Madron v. Green Giant Co.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 10982,10982
• Citation: 94 Idaho 747,497 P.2d 1048
• Parties: Ruth MADRON, Claimant-Appellant, v. GREEN GIANT COMPANY, and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1048

497 P.2d 1048

94 Idaho 747

Ruth MADRON, Claimant-Appellant, v. GREEN GIANT COMPANY, and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 10982.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 7, 1972.

Rayborn, Rayborn, Webb & Pike, Twin Falls, for claimant-appellant.

Elam, Burke, Jeppesen, Evans & Boyd, Boise, for defendants-respondents.

BAKES, Justice.

This appeal was generated by an allegedly inadequate compensation award by the Industrial Accident Board to Mrs. Ruth Madron, appellant herein, arising out of a September 10, 1963, accident which occurred during the course of her employment with the Green Giant Company, respondent herein. Following the accident, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, surety-respondent, paid appellant's medical expenses ($793.50) and reimbursed her for disability from work ($1,069.65). At the hearings, the board approved these previously made payments and further ordered compensation to appellant for partial permanent disability for a period of 9 weeks at $30.00 per week (a total of $270). Appellant, claiming that an osteoarthritic hip condition either resulted from or was precipitated by the accident, appeals from that award seeking additional permanent disability compensation.

The circumstances of the accident are not in dispute. Appellant was working the night shift during the corn canning season at Green Giant. At the time of the accident, she was working along a conveyor belt inspecting corn. Appellant stepped back and apparently slipped on a pile of wet corn cobs or shucks. In an attempt to break her fall, appellant twisted severely and endeavored to grasp a beam. She missed the first beam, but caught a lower one and then fell to the floor.

Appellant initially complained primarily of injuries to her shoulders and back. The damage to appellant's hip was not pinpointed until July, 1965, almost two years after the accident, when Dr. Shaw denominated her condition as 'moderately advanced osteoarthritis of the right hip.' By 1967, appellant's hip had degenerated to the point that she could hardly move and was in constant pain. While visiting a daughter in Denver, appellant received operative care, having an artifical (Smith-Peterson) cup implanted in her right hip joint. Although her condition has improved, appellant is still largely immobile and apparently unable to secure gainful employment.

At the conclusion of a series of three hearings at which both the testimony and the depositions of numerous doctors were received, the board determined that the hip condition was not related to the accident, but allowed her a 5% permanent disability as compared to the loss of the leg at the hip for the trauma which appellant had suffered in her fall. The board allowed appellant no compensation for her disabling hi condition. In its findings, the board detailed the testimony of many of the doctors and, in an ultimate finding of fact based on Dr. Shaw's testimony, arrived at the 5% disability figure. From that award, specifically from the denial of any compensation for her hip condition, appellant has appealed, advancing two main assignments of error: (1) The board erred in basing its award primarily on the testimony of Dr. M. B. Shaw, said testimony being incompetent because it was allegedly founded on an incorrect medical history. (2) The board erred in arbitrarily rejecting or ignoring competent testimony presented at the hearing-i.e., the testimony of appellant's personal physician, Dr. Willard Clark. Appellant's assignments of error notwithstanding, we are constrained to affirm the board's award.

In workmen's compensation cases, it is well established that the claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the facts essential to a recovery. E.g., Wilson v. Carl Gilb, Inc., 94 Idaho 106, 482 P.2d 81 (1971); W. Schneider, 12 Workmen's Compensation Text, p. 279 (1959). As stated in Tipton v. Jansson, 91 Idaho 904, 907, 435 P.2d 244, 247 (1967):

'Workmen's compensation for personal injury or death will be granted only if it be shown that an industrial accident has caused the affliction. Appellant had the burden of proving both elements, the accident and its causation of the injury.'

Accord: In re Brown's Death, 84 Idaho 432, 373 P.2d 332 (1962). It is implicit in the board's award that appellant failed to meet her burden in establishing a causal connection between the accident and her hip condition.

In reviewing an Industrial Accident Board ruling on appeal, this court is controlled by well settled principles. In workmen's compensation appeals this court is limited in its study to questions of law. Idaho Constitution, Art. V, § 9. I.C. §§ 72-608, 72-609 (repealed effective January 1, 1972). E.g., Wilson v. Carl Gilb, Inc., supra; Bennett v. Bunker Hill Co., 88 Idaho 300, 399 P.2d 270 (1965). When, as in the case at bar, factual findings of the board are challenged on appeal, our investigation is restricted to a determination of whether the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Duerock v. Acarregui, 87 Idaho 24, 390 P.2d 55 (1964); Walker v. Hogue, 67 Idaho 484, 185 P.2d 708 (1947). Findings of fact of the board will be sustained on appeal if supported by substantial competent evidence. iE.g., Kern v. Shark, 94 Idaho 69, 480 P.2d 915 (1971); Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 93 Idaho 107, 456 P.2d 751 (1969).

With these relevant principles in mind, it is our task to respondent to appellant's arguments. Appellant's first contention can be capsulized as follows: The board relief heavily on Dr. Shaw's testimony in its implied conclusion that the accident has no causative effect on appellant's current hip condition. Appellant suggests that Dr. Shaw based this conclusion on the assumption that appellant suffered no pain at a time in close propinquity with the accident. Appellant notes, however, that she did experience such pain shortly after the accident and reported this fact to Drs. Woodson and Burkholder, both of whom examined her within six months of the accident. Therefore, appellant asserts that Dr. Shaw's conclusion that there is no causative link between the hip condition and the accident is erroneous due to his inaccurate medical history. Appellant then attempts to elicit from Dr. Shaw's testimony an absolute medical rule that if appellant suffered hip-related pain immediately after the accident this factor would establish a causal connection between appellant's hip condition and the accident.

Appellant's argument is not persausive. First of all, the evidence of hip-related pain shortly after the accident referred to by appellant is equivocal. In reports from a November 18, 1963, examination of appellant, Dr. William Woodson, an orthopedic surgeon, noted that appellant 'experienced pain all over her back, but especially in the lower portion, extending through the pelvis to the right groin.' Defendant's Exhibit #1. The bulk of Dr. Woodson's report, however, deals with appellant's subjective complaints concerning her inexplicable back pains. In summarizing his examination Dr. Woodson stated: 'I feel it...