Broccoli v. City of Cranston, No. PC/03-0643 (RI 1/28/2005)
| Decision Date | 28 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. PC/03-0643,PC/03-0643 |
| Parties | BENEDETTO BROCCOLI v. CITY OF CRANSTON, JOSEPH GRANATA, as Treasurer for the City of Cranston, and JOHN TOIC |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case is before the Court on Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. The Defendants include the City of Cranston and its Treasurer, Joseph Granata (hereinafter "the Defendants" or "the City"). Defendants argue that the public duty doctrine precludes liability for Count IV of the complaint, a count alleging common law fraud,1 and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that count.
The following material facts are undisputed. The City of Cranston is a municipality subject to G.L § 9-31-1 (2004), the Governmental Tort Claims Act. The Plaintiff in this case, Benedetto Broccoli, was at the time of the activities at issue in this case, the owner of 1400 Cranston Street, in Cranston, Rhode Island ("the Premises"). Sometime after October 10, 2001, the City and Mr. Broccoli entered into discussions regarding the acquisition of the Premises by the City in conjunction with the construction of a new police station. Plaintiff's claim of fraud (Count IV) arises from the eventual breakdown of those discussions.
The standard of review on motions for summary judgment is well settled. If, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party there remains no genuine issue of material fact, then judgment may be entered as a matter of law. Yankee v. LeBlanc, 819 A.2d 1277, 1279 (R.I. 2003); Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c). It is an extreme remedy that should be cautiously applied. Maggiacomo v. Stanley, 771 A.2d 896, 898 (R.I. 2001).
The sole issue to be decided on this motion is whether or not the public duty doctrine applies to Plaintiff's claim of fraud in this case. The public duty doctrine is a common law doctrine that developed out of the application of the sovereign immunity afforded to the state. Torres v. Damicis, 853 A.2d 1233, 1237 (R.I. 2004). The legislature explicitly waived the sovereign immunity otherwise afforded the state and its political subdivisions with regard to actions in tort by enactment of G.L. § 9-31-1. Notwithstanding that waiver, the common law public duty doctrine remains available under certain circumstances to immunize the state and municipal entities from certain types of tort liabilities. Torres, 853 A.2d at 1238.
"The public duty doctrine shields the state and its political subdivisions from tort liability arising out of discretionary governmental actions that by their nature are not ordinarily performed by private persons." Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992).
The public duty doctrine affords immunity from suit to a governmental entity when it performs an activity that would not ordinarily be performed by a private individual. Bierman v. Shookster, 590 A.2d 402, 404 (R.I. 1991); Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 333 (R.I. 1989). Two exceptions to the public duty doctrine have developed. The first is the so-called "special duty exception," which precludes the application of the immunity when it is shown that the state owed the plaintiff a special duty either because of prior contact or previous knowledge of the plaintiff. Torres, 853 A.2d at 1239. The second is the so-called "egregious conduct exception," which precludes invocation of the defense in circumstances wherein the public defendant has failed to remedy a peril caused by its own conduct and of which it has knowledge. Id. at 1241.
The public duty doctrine exists in order to "encourage the effective administration of governmental operations by removing the threat of potential litigation." Haley, 611 A.2d at 849 (quoting Catone, 555 A.2d at 333). Recently, our Supreme Court has reacted to the continued viability of the doctrine in light of increasing expansion of exceptions to its application. See e.g., Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158, 1167 (R.I. 2001) (); Bierman, 590 A.2d at 404 ().
In Haworth v. Lannon, 813 A.2d 62 (R.I. 2003), the Rhode Island Supreme Court based its holding in favor of the doctrine's applicability on the fact that the "public treasury should not be exposed to claims involving acts done for the public as a whole." Id. at 66. Because subjecting the government to increased liability would open the proverbial floodgates of litigation, the Court reasoned that those floodgates should be carefully monitored so as to allow the government to continue to "perform duties necessary to the functioning of a free society." Id. (quoting Orzechowski v. State, 485 A.2d 545, 549-50 (R.I. 1984)).
The question of whether the public duty doctrine applies to a claim of fraud has not been decided by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has generally analyzed the public duty doctrine in the context of negligence cases, (see e.g. Shookster, 590 A.2d at 404; Catone, 555 A.2d at 333; Haworth, 813 A.2d at 62), the Court has suggested that the doctrine may also be applicable to claims involving certain intentional torts. L.A. Ray Realty v. Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I. 1997). The plaintiffs in that case were engaged in a number of real estate projects. An amendment to the zoning ordinance passed by referendum, and later invalidated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, resulted in the denial of a number of applications for subdivision that plaintiffs then had pending before the Cumberland Planning Commission. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that the enactment of the invalid ordinance with the intent to interfere with plaintiff's property right satisfied the elements of the tort. Clearly, the elements of interference with prospective contractual relations include knowledge by the interferor with the existence of a business relationship, as well as an intentional act of interference therewith. See Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 669 (R.I. 1986).
Notwithstanding the fact that the tort in question in the L.A. Ray Realty case was intentional, the Court in its analysis found that both the public duty doctrine and its exceptions were available to the parties. The Court upheld the trial court's finding that the Town was liable for the tort of intentional interference with prospective contractual relations by the actions of the Town's officials demonstrating an intent to interfere with plaintiff's legitimate expectation of developing their property under subdivision regulations existing at the time of the filing of subdivision applications. L.A. Ray Realty, 698 A.2d at 207. As to the public duty doctrine, the Court found that the adoption and application of a zoning ordinance is a governmental function and, therefore, upheld the trial justice's consideration of the public duty doctrine. Id. at 208. The Court, however, determined that proof of the intentional tort (adoption of an invalid ordinance in order to interfere with plaintiffs' legitimate expectations regarding their property) was also sufficient to prove the exception to the public duty doctrine for egregious conduct. Id. at 208-09.
Similarly, in this case, the Plaintiff alleges that certain facts, if proven at trial, may constitute the intentional tort of fraud. The elements of fraud include: (1) a false representation, (2) intent that the plaintiff rely on that representation, (3) justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff on the false representation, and (4) resultant damages. Zaino v. Zaino, 818 A.2d 630, 638 (R.I. 2003); Travers v. Spidell, 682 A.2d 471, 472-73 (R.I. 1996).
The Plaintiff herein alleges that the City represented its intent to take the property by eminent domain, and represented to the Plaintiff that requests for zoning would be denied because of the potential increase in the value of his property that would result from such zoning variances. In reliance on...
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