference by the appellate courts, see Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 534 (6th Cir.1995) ("Hadix I"), the court's discretion "must be guided by the statutory presumption that fees should be awarded to successful plaintiffs absent unusual circumstances." Williams v. Hanover Housing Auth., 113 F.3d 1294, 1300 (1st Cir.1997). As the Supreme Court has directed, "a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render an award unjust." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal quotation omitted).
Under the statute, a prevailing party is entitled to a "reasonable attorney's fee." In determining the reasonableness of a fee, a court generally applies the "lodestar" formula. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). Under the lodestar approach, the appropriate starting point "is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). This figure is strongly presumed to represent a reasonable fee, but the court may adjust it upward or downward based on other considerations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. In determining the proper hourly rate under the lodestar approach, a court must try to determine the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community" for the service rendered. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). A number of factors may be considered by the court in making this determination. However, "the actual rate that applicant's counsel can command in the market is itself highly relevant proof of the prevailing community rate." National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1982). Probably the best evidence of a reasonable rate is the rate ordinarily charged by plaintiff's attorney. Id. at 1325; see also, Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987); Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 473 (2d Cir.1974).
Although the lodestar method provides the correct approach for determining a reasonable attorney fee under § 1988 generally, the amount which may be awarded in a case brought by a prisoner is now capped. Specifically, both the availability of fees and their amount have been restricted by section 803 of the PLRA, which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that —
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.
(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).
Few courts have considered the substance of these provisions, addressing rather the preliminary question of whether these provisions apply to cases pending at the time the PLRA was enacted. Specifically, no court has examined the framework for analyzing fees requests. However, after harmonizing the general approach of § 1988 with the more specific requirements of § 1997e(d), and engaging in a bit of streamlining, I conclude that the following approach is proper:
• First, the court should determine whether plaintiff is eligible for an award of attorney fees by determining whether he is a prevailing party under § 1988.
• Second, the court should calculate the lodestar method in the ordinary fashion. In making this calculation, however, the court must: (a) limit the hourly rate sought to the lesser of the prevailing market rate (normally applied under § 1988) or the maximum provided in § 1997e(d)(3); and (b) limit the hours sought to only those hours which were "directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights" as required by § 1997e(1)(A).
• Third, the court should determine whether the amount of the fee determined from the first two steps is proportionate to the relief obtained under § 1997e(d)(1)(B).
• Fourth, if a monetary judgment was awarded the court must, in accordance with § 1997e(d)(2), apply some portion of the judgment, not greater than 25%, to satisfy the attorney fee award and limit the total award to 150% of the judgment.
Cf. Clark v. Phillips, 965 F.Supp. 331, 333-38 (N.D.N.Y.1997) ().
Plaintiff contends that the last step of the above analysis is not dictated by the statute. In his view:
Given Congress' failure to indicate...
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