Madson v. Madson

• Decision Date: 21 June 1897
• Citation: 69 Minn. 37,71 N.W. 824
• Parties: MADSON v MADSON ET AL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

69 Minn. 37

71 N.W. 824

MADSONvMADSON ET AL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 21, 1897.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Section 5660, Gen. St. 1894, forbids a party to an action, or a person interested in the event thereof, from testifying indirectly to conversations with or admissions by a deceased or insane party or person, by stating in the form of conclusions of fact the result of such conversations, or the effect of such admissions.

2. On the trial of this action, one of the main issues was whether the plaintiff made an oral contract for the purchase of certain land with the deceased owner thereof. Held, that it was error to permit him to testify that he bought the land for $10 per acre from the deceased, and was to have a deed for the land when he paid for it, and that he had done so. But held, further, that the wife of the plaintiff, who was not a party to the action, was a competent witness to testify to conversations with the deceased relative to the issue, she having no direct and certain pecuniary interest in the event of the action.

3. Where a married man sold land, but his wife did not join therein, she is not estopped to assert, after his death, her title to one-third of the land, by the mere fact that she knew of the sale, and that the purchaser was in possession of the land, and made no objection thereto, during coverture.

Appeal from district court, Freeborn county; John Whytock, Judge.

Action by John Madson against Erick Madson and others. Findings for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Reversed.

John Anderson, for appellants.

John A. Lovely and C. S. Edwards, for respondent.

START, C. J.

This is an action under the statute to determine adverse claims to real estate. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the plaintiff was the owner of the real estate in question, and that none of the defendants had any right or title thereto, and directed that judgment be entered accordingly. The defendants appeal from an order denying their motion for a new trial. The subject-matter of this action is 43 acres of land, the legal title to which, it is conceded by all parties, was in Andrew Madson at the time of his death. The defendants are his widow and heirs at law. The plaintiff claimed title to the premises by virtue of an oral contract with his brother, Andrew Madson, made in 1876, and that he entered into possession of the premises pursuant to such sale, and paid the agreed purchase price therefor. On the trial the plaintiff was permitted, against the objection and exception of the defendants, to testify in his own behalf that he bought 40 acres of the land of his brother for $10 per acre; that he paid $100 in cash, and $50 a year for seven years; and that he paid all that he was to pay for it. And in relation to the three acres he testified that he could pay his brother for the land any time he was a mind to; that the first year there was no interest, but the second year he had to pay $30 on the balance, and 10 per cent. interest. Again, he testified that he was to have a deed for the land as soon as he paid up; that such was the bargain; that he never got a deed of the land. This evidence was elicited in response to several separate questions, all of which were duly objected to by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff was incompetent to testify to any conversations with Andrew Madson, deceased. The objections were all overruled, and the defendants duly excepted. After the testimony was received, the defendants made a motion to strike out all of the evidence tending to show conversations or admissions with or by Andrew Madson. The motion was denied, and defendants excepted. The reception of this evidence is assigned as error.

The statute (Gen. St. 1894, § 5660) provides that: “It shall not be competent for any party to an action, or interested in the event thereof, to give evidence therein of or concerning any conversation with, or admission of, a deceased or insane party, relative to any matter at issue between the parties.” In the case of Chadwick v. Cornish, 26 Minn. 28, 1 N. W. 55, and subsequent cases, it is held that this statute only excludes the testimony of a party, or of one interested in the event of the action, as to oral conversations and admissions with and by the deceased, but that it does not extend to the acts of the deceased, although they may, in law, have the same effect as oral admissions. Counsel for the plaintiff attempts to justify the rulings of the court in receiving and retaining in the record the evidence of the plaintiff as to the contract between him and his deceased brother upon the ground that no evidence of any conversation was given, and that the...