Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Barnes
| Decision Date | 08 October 1946 |
| Docket Number | 31940. |
| Parties | MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO. v. BARNES. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied April 8, 1947.
Appeal from District Court, Creek County; C. O. Beaver, Judge.
Action by S. A. Barnes, administrator with will annexed of the estate of Paul Chandler Grady, deceased, against the Magnolia Petroleum Company to recover damages for the wrongful death of deceased. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. In an action for wrongful death where the evidence is sufficient to show primary negligence on the part of defendant, and further shows a succession of events so linked together as to constitute a natural and probable sequence of events from the negligence to the injury, and there is no evidence of a new and intervening cause, sufficient of itself to produce the injury, it may be said as a matter of law that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
2. It is not error to refuse a requested instruction which cannot be given without correction or modification.
3. In an action to recover damages for wrongful death, the plaintiff is not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, freedom from all negligence on the part of deceased, nor is the burden of proof upon plaintiff to show freedom from contributory negligence.
4. The 'other' cause, to be sufficient to relieve a person from the consequence of his own negligence, must be such as to sever the connection between the original negligence and the injury. It is not enough to say that it is 'another independent' cause. It must be an efficient, intervening cause.
5. It is not necessary that the court should define 'proximate cause' though requested so to do, where there is evidence to prove primary negligence and no evidence tending to prove an efficient, intervening cause and where instructions given properly submit the issues of fact to the jury and properly state all the elements of proximate cause.
6. A possessor who holds his land open to others for his own business purposes must possess and exercise knowledge of the dangerous qualities of the place itself and the appliances provided therein, which is not required of his patrons and invitees.
Walace Hawkins, of Dallas, Tex., Robert W. Richards, of Oklahoma City, and Tom Wallace, of Sapulpa, for plaintiff in error.
Speakman & Speakman and George D. Wilhite, all of Sapulpa, for defendant in error.
S. A Barnes, administrator with will annexed of the estate of Paul C. Grady, deceased, sued Magnolia Petroleum Company to recover damages for the wrongful death of deceased. Trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $15,000. Defendant appeals.
Deceased Paul C. Grady, was a member of a partnership engaged in the business of repairing and selling oil field equipment. Defendant is engaged in the production of petroleum and natural gas. It operated oil and gas wells on the Ben Vance Lease in Creek County. Well No. 7, so located, produced oil and gas. It was equipped with the standard jack pump and about 40 feet of 15 1/2 or 16 inch 'surface casing' enclosing a string of 7 or 8 inch 'surface' casing extending down to the producing sand. The service casing enclosed tubing through which petroleum was pumped and through which gas flowed. The service casing was suspended by a clamp. This casing extended a few feet above the surface. There was a concrete derrick platform with an opening about two feet square over the well, through which the casing and tubing extended upward. There was a bridge, consisting of sacked rocks, sand, and waste, covering the top of the surface casing and around it. This bridge was from 1 to 1 1/2, to 2 to 2 1/2 feet thick, according to the testimony of the various witnesses.
A space existed between the two strings of casing below the bridge and it extended 40 feet below. Above the platform and connected with the tubing, there was a pipe through which the well was pumped, when there was no flow, to the tank. Above the oil flow pipe, another pipe connected with the tubing, through which the gas flowed. Connected with the gas flow pipe there was a vacuum pump which was designed to draw the gas from the well. There was also connected with the tubing a small pipe about an inch in diameter, known as a 'bleeder pipe.' The purpose of the bleeder pipe is to reveal, upon an opening and examination of its valve, whether the well is producing oil. The bleeder pipe opened directly above the opening in the platform and when the valve in the bleeder pipe was opened, the oil would flow therefrom directly into the space and onto the bridge over the open space between the two strings of casing. At the surface of the bridge there was a drain pipe leading to the slush pit, the purpose of which was to drain away the oil which came from the bleeder pipe. The pump was secured to the concrete platform by bolts embedded in the concrete and extending up through the frame of the pump. This frame was strengthened by braces made of 'angle iron' or steel. Vibration caused by the operation of the pump had a tendency to break the bolts securing the frame of the pump to the concrete platform and also to break the angle iron braces. When this occurred, it was necessary to repair the breaks by welding the broken parts.
On September 17, 1941, deceased was employed by defendant to weld certain of the bolts and the brace in the frame of the pump. He had welded a number of bolts in the platform and while welding an angle iron brace in the frame of the pump, directly over and above the opening in the platform, sparks from the electric welder used, ignited gas which had accumulated in the open space, causing an explosion, severely injuring deceased so that he died within five or six hours.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to provide deceased a safe place in which to work; and in the operation of the well, it was defendant's duty to deceased to use the highest degree of care against danger; and defendant violated its duty in leaving the open space between the outer and inner casing and in allowing petroleum to run over the bridge above the space, thus permitting gas to accumulate; that because of the bridge over the space, it was hidden from deceased's view so that he could not and did not know of its existence; and the injuries to deceased and his death resulted from the carelessness and negligence of defendant.
Defendant plead that deceased, while engaged in the welding operation, was an independent contractor and not an employee of defendant; that deceased was a welder of experience and acquainted with possible dangers and hazards of the work; that he assumed the risk and was guilty of contributory negligence.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling demurrer to plaintiff's evidence; that there was no evidence tending to show primary negligence on the part of defendant; that the evidence shows deceased was an independent contractor. As to the last specification, there is no dispute. Defendant was an independent contractor, but as an independent contractor, deceased was defendant's invitee. It is the duty of the owner to keep the premises reasonably safe for the performance of work by a contractor; this duty applies to conditions which are in the nature of a hidden danger, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like; they are not ordinarily known to the invitee and if not observed by the invitee, he can exercise no kind of care to avoid injurious consequences of them; the invitee assumes all ordinary risks attendant upon the use of the premises; the owner is under no legal duty to alter the premises so as to eliminate known and obvious dangers. City of Tulsa v. Harmon, 148 Okl. 117, 299 P. 462; 45 C.J. 837. But in Billington Lbr. Co. v. Cheatham, 181 Okl. 402, 74 P.2d 120, 121, it is the rule that:
'Although an invitee assumes all normal, ordinary, and obvious risks attendant upon the use of premises, the owner thereof who knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, of their dangerous and unsafe condition owes to such invitee a duty to warn him of the danger where the peril is hidden, latent, or concealed or the invitee is without knowledge thereof.' 45 C.J. 875.
The jury found from the evidence the existence of a hidden danger which deceased may not have observed although he may have exercised ordinary care; the jury found that the defendant knew, or should have known, of the hidden danger. The jury's verdict, based on defendant's negligence, necessarily presupposes these findings.
There was evidence of primary negligence on the part of defendant. The defendant is not shown to have warned of the hidden danger and if the defendant neglected to do so, the defendant breached a duty owed to deceased. There was evidence on the part of defendant that the well was equipped and operated in the usual and customary manner, in the field, but the whole of the evidence on the point is in conflict. Witnesses testified that the custom was to fill the open space between the outer and inner casing, to prevent the accumulation of gas. The evidence of defendant shows the deceased, on two previous occasions, within a year before the injury, welded the equipment without an explosion and there had been no indication of gas forming around the well. Defendant contends the condition existing at the time of the explosion was of recent origin and had not existed long enough for defendant's notice. There is no evidence that deceased had ever welded a brace in the frame of the pump directly over the opening in the concrete platform. The conditions under which oil might seep through the bridge and accumulate in the open...
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