Maggiacomo v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 04 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000-15-Appeal.,2000-15-Appeal. |
| Citation | 771 A.2d 896 |
| Parties | Piero MAGGIACOMO v. Michael STANLEY d/b/a R.I. Casting Co. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Robert B. Jacquard, Seth A. Perlmutter, Cranston.
Jeffrey S. Brenner, Boston, MA.
This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on March 12, 2001, pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. Piero Maggiacomo (plaintiff) has appealed from a summary judgment in favor of Michael Stanley d/b/a R.I. Casting Co. (defendant) in an action to recover amounts due. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and after hearing arguments of their counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown. Therefore, we shall proceed to summarily decide the case at this time.
Many of the facts in this case were undisputed. In January 1989, plaintiff, defendant, and defendant's brother, Kenneth R. Stanley (Kenneth), entered into an agreement to form a partnership known as R.I. Casting Co. for the purpose of supplying casting molds to the jewelry industry. The plaintiff supplied $5,000 cash and $3,000 worth of casting equipment, defendant and his brother supplied the labor, and each of the three was to receive an equal ownership interest in the business. Although plaintiff claimed to have prepared a handwritten agreement detailing the terms of this partnership, no such agreement was produced, as it was purportedly lost or stolen. According to plaintiff, in May 1989 the parties agreed that plaintiff would retire as a partner and become a creditor ofthe business, to whom defendant would be solely responsible for repayment of the cash loan and value of the equipment. After this point, plaintiff's and defendant's version of the facts differed. The defendant agreed that he was responsible for repayment of the $8,000 investment in the partnership, but averred that after payment of approximately $7,000, he owed no more than $1,000.92. The plaintiff claimed that he advanced an additional $6,000 to defendant in 1989 and that in July 1991, the parties agreed that the debt totaled $17,000, including 12% annual interest accrued from April 1989. The plaintiff further claimed that defendant made only fifty of 231 scheduled weekly payments of $95, resulting in a remaining debt of $13,985.28. The plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court on March 25, 1993 for the recovery of this amount. On July 14, 1999, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the lack of evidence that such an agreement existed and on plaintiff's sworn statement in a deposition incident to his divorce proceedings in September 1990. In that deposition, plaintiff testified that he had no interest in defendant's business beyond providing casting equipment worth between $7,000 to $8,000.
The case was continued to permit plaintiff to file supplemental affidavits on behalf of his opposition to defendant's motion. The plaintiff provided several affidavits, including one by Frank Messina, C.P.A, (Messina) who stated that he had prepared a financial statement for defendant that "included a line item * * * for a Note Payable to Piero Maggiacomo for $16,094," which Messina recalled as a debt resulting from plaintiff's sale of assets to defendant. The plaintiff also introduced an affidavit by defendant's brother Kenneth confirming plaintiff's claim that in addition to the initial $8,000 investment in the business, he had made a further loan of $5,000 to defendant. Subsequent to a hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Superior Court motion justice granted the motion after pointing out that "noticeably missing from the affidavits is something contradicting that sworndeposition testimony" during plaintiff's divorce proceedings that he was owed only between $7,000 and $8,000. Consequently, the motion justice granted defendant's motion because plaintiff's "affidavits [did] not raise any genuine issue of material fact." The plaintiff appealed.
It is well established that this Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment on a de novo basis, applying the same criteria as the trial court. Marr Scaffolding Co. v. Fairground Forms, Inc., 682 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I.1996). Consequently, "we shall affirm a summary judgment if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we are of the opinion that no genuine issue...
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