Magee v. J.R. Simplot Co.
| Decision Date | 12 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 4:19-cv-00353-REP |
| Parties | SUSAN MAGEE, LANCE MAGEE, Plaintiffs, v. J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, a Nevada Corporation Authorized to do Business in the State of Idaho, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE (Dkt. 26)
Pending before the Court are the following motions: (i) Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine (Dkt. 26); (ii) Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Opinion Testimony and Animation Video by Defendant's Expert Torrey Roberts (Dkt. 36); (iii) Plaintiffs' Motion to Exempt the Claims of Lance Magee and Susan Magee From Limitations Imposed by I.C. § 6-1603 and to Submit the Issue of Recklessness to the Jury (Dkt. 37); (iv) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Include Prayer for Punitive Damages (Dkt. 39); (v) Defendant's First Motion in Limine (Dkt. 54); (vi) Plaintiffs' Second Motion in Limine (Dkt. 65); and (vii) Defendant's Second Motion in Limine (Dkt. 70). Having carefully considered the record, participated in oral argument, and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order:
BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury action brought by Plaintiffs Susan and Lance Magee ("Plaintiffs") against Defendant J.R. Simplot Company ("Defendant"), arising out of a December 24, 2018 vehicle collision that occurred on Smoky Canyon Road (the "Road") in Caribou County, Idaho. Mr. Magee was driving a 2016 GMC Sierra Truck with Mrs. Magee in the front-passenger seat on a trip to go snowmobiling in the Diamond Creek drainage, driving uphill on the Road and pulling a snowmobile trailer. Headed downhill on the Road from the Smoky Canyon Mine, Defendant's employee was driving a 1997 Kenworth Diesel Truck with an attached snowplow. At a curve in the Road, the two vehicles collided. Plaintiffs were injured in the accident and bring this case against Defendant, asserting claims for (i) negligence, (ii) negligent hiring and retention, (iii) respondeat superior liability, and (iv) violating the "extreme caution" standard in the operation of a commercial motor vehicle. Defendant answers and alleges, among other defenses, the affirmative defense of comparative negligence.
"A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a particular area." United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). There is noexpress authority for motions in limine in either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence. But see Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). Nevertheless, these motions are well-recognized in practice and by case law. See, e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 (2000). The key function of a motion in limine is to "exclude prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 (1984).
Judges have broad discretion in ruling on motions in limine. See United States v. Torres, 794 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) (). Moreover, such rulings are provisional and "not binding on the trial judge" or the court. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 758, n.3. It is sometimes necessary to defer ruling until trial when a better estimate of the impact of the evidence on the jury can be made by the trial judge. See Crawford v. City of Bakersfield, 2016 WL 5870209, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Generally, motions in limine excluding broad categories of evidence are disfavored, as such issues are more fairly dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises. See Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975).
Here, most of the parties' motions in limine involve challenges to relevance under Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 401 and unfair prejudice under FRE 403. FRE 401 provides that "[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. "[R]elevance is a very low threshold to overcome in determining the admissibility of evidence." Taylor v. Shippers Transport Exp., Inc., 2014 WL 7499046, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402.
FRE 403 provides that "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presentingcumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Importantly, Rule 403 is not designed to exclude all prejudicial evidence, only "unfairly" prejudicial evidence substantially outweighed by its probative value. See United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000). Id. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has an "'undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.'" Id. (quoting Adv. Comm. Notes to Fed. R. Evid. 403). The balancing of the unfair prejudice and probative value lies within the court's discretion. See United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine seeks to preclude the introduction of the following evidence at trial: (i) Mr. Magee's consumption of alcohol before the accident; (ii) testimony from Defendant's expert relating to the use of snow chains; (iii) Plaintiffs' failure to wear safety restraints; (iv) Mr. Magee's citation for driving left-of-center; and (v) testimony from Defendant's expert on how Mr. Magee could have avoided impacting the snowplow had he been driving 22 miles per hour ("mph") or less. See generally Pls.' MIL (Dkt. 26). Each argument is addressed below.
Mr. Magee testified that he drank one beer on the morning of the accident. See id. at 1.1 Plaintiffs argue that such evidence is inadmissible under FRE 403 because there is no evidencethat Mr. Magee's consumption of the beer had any impact, effect, or influence on the accident later that day, yet the jury would unfairly speculate that it did. See id. at 1-2.
Defendant concedes that it cannot prove that Mr. Magee was operating his vehicle while intoxicated. See Def.'s Opp. to Pls.' First MIL at 3 (Dkt. 27). Even so, it argues that Mr. Magee's consumption of the beer is relevant under FRE 401 to its comparative negligence defense, and the jury should determine whether it influenced the accident. See id. Further, under FRE 403, Defendant argues that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because any prejudice can be cured by Mr. Magee's presentation of contrary evidence. See id. The Court agrees.
That Mr. Magee drank alcohol before the accident is relevant to Defendant's affirmative defense of comparative negligence. Indeed, ingesting any intoxicant prior to an accident has a tendency to make a fact of consequence - the exercise of ordinary care by that party - more or less probable. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. Even if the probative value is slight (because Mr. Magee allegedly drank only one beer two hours before the accident), it must be "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice to be excluded. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here, Plaintiffs' Motion fails.
The prejudice that might arise from the jury hearing that Mr. Magee drank one beer is neither great nor unfair. Beer is a legal intoxicant, unlike say, heroin. Drinking alcohol prior to driving is not per se illegal. Mr. Magee made the wise decision to allegedly consume only one beer before he took the wheel, and approximately two hours before the accident. The risk that the jury would be inflamed by this set of facts is slight. Yet, it was Mr. Magee's voluntary choice to take that drink and it bears on his exercise of ordinary care, even if Defendant cannot prove that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. It is true that the evidence may be prejudicial (as evidence tends to be), but under these circumstances, it is not unfairly so. See,e.g., United States v. Akpa, 120 F. App'x 717, 720 (9th Cir. 2005) (). That is because Mr. Magee can present contrary evidence that he was not impaired, and he is in the best position to do so. In short, on this record, it cannot be said that the evidence's probative value is "substantially outweighed" by a danger of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Harley, 2018 WL 11236171, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2018) () (quoting Deters v. Equifax Credit Infor. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine is denied in this respect.2
Plaintiffs argue that there was no mandate that snow chains were required, or even advised, while driving on the Road. See Pls.' MIL at 2 (Dkt. 26). Thus, according to Plaintiffs, Defendant's proposed expert testimony that snow chains would have...
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