Maggard v. O'Connell
| Decision Date | 29 March 1983 |
| Citation | 227 U.S.App.D.C. 62,703 F.2d 1284 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action No. 80-02711).
William F. Hanrahan and Jeanne K. Beck, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellants.
David J. Frantz, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for appellee.
Before WILKEY and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges and McGOWAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.
Appellee Hester Maggard filed suit in federal district court seeking retirement benefits allegedly due her husband from the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds. The district court originally granted summary judgment for the Trustees of the Funds, but that grant was reversed by a prior opinion of this court. See Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568 (D.C.Cir.1982). After further proceedings the district court granted summary judgment for Mrs. Maggard and this appeal followed. We now affirm, largely in agreement with the district court and for additional reasons.
Edmond Maggard filed an application for a pension on 17 March 1966 with the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds (Trustees). A series of denials and reapplications culminated in a final denial of the petition in May 1980. Maggard having died four months before, his wife then sued, both individually and as administratrix of his estate.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Trustees in a 2-page order which merely deferred to their determination that Maggard had not worked long enough as a miner to qualify for a pension. There was no discussion of the evidence.
This court remanded, noting that the district court had a responsibility to examine the entire record with care to ensure that the Trustees' decision was adequately supported. The court noted further:
[O]ur understanding of the issues makes it appear that, indeed, substantial evidence does not support appellees' position. While we may leave open the possibility that the district court may ultimately conclude the contrary, our impression underlines the appropriateness of a remand for fuller, more explicit consideration and analysis by the district court.
671 F.2d 568, 572-73 (D.C.Cir.1982).
On remand, the district court permitted new evidence to be filed concerning Maggard's claims, which was incorporated into the record and reviewed by the Trustees. When the Trustees sustained their decision to deny Maggard's pension application, both sides again moved for summary judgment in the district court. This time the district court granted summary judgment for Mrs. Maggard.
An ex-miner may be awarded a pension upon any one of three showings. First, he may show that he worked in the mines for 20 of the 30 years immediately preceding the pension application. See Resolution 83 at 5, reprinted in Joint Appendix (JA) vol. II at 254, 258. For some time, apparently, this was the only way in which a pension could be earned. However, according to the terms of the settlement in Blankenship v. United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Fund of 1950, Nos. 2186-69 & 2350-69 (settlement approved by D.D.C. 2 Jan. 1973), reprinted in JA vol. II at 223, a miner otherwise ineligible can still qualify for a pension if he meets either of two tests adopted in Blankenship.
Under Blankenship Test One a miner is eligible if he can show, inter alia, that he completed at least 20 years of classified service at any time, including at least 5 years of "signatory service" after 28 May 1946. 1 Blankenship Settlement at 4, reprinted in JA vol. II at 226.
Under Blankenship Test Two a miner is eligible if he completed 20 years of classified service prior to 1953, including any signatory service at all after 28 May 1946, and was physically unable to satisfy the "20-out-of-30" requirement because "permanently disabled as a direct result of industry service." Blankenship Settlement at 5, reprinted in JA vol. II at 227.
Another principle of importance to this case derives from the settlement agreement in Maggard v. Huge, No. 76-2219 (settlement approved by D.D.C. 14 Mar. 1979). A Trustees' Policy Statement adopted as part of that agreement, reprinted in JA vol. II at 271, provides up to 4 years additional credit to miners if a mine-related disability or disease "was the direct and proximate cause of applicant's inability to work in the coal industry for a period of time of ascertainable duration." Id.
It is important to note that the Maggard v. Huge credit could be applied to either of the two Blankenship tests. Under Blankenship Test One a miner with a Maggard v. Huge disability would need only 16 years of classified service including at least one year of signatory service. Under Blankenship Test Two such a miner would need 16 years of classified service prior to 1953, including any signatory service at all after 28 May 1946. In the latter case, however, the miner would also need to show that he had a permanent mine-related disability, not merely one that left him unable to work in the mines for an ascertainable period.
The Maggard v. Huge disability test and the Blankenship Two disability test are different, despite an apparently contrary statement in the Trustees' brief. Brief for Appellants at 32. Thus, for example, an injury that kept a worker out of the mines for two years, after which he returned to work, would not satisfy the Blankenship Test Two requirement even though it gave rise to two years credit under Maggard v. Huge.
The years after 1936 are not in dispute. Maggard had 7 1/4 years of classified service after 1936, including 4 1/4 years of signatory service. He ceased mining altogether in 1956 at the age of 48. 2
In addition, the Trustees have credited Maggard with 6 1/2 years of classified service for the period 1921 to 1936. Thus, it is undisputed that Maggard had at least 13 3/4 years of classified service, including 4 1/4 years of signatory service.
To qualify under Blankenship Test One, therefore, Maggard needs at least 3/4 year of signatory credit by dint of a Maggard v. Huge disability and 5 1/2 years of classified service by way of additional credit for 1921-1936 (minus up to 3 1/4 years possible additional Maggard v. Huge disability credit). Under this test, Maggard need not show any permanent disability, but only that he was prevented by a disease or injury from working as a miner for a given period of time of at least 3/4 year.
To qualify under Blankenship Test Two, Maggard needs to show a permanent mine-related disability (for which he will also get 4 years of Maggard v. Huge disability credit) and an additional 2 1/4 years credit during 1921-1936.
Mrs. Maggard claims that, with the exception of the latter half of 1929, her husband worked full-time in the coal industry from January 1921 through December 1936. The Trustees, however, have only given him credit for 6 1/2 of those 15 1/2 years. Thus, 9 years are in dispute: specifically, January 1921 to October 1925 (4 3/4 years); 3 months of 1929; half of 1930; and January 1931 to July 1934 (3 1/2 years).
Year Maggard Claims Trustees Grant In Dispute
--------------------------------------------------
1921 1 0 1
1922 1 0 1
1923 1 0 1
1924 1 0 1
1925 1 1/4 3/4
1926 1 1 0
1927 1 1 0
1928 1 1 0
1929 1/2 1/4 1/4
1930 1 1/2 1/2
1931 1 0 1
1932 1 0 1
1933 1 0 1
1934 1 1/2 1/2
1935 1 1 0
1936 1 1 0
------------------------------------------
15 1/2 6 1/2 9
Post-
1936 7 1/4 7 1/4 0
------------------------------------------
Totals 22 3/4 13 3/4 9
------------------------------------------
Mrs. Maggard claims that, upon his retirement from the coal industry (said to be in 1958), her husband was totally disabled by both pneumoconiosis (otherwise known as silicosis or "black lung"), a mine-related disease, and arteriosclerotic heart disease.
The Trustees, on the other hand, claim "that Maggard was not disabled by pneumoconiosis as of the date of his last coal industry employment in 1956, and that pneumoconiosis was not the cause of Maggard's inability to work in the coal industry during the period 1956 to 1960." Brief for Appellants at 17. Rather, at that time, he suffered from arteriosclerotic heart disease and myocardial failure. His problems with silicosis did not arise until 1963.
The district court granted Maggard complete credit for the 9 years in dispute during the period 1921-1936.
The district court did not reach this issue, believing it to be foreclosed by the prior opinion of this court.
The issue of whether Maggard was prevented from continued employment in the coal industry on account of an occupational disease ... is precluded by the scope of the mandate from the Court of Appeals. The fact that Maggard was disabled by pneumonoconocis [sic] at the time of his retirement was never challenged...
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