Role Models America, Inc. v. Harvey
| Decision Date | 28 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 01-1595(RMU). |
| Citation | 459 F.Supp.2d 28 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | ROLE MODELS AMERICA, INC., Plaintiff, v. Francis HARVEY, Secretary of the Army,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> et al., Defendants. |
Gary M. Hnath, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Robert F. Condon, Washington, DC, Joseph Randall Whaley, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiff.
Kevin K. Robitaille, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS'
The plaintiff, Role Models America, Inc. ("RMA"), brings suit against the defendants, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Department of Education, for wrongfully depriving the plaintiff of a fair opportunity to compete for and acquire a surplus military base located at Fort Ritchie ("the Fort Ritchie property"). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("APA"), and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq. ("DBCRA"). In particular, the plaintiff's allege that the defendants failed to properly screen parties who were interested in the Fort Ritchie property before committing to convey the property to a state-created development corporation, PenMar Development Corporation ("PenMar"). The plaintiff also claims that PenMar will immediately sell, or "flip," the property to a third party, Corporate Office Properties Trust ("COPT"). Because COPT allegedly plans to build two modern buildings on the site the plaintiff claims that the Secretary of the Army's ("the Army") proposed conveyance of the Fort Ritchie property to PenMar violates the APA and the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq. ("NHPA"). The defendants move to dismiss arguing that the D.C. Circuit's previous rulings in this case bar some of the plaintiff's claims and that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring its remaining claims. Because the plaintiff cannot identify a personal, redressable injury for its APA, DBCRA or NHPA claims and because the D.C. Circuit's rulings bar some of the plaintiff's claims, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The court takes a step back to review the protracted procedural history of this case. The case originates on September 8, 1995, when Congress designated the Fort Ritchie property for closure under the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act ("DBCRA"), 10 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18. After its closure, the Fort Ritchie property became surplus real property available for purchase by third parties under the Federal Property Administrative Services Act ("FPASA"), 40 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., and under the DBCRA. Am. Compl. ¶ 18; Role Models Am. Inc. v. White, 193 F.Supp.2d 76, 77 (D.D.C.2002) ("Role Models I"). The DBCRA creates statutory procedures for the sale of closed bases. Specifically, the DBCRA requires that the Secretary of Defense and a Local Redevelopment Authority ("LRA")2 conduct a screening for non-commercial uses of the land by issuing a notice of the surplus real property to both (1) representatives of the homeless and (2) "other interested parties." 10 U.S.C. § 2905(b)(7)(f). Once the LRA takes these steps and formulates a redevelopment plan for the property, the LEA may then submit the plan to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") for approval. Id.
The plaintiff, RMA, is a non-profit Maryland corporation seeking to establish a military-style high school for at-risk youth.3 Mem. Op. (May 18, 2005) ("Role Models II") at 2. In 1996, RMA sought to acquire the Fort Ritchie property for the site of its school. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. The plaintiff previously rented the property. Id. ¶ 53.
In 1997, the state of Maryland designated PenMar as the. LRA for implementing the local redevelopment plan at the Fort Ritchie property. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-26. According to the plaintiff, however, PenMar denied it an opportunity to compete for the Fort Ritchie property. Id. ¶ 136. On May 10, 2002, the plaintiff filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, id. ¶ 151, and four days later, the defendants approved PenMar's plan for the Fort Ritchie property and purported to convey the property to PenMar. Id. ¶ 118. Subsequently, in 2004, PenMar voted to sign a Purchase and Sale Agreement to sell Fort Ritchie Property to COPT. Id. ¶ 60.
After an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the Fort Ritchie property in 2001, the plaintiff brought suit asking the court to enjoin the conveyance from the Army to PenMar. Role Models Am. Inc. v. White, 317 F.3d 327, 331 (D.C.Cir.2003) ("Role Models II"). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants did not follow the required procedures under the DBCRA, thereby depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity to compete for and acquire the Fort Ritchie property. Am. Compl. ¶ 145.
The D.C. Circuit ruled on February 3, 2003 that the defendants' conveyance procedures were defective. Role Models II, 317 F.3d at 333. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the defendants failed to give notice of the availability of the property to potential public benefit conveyees, like the plaintiff. Id. The circuit court remanded the case, instructing this court to enter a permanent injunction against the conveyance from the Army to PenMar until the defendants remedied the procedural errors of the screening process. Id. at 333-34. In October 2003, the defendants issued remedial notices and conducted a screening of "other interested parties" like RMA who may be eligible to obtain the property. Role Models III. The plaintiff submitted its application for a no-cost public benefit conveyance of the property. Id. at 14. Defendant Department of Education, however, subsequently denied the plaintiff's application. Id.
On October 15, 2004, the defendants moved to dismiss, alleging that they cured all procedural deficiencies as required by the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 12-17. The court denied their motion, concluding that although the defendants conducted the additional screening, the defendant did not conduct the screening before it submitted the redevelopment plan to HUD as required by the DBCRA. Id. at 16-17. Consequently, the defendants remained enjoined from conveying the property to PenMar. Id.
On January 1, 2006, the plaintiff amended its complaint to argue that it is a homeless provider and that PenMar did not properly screen for homeless interests when it issued remedial notices in 2003. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80, 85. The amended complaint also alleges that the defendants violated the NHPA by agreeing to convey the property to PenMar. Id. ¶¶ 141-145. On February 17, 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, claiming that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring its complaint under the APA, the DBCRA, or the NHPA. The court now turns to the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C.Cir.2004) ().
Because "subject-matter jurisdiction is an `Art. III as well as a statutory requirement[,] no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'" Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982)). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 343 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
Because subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the court's power to hear the claim, however, the court must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001). Moreover, the court is not limited to the allegations contained in the complaint. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Instead, to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the claim, the court may consider materials outside the pleadings. Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir. 1992).
The defendants move to dismiss arguing that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims under the DBCRA and the NHPA and because the APA does not confer independent subject-matter jurisdiction. See generally Defs.' Mot. The plaintiff counters that it has standing under both the DBCRA and the NHPA because it suffered an injury when it was deprived of the opportunity to compete for and acquire the Fort Ritchie' property. Pl.'s Opp'n at 24, 29. Because the plaintiff has neither a...
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