Magaraci v. Marie.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1943
• Citation: 130 Conn. 323,33 A.2d 424
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MAGARACI v. SANTA MARIE.

130 Conn. 323

33 A.2d 424

MAGARACI v. SANTA MARIE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 22, 1943.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas of Waterbury; Klau, Judge.

Action by Joseph Magaraci against Mary Santa Marie to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by defendant's negligence and by a nuisance maintained by defendant. From verdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed and filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the lower court.

No error. Plea to the jurisdiction overruled.

Walter E. Monagan, of Waterbury, for appellant (defendant).

Michael V. Blansfield and Irving W. Pasternak, both of Waterbury, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

ELLS, Judge.

The plaintiff brought this negligence action in 1940 to ‘the Court of Common Pleas, at Waterbury, for the Judicial District of Waterbury,’ claiming $15,000 damages. At that time the court had ‘concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court of all civil actions in which equitable relief only shall be demanded and of appeals from assessments of benefits or damages made by the city of Waterbury or by the borough of Naugatuck, and shall have jurisdiction of all other civil actions wherein the matter in demand shall exceed one hundred dollars, provided the parties or either of them reside within the limits of the judicial district of Waterbury.’ General Statutes, § 5440.

The case was tried in May, 1942, for $12,500. At that time there had been a change in the statutes, and the general jurisdiction of the new Court of Common Pleas was limited to a maximum of $2,500, but it was provided that the new court ‘shall retain final jurisdiction of all cases * * * made returnable to the several courts of common pleas throughout the state under statutes existing prior to July 1, 1941.’ General Statutes, Sup.1941, § 812f. The defendant appealed to this court and has filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging that the lower court at no time had jurisdiction of the case and that the judgment is void and of no effect.

We have, since the filing of the plea, sustained the authority and status of the Court of Common Pleas as created by the act of 1941. Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 32 A.2d 547. Therefore it was a duly constituted court which entered judgment for $12,500; and by virtue of § 812f it retained the jurisdiction it had over this action at the time it was returned.

There remains the question whether § 5440 is unconstitutional because it created a court, operating within a limited area, which was not inferior to the Superior Court. Our decision in Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, supra, disposes of the defendant's contention. The statute evidently distinguished between ‘civil actions' and administrative appeals by its express mention of certain of the latter. For example, appeals in administrative matters not mentioned, such as those from compensation commissioners, the liquor control commission and zoning boards, and unemployment compensation appeals, still had to be taken to the Superior Court. There were other limitations. One was that one party must reside within the district, which eliminated jurisdiction in those cases where ‘neither of them is an inhabitant of this state.’ General Statutes, § 5444. Another was that, by judicial construction, its jurisdiction did not include actions ‘wherein the title to hand is to be tried,’ if the land by outside the district; Martin v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, 72 Conn. 698, 46 A. 152, 153; whereas the requirement for such actions in the Superior Court in the county where the land lies (General Statutes, § 5444) goes merely to venue, as there is but one Superior Court throughout the state. Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683, 684, 169 A. 58. In one case the Superior Court sitting in Waterbury could try title to lands in Hartford County if the parties waived any question of venue; in the other, the Court of Common Pleas could not, because jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent. Cf. Conn.App.Proc., §§ 31, 32.

Approaching the problem from another angle, under § 5441 equitable relief against causes pending or judgments rendered in the Superior Court can be brought only in that court; the Court of Common Pleas at Waterbury could not entertain such an action, Cronan v. Mersick, 80 Conn. 593, 595, 69 A. 938; but the Superior Court could entertain one as regards an action in that Common Pleas Court. The Superior Court could grant a writ of prohibition as regards the Common Pleas Court, § 5917; or a writ of mandamus against one of its judges. Borough of Ansonia v. Studley, 67 Conn. 170, 176, 34 A. 1030; see Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, supra, 130 Conn. 131, 132, 32 A.2d 547.

Appeals from the Probate Courts for the districts lying within the territorial limits of the judicial district of Waterbury could be taken only to the Superior Court in the county where such Court of Probate was held, General Statutes, § 4990; so also as to appeals from doings of commissioners, § 4993, and commissioners on insolvent estates, § 4920. The criminal jurisdiction of the court was drastically limited. General Statutes, § 6419. It only heard cases upon appeal from justice and police courts.

This compilation does not exhaust the differences in the jurisdiction of the two courts, nor the restrictions which our statutes placed upon the jurisdiction of the Waterbury court. Putting together limitations upon the powers of the latter court, as compared with the powers of the Superior Court, we conclude that the legislature did not exceed its power in creating the Waterbury court as it existed at the time this action was brought.

We have not overlooked the fact that we said in the Walkinshaw case, supra, 130 Conn. 141, 32 A.2d 547, that the legislature could not create a court with jurisdiction equal to that of the Superior Court, even in a portion of the state. The statement does not apply to the present situation because the Waterbury court did not have jurisdiction at all equal to that of the Superior Court. The plea to the jurisdiction is not well grounded.

This action was brought in behalf of a twelve-year-old boy who picked up a dynamite cap lying in the driveway of the defendant's premises, took it home, stuck a pin into it and had a part of his hand blown off when it exploded. The jury brought in a verdict for $12,500, and the defendant appealed from the denial of her motion to set it aside as against the evidence, and as excessive, and also from the judgment, assigning error in the charge.

There was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant owned a two-family house, and lived on the first floor with her husband and her three children. The house faced the highway and was about fifteen feet from it. Two one-car garages were built into the house, on the ground level, and driveways from each garage led to the highway. The defendant and her husband occupied one of these garages, and back of it, accessible only through the garage, was a small cellar. During the first few months of 1940, the husband, a contractor, had occasion to use dynamite and dynamite caps in an excavating job, and with the defendant's knowledge and permission he stored what were left over from day to day in this back room. The defendant kept the garage doors...