Madrid v. United States

• Decision Date: 14 March 2014
• Docket Number: EP-12-CR-1260-KC-1,EP-13-CV-134-KC
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
• Parties: AGUSTIN MADRID, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

AGUSTIN MADRID, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

EP-13-CV-134-KC

EP-12-CR-1260-KC-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO DIVISION

SIGNED: March 14, 2014

ORDER

On this day, the Court considered Petitioner's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (the "Motion"), ECF No. 26.¹ By the Motion, Petitioner challenges his sentence on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2012, a grand jury charged Petitioner in a two-count indictment alleging importation and possession with intent to distribute a quantity of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), and 841(a)(1). See ECF No. 9. The Honorable United States Magistrate Judge Norbert J. Garney appointed a federal public defender ("Counsel") to represent Petitioner in the Case. See ECF No. 4.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to both counts before this Court on August 1, 2012, and this Court accepted Petitioner's plea after engaging in a colloquy with Petitioner to confirm that his plea was knowing and voluntary. See Plea Hr'g Tr., Aug. 1, 2012, ECF No. 31, at 2-25, 31-32.At the plea hearing, Petitioner admitted to importing and possessing 19.64 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute. See id. at 24. Petitioner was assisted by the official court interpreter at the plea hearing. See id. at 2-3. There is no plea agreement in the Case. See id. at 19.

At the plea hearing, this Court advised Petitioner that a probation officer would prepare a presentence investigation report ("PSR") in the Case, and that Petitioner would have an opportunity to review the PSR with Counsel and object to any inaccuracies. See id. at 14-15. Petitioner affirmed to the Court that he understood. See id. at 15.

A United States probation officer duly prepared the PSR and disclosed it to both Counsel and the Government. See PSR, ECF No. 22; ECF No. 22-2. The PSR reflects that, at the time he was apprehended, Petitioner admitted to a federal agent that "he had successfully smuggled marijuana through the El Paso ports of entry on six different occasions without being apprehended." PSR 4. The PSR therefore reached the following conclusion:

Based on investigative reports, [Petitioner] is held accountable for the 19.61 kilograms imported during the commission of the instant offense. However, [Petitioner] is also held accountable for the six prior loads of marijuana he admitted to transporting previously. As there is insufficient information to confirm the specific quantities of those prior loads, it is reasonable to infer that the prior loads were of like quantities. Therefore, [Petitioner] is held responsible for a total of 137.27 kilograms of marijuana.

Id. at 5.²

Counsel objected in writing to the consideration of 137.27 kilograms of marijuana as relevant conduct instead of the 19.61 kilograms to which Petitioner admitted at the plea hearing. See ECF No. 22-3. Counsel specifically argued that

[r]eference to any amount other than 19.61 kilograms is highly speculative andlacks evidentiary foundation. Although [Petitioner] admitted to participation on prior occasions, there does not exist any manner to prove the items or weight of said items that [Petitioner] transported on prior trips . . . Here, the presumption that the prior crossings contained the identical type and weight of the narcotic is not warranted.

Id. at 1.

The Government responded to Counsel's objection. See ECF No. 22-4. The United States Probation Office reviewed the objection and the Government's response and concluded that Petitioner should indeed be held responsible for 137.27 kilograms of marijuana. See ECF No. 22-5.

The Court held a sentencing hearing in the Case on October 11, 2012. See Sentencing Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 32. Petitioner was assisted by the official court interpreter at this hearing. See Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 2. Counsel affirmed to the Court that he had received a copy of the PSR and reviewed it with Petitioner. See id. at 3. Counsel then renewed his objection to the Court's consideration of 137.27 kilograms of marijuana as relevant conduct. See id. at 3-7. The Court, "having reviewed all of the information, . . . believe[d] there [wa]s sufficient evidence to support the scoring of the relevant conduct," and accordingly overruled Counsel's objection. Id. at 8. The Court then imposed a sentence of fifty-one months of incarceration and four years of supervised release based in part on the scoring of relevant conduct. Id. at 13.

Petitioner filed the Motion on April 29, 2013. See Mot. The Motion is Petitioner's first motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Case. The Government filed a response to the Motion (the "Response"), ECF No. 33, on July 2, 2013. Petitioner filed a reply to the Response (the "Reply"), ECF No. 38, on September 11, 2013. See also ECF No. 35 (order allowing Petitioner to file the Reply late).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that

[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

After a petitioner has been convicted and has exhausted or waived any right to appeal, a court is normally "entitled to presume that the defendant stands fairly and finally convicted." United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982)). Accordingly, "[r]elief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1994)). Typically, before a court will grant relief pursuant to § 2255, the petitioner must establish that "(1) his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack." United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

Moreover, a collateral challenge to a conviction or sentence should not serve as a substitute for a direct appeal. Frady, 456 U.S. at 165; United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231(5th Cir. 1991). When raising issues of jurisdictional or constitutional magnitude for the first time in a motion seeking collateral relief, a petitioner must either: (1) demonstrate "cause" for not raising the issue on direct appeal and "actual prejudice" resulting from the error, or (2) show that he is "actually innocent" of the crime for which he was convicted. United States v. Torres, 163 F.3d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1999). The cause and actual prejudice standard is "significantly more rigorous than even the plain error standard . . . applied on direct appeal." Gaudet, 81 F.3d at 589. If the petitioner does not meet either burden, then he is procedurally barred from attacking his conviction or sentence. United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1992). This procedural bar does not apply, however, to claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508 (2003).

The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Moreover, "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). "[I]neffective assistance claims are ordinarily brought for the first time on collateral review because of the difficulty of compiling an adequate record by the time of direct appeal." Gaudet, 81 F.3d at 589 n.5. To obtain relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate both (1) that his "counsel's performance was deficient[,]" and (2) that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1994) (summarizing the Strickland standard of review). A failure to establish either prong of this test requires a court to find that counsel's performance was constitutionally effective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ("Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannotbe said that the conviction or . . . sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable."); Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Failure to prove either deficient performance or actual prejudice is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim."); Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 1994) ("A court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.").

The test's performance prong centers on whether counsel's assistance was reasonable in light of all the circumstances at the time of counsel's conduct. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."). In order to obtain relief, a petitioner must establish "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the ...