Maggard v. State
| Decision Date | 07 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 283S76,283S76 |
| Citation | 472 N.E.2d 888 |
| Parties | John Hite MAGGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Mattern, Wabash, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Robert K. Johnson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a trial court's decision not to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty pleas to rape, a class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-1, criminal deviate conduct, a class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-2, and confinement, a class B felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-3-3. Appellant was sentenced to fifty years in prison.
Appellant raises several issues. We will reach the merits of one on appeal: (1) whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
These are the facts that tend to support the trial court's acceptance of appellant's guilty pleas. Appellant was arrested and taken to the Wabash County Jail at about 12:35 a.m. on August 11, 1982. He was taken before the court for arraignment on August 12, 1982. He appeared before the court without counsel. The proceeding that day concluded with findings of guilty upon pleas of guilty to three charges, namely; Count I, rape while armed with a gun; Count II, criminal deviate conduct while armed with a gun; and Count III, confinement while armed with a gun. A pre-sentence investigation and report was ordered.
On August 23, 1982, appellant appeared without counsel before the trial court in order to submit his verified motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court appointed counsel, and ordered a hearing to be held on the matter.
On September 20, 1982, a full evidentiary hearing was held to determine the validity of his guilty pleas, and the trial court denied appellant's motion. Subsequently, the State filed a "Motion to Dismiss Appeal" with this Court. This Court denied the State's motion on May 4, 1983, and allowed this case to proceed as a direct appeal.
The record reflects the pertinent exchange between appellant and the court.
Q. Mr. Maggard you are here today charged with rape, you are here for arraignment on that charge, arraignment means the charges against you will be read to you, your rights will be explained to you and you will be asked whether you want to plead guilty or not guilty. Your first right is your right to have an attorney represent you at this proceeding and at all future proceeding. Do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you want to be represented by an Attorney in this proceeding?
A. No sir.
Q. You understand you are entitled to have one, whether you can afford one or not.
A. Yes.
Q. And you do not want to be represented by one, is that correct?
A. Correct.
The state in its brief takes the position that the waiver of counsel was accomplished at this point. There is no other possible interpretation of the record of this proceeding for after this point no further mention is made of the right to counsel or to the waiver of the right. However, it is important to a principled decision in this matter that after the purported waiver of counsel, the following occurred:
"Q. How old are you, Mr. Maggard?
A. Thirty-one.
Q. Then let me read the information which has been filed against you, to you, then I will explain your rights to you and read the statute....
MR. THRUSH: (Prosecutor) There are three informations.
Q. Okay, the information is plural then, Mr. Maggard. (Court reads informations to defendant). Do you understand the charges against you Mr. Maggard?
A. Is that three separate charges?
Q. Three separate charges, yes........
* * *
* * *
A. Uh, yes. Uh, do the charges run together or are they separate?
* * *
* * *
A. Uh, it says that it is a deadly weapon. Is a pellet gun a deadly weapon?
Q. I don't know. Is it a deadly weapon Mr. Thrush?
A. Or a bebe gun, I guess it was a bebe gun.
Two things are clear from this record. First at the time appellant purportedly relinquished his right to have the aid and assistance of counsel he had been expressly and mistakenly informed by the judge that he was being called upon to waive counsel in a proceeding involving only a single rape charge, when in fact it involved three charges, two of which were Class A felonies, and all three of which carried the element of being armed. Second, after the purported waiver, several distinct and important legal issues were developed in the proceedings which required legal study and contemplation on the part of the judge and prosecutor. The circumstances in this arraignment are similar to those which occurred in Catt v. State (1982), Ind.App., 437 N.E.2d 1001, where the trial judge informed the defendant that he was confronted with a misdemeanor charge, where in fact the charge was a felony. That misinformation robs the waiver of counsel of its necessary knowing quality. Moreover, the legal questions posited by appellant to the court, tracing their source to exact nature of the three felony counts and the sentencing provision which they triggered, likewise undermine the waiver.
Here, the record shows...
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Sides v. State
...the misadvisement may, in some circumstances, significantly impair a defendant's capacity to make a valid waiver. See e.g. Maggard v. State (1985) Ind., 472 N.E.2d 888 (defendant advised he was waiving right to counsel on one charge, but he was actually facing three charges); Catt v. State,......
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Watson v. State, 48S00-8709-CR-842
...allows a direct appeal to a defendant after the trial court has refused to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea. See Maggard v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 888. This Court also finds that the denial of the withdrawal of guilty plea is interlocutory until the sentence is Appellee is therefor......