Magaw v. Beals

• Decision Date: 01 July 1922
• Citation: 136 N.E. 174,242 Mass. 321
• Parties: MAGAW v. BEALS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

242 Mass. 321

136 N.E. 174

MAGAW

v.BEALS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

July 1, 1922.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Patrick M. Keating, Judge.

Action by Mary K. Magaw against Sidney L. Beals. Verdicts for plaintiff, and case reported for determination by the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment for plaintiff on the verdicts as reduced.

The first count of the declaration was waived, the second count sought to recover damages for eviction from premises leased by plaintiff, and the third count was for the unlawful attachment and conversion of household goods exempt from attachment. The jury found for plaintiff on both counts, and, on motion of defendant, the verdict on the second count was reduced to $2,000, and the verdict on the third count to $600.Stanley A. Dearborn, of Boston, for plaintiff.

Philip Nichols, of Boston, for defendant.

BRALEY, J.

The jury would have been warranted in finding that 10 or 12 years prior to March 17, 1919, the record title to the premises in question was in one Albert E. Little, an attorney at law, who formerly had been in the same law office as the defendant. While Little had no beneficial interest, the title being taken in his name for undisclosed reasons, the defendant, his brother, and his sister's husband, Frank A. Bourne, who acted as trustees under an unrecorded trust deed, were the real owners. Little when he acquired title simultaneously reconveyed to the trustees; but the deed never was recorded, and thereafter he took no part in the management and control of the property, and until informed of the controversy out of which the case at bar arose he was not aware that the deeds were unrecorded, leaving him the owner of record, and ‘that no one was authorized by him to rent the property in his name.’ The defendant testified that after negotiations with the defendant he leased on February 27, 1919, the premises referred to in the record as 851 Beacon street, to the plaintiff for a term of 6 months at a monthly rental payable in advance of ‘one hundred dollars' beginning March 1, 1919. The lease was executed by the plaintiff, and by Albert E. Little, Sidney L. Beals, Attorney,’ and there was evidence that at the time of signing he explained to her ‘that he had sole charge of the property and that he was the only person for her to deal with.’ The plaintiff who had entered into occupation made the first payment. But more or less dispute shortly sprung up over repairs which the plaintiff claimed the defendant agreed to make, and over a water bill the defendant had paid for which he contended the plaintiff should reimburse him. The plaintiff then complained to Little of the conduct of the defendant, and as a result of the information Little executed to the trustees a deed of the premises which was placed on record March 17, 1919.

The defendant by assuming to act as the agent of Little impliedly held himself out as having authority to lease in Little's name to the plaintiff, who apparently, or it could be so determined by the jury, dealt with him in good faith and in reliance on his representations of authority. Milliken v. Thorndike, 103 Mass. 382. By so doing he made himself personally liable. And this is so even if he knew of his lack of authority and assumed to act as if he were authorized, or whether he honestly was of opinion that he possessed authority when as matter of fact he had none. Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336, 6 Am. Rep. 240;May v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 112 Mass. 90;Conant v. Alvord, 166 Mass. 311, 44 N. E. 250. A tenant who enters into the relation of landlord and tenant by demise and occupation as in the present case would be estopped to deny his landlord's title. Cobb v. Arnold, 8 Metc. 398. And the defendant, who acted with full knowledge of the title at the time of the demise, is estopped as between himself and the plaintiff from denying the validity of the execution of the lease. Howe v. Merrill, 5 Cush. 80.

While there was evidence that counsel then acting for the plaintiff tendered the rent a day or two after the 1st of April and the proportionate part of the water rates due in April to the defendant who refused to accept for the sole reason, that the plaintiff owed him money advanced in settlement of a water bill left unpaid by a prior tenant, which he testified she had agreed to pay, and the jury could say on the plaintiff's evidence that she never made the promise, and that the money paid by the defendant formed no part of the water rates accruing under the lease, yet the tender was insufficient, and she was in default. Dewey v. Humphrey, 5 Pick. 187. See Schayer v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 163 Mass. 322, 323, 324, 39 N. E. 1110. The defendant, however,...