Magana v. People
| Decision Date | 13 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 20SC928 |
| Parties | Christopher MAGANA, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Alexis King, District Attorney, First Judicial District, Colleen R. Lamb, Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Golden, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 Defendant, Christopher Magana, started a fire that engulfed two cars and a duplex. A jury found Magana guilty of eighteen counts of arson, including two counts of first degree arson, each of which the prosecution had charged as a crime of violence ("COV") based on Magana's use of "fire and accelerant" as a deadly weapon.
¶2 The jury also found that both counts of first degree arson involved the use of a deadly weapon. But at sentencing, the trial court surmised that the jury had reached its sentence-enhancement finding based on fire alone. The trial court concluded that first degree arson necessarily requires the use of fire. Without more, it refused to sentence Magana under the COV statute.
¶3 A division of the court of appeals affirmed the convictions, but it concluded that the trial court should have imposed the COV enhancer.
¶4 We address two arguments Magana makes in challenging the judgment of the court of appeals. First, he claims his eighteen convictions are multiplicitous. (In other words, he believes that the trial court improperly imposed multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.) More specifically, he contends that the controlling unit of prosecution for all forms of arson is the act of starting a fire or causing an explosion—rather than the number of buildings torched, property burned, or people endangered—and, therefore, he should have been convicted on just three counts—one count for each of the categories of harm. Second, he argues that the General Assembly didn't intend fire to serve as both a constituent element of first degree arson and a basis for COV sentence enhancement.
¶5 We hold that (1) the unit of prosecution under the first-, second-, and fourth-degree-arson statutes is, respectively, each building or occupied structure damaged or destroyed, each person's property (other than a building or occupied structure) damaged or destroyed, and each person endangered; and (2) fire alone is not a deadly weapon for the purpose of prosecuting first degree arson as a COV. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the division's judgment.
¶6 Late one night in April 2016, Magana set fire to his ex-girlfriend's car. The fire spread to another car and an adjacent duplex occupied by fourteen people, all of whom, fortunately, escaped uninjured. An investigation revealed three different ignition points on the ex-girlfriend's car.
¶7 The prosecution charged Magana with eighteen counts of arson: two counts of first degree arson, one for each unit of the duplex, § 18-4-102, C.R.S. (2021); two counts of second degree arson, one for each car, § 18-4-103, C.R.S. (2021); and fourteen counts of fourth degree arson, one for each person endangered, § 18-4-105, C.R.S. (2021).
¶8 Colorado divides arson into four degrees, spanning "offenses involving damage or destruction, on the one hand, and endangerment, on the other hand." People v. Magana , 2020 COA 148, ¶ 38, 490 P.3d 948, 957. The provisions break down as follows:
¶9 The prosecution also charged a COV sentence enhancer for the first-degree-arson counts on the grounds that Magana used "fire and accelerant" as a deadly weapon. See §§ 18-1.3-406(1)(a), (2)(a)(I)(A), (2)(a)(II)(G), - 401(10)(a), (b)(XII), C.R.S. (2021) ( together, in relevant part, that using a deadly weapon during the commission of first degree arson can more than double a defendant's potential sentence).
¶10 During jury deliberations, the jury asked if "fire itself" could be considered a deadly weapon. The trial court said yes. The jury found Magana guilty of all eighteen counts of arson and found that Magana used a deadly weapon in committing first degree arson, thereby triggering the COV sentence enhancer.
¶11 Following additional briefing from the parties, however, the trial court chose to disregard the jury's deadly weapon finding. The court reasoned that allowing fire to be classified as a deadly weapon could make every first-degree-arson case a COV. It further determined that if every first-degree-arson conviction is a COV, the provision classifying arson by explosive as a per se COV1 would be superfluous. This result would be contrary to legislative intent. The trial court, therefore, sentenced Magana without imposing the enhancer.
¶12 On appeal, Magana argued that the unit of prosecution for arson is the number of fires set by the defendant, not the number of buildings or property burned or people endangered, as the prosecution claimed. On cross-appeal, the prosecution argued that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it rejected the jury's finding that the first-degree-arson counts involved the use of a deadly weapon for COV purposes.
¶13 The division agreed with the prosecution on both questions. Magana , ¶¶ 53, 69–70, 490 P.3d at 960, 963. In its analysis of the first -degree-arson statute, the division found it compelling that the General Assembly explicitly provided that "[i]f a building is divided into units for separate occupancy, any unit not occupied by the defendant is a ‘building of another.’ " Id. at ¶ 41, 490 P.3d at 958 (quoting § 18-4-101(4), C.R.S. (2019) ). The division therefore held that the unit of prosecution for first degree arson is each dwelling or structure burned. Id. at ¶ 47, 490 P.3d at 959.
¶14 Turning to second degree arson, the division concluded that while the more amorphous term "any property" could imply an aggregating effect irrespective of the separately identifiable pieces of property damaged, the phrase "of another" that follows that term demonstrates legislative intent to confine the unit of prosecution to each person whose property is damaged or destroyed. Id. at ¶ 50, 490 P.3d at 959 ; see § 18-4-103(1).
¶15 And, focusing on fourth degree arson's distinction between whether "a person" or "only property" is endangered, the division held that the legislature intended to permit separate charges for each person placed in danger. Magana , ¶ 52, 490 P.3d at 960 ; see § 18-4-105.
¶16 Finally, the division concluded that the same evidence proving an element of first degree arson by fire could support a sentence enhancer because, unlike first degree arson by explosives, the prosecution would still need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fire could cause death or serious bodily injury. Magana , ¶¶ 60–69, 490 P.3d at 961–63.
¶17 We granted certiorari.2
¶18 We review the relevant statutes de novo to determine the General Assembly's intended unit of prosecution. Woellhaf v. People , 105 P.3d 209, 215 (Colo. 2005) ; McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. We also review de novo whether a defendant's conviction violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. People v. Arzabala , 2012 COA 99, ¶ 19, 317 P.3d 1196, 1203.
¶19 The unit of prosecution is the way the General Assembly, in drafting a criminal statute, divides a defendant's conduct "into discrete acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple offenses." Woellhaf , 105 P.3d at 215. "To determine the unit of prosecution, we look exclusively to the statute," and we seek to "ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent." Id. "[W]e read scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we must avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous ...." McCoy , ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389. If the statute is unambiguous, "we apply it as written." People v. Jones , 2020 CO 45, ¶ 54, 464 P.3d 735, 746. However, if "the language is ambiguous, meaning it is silent or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may use extrinsic aids of construction." Id. at ¶ 55, 464 P.3d at 746.
¶20 We start by examining the constitutional backdrop against which this issue of...
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