Magnuson, In re
| Decision Date | 26 March 1952 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 2346 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re MAGNUSON. |
Chargin & Briscoe, Stockton, Richard Gibson, Stockton, for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
As a result of proceedings under the Juvenile Court Law, begun by petition of the probation officer of San Joaquin County, charging that Ronald G. Magnuson, 17 years of age, came within the provisions of subdivisions (b) and (m) of Section 700 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, said minor was, on December 21, 1951, adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile court. It was ordered that he be removed from the custody of his parents and committed to the Youth Authority, which commitment was suspended upon condition that the minor complete a course of schooling in the California Junior Republic. The minor is presently held in the said school. He has appealed from the order adjudging him to be a ward of the court, and the appeal is pending in this court.
The minor, through his attorney, applied to the juvenile court for an order releasing him on bail pending the appeal, and on February 25th, after a hearing, the application for bail was denied without prejudice to any further application that might be made to the court pursuant to the provisions of Section 580 of said Welfare and Institutions Code. Thereupon said minor applied to this Court to be released on bail pending appeal. An order to show cause was issued and the matter has been argued and submitted for decisions.
An order adjudging a person to be a ward of the juvenile court is not a conviction of crime, sec. 736, Welf. & Inst. Code, and proceedings to have such a wardship declared are not criminal proceedings. It follows that the provisions relating to bail contained in Article I, Section 6, of the California Constitution, and Sections 1271 and 1272 of the Penal Code, do not apply to such proceedings. 'Where the provisions of the constitution relate only to offenses, and to cases where there may be a conviction therefor, they do not apply to proceedings under a juvenile court statute which does not relate to offenses or permit a conviction in the ordinary sense of the term.' 8 C.J.S., Bail, § 34, p. 53. See, also, cases annotated in 160 A.L.R. 284; 31 Am.Jur., 1951 Supp., p. 68.
Turning to the Juvenile Court Law itself, we find that Section 828 of the code provides that: 'Pending hearing in the juvenile court the judge thereof may admit the person so brought before him to bail or may otherwise provide for his temporary custody in any manner provided in this chapter for the care of a ward of the juvenile court.' This section concerns bail pending a hearing and does not cover the situation presented here, that is, an application for bail pending appeal after an order has been made adjudging the minor to be a ward of the court.
Section 580 of the code provides for an appeal from an order adjudging a person to be a ward of the juvenile court and from any subsequent order made after judgment, but specifically provides that 'no such order or judgment shall be stayed by such appeal, unless suitable provision is made for the maintenance, care, and custody of such person pending the appeal, and unless such provision is approved by an order of the juvenile court.'
The provision for bail pending a hearing when a minor has been certified to the juvenile court after accusation of law violations, Sec. 828, supra, the absence of any other provision for bail, and the declaration that an appeal does not stay an order declaring a person to be a ward of the court, all impel toward the conclusion that the legislature, not herein bound in matters of bail by the constitutional provisions thereon, has intentionally omitted any provision therefor during these proceedings.
These conclusions are fortified by a consideration of the general purposes to be served by proceedings to declare a minor a ward of the court. Such proceedings are for the benefit and protection of the minor when such protection is needed by the occurrence of causes for wardship, as set forth in the pertinent code sections. The result of a declaration of wardship, far from being a...
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People v. Smith
...104 Cal.App. 276, 281, 285 P. 871. 21. In re Dargo (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 205, 207, 183 P.2d 282, italics added. 22. In re Magnuson (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 73, 74, 242 P.2d 362. 23. In re Ricardo M. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 744, 749, 125 Cal.Rptr. 291, italics 24. Welfare and Institutions Code sect......
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State v. Naylor
...of the courts have concluded that a juvenile involved in delinquency proceedings has no constitutional right to bail. In re Magnuson, 110 Cal.App.2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952); Epinosa v. Rice, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576, 160 A.L.R. 284 (1945); Ex parte Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A. 716; S......
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Schoonover v. Elford (In re Elford)
...9 Cal.App.3d 613, 615 .) They also instruct that adjudications of juvenile wrongdoing are not "criminal convictions " ( In re Magnuson (1952), 110 Cal.App.2d 73, 74 ) and that the commitment of a ward to the Youth Authority is not a "sentence." ( People v. Wilkins (1967), 251 Cal.App.2d 823......
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William M., In re
...8th Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, § 6; see Trimble v. Stone (D.D.C.1960) 187 F.Supp. 483, 488 (right to bail); In re Magnuson (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 73, 74, 242 P.2d 362 (no right to bail on appeal); see Freed & Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964 (1964) p. 94 fn. 6.) In Gault the United Sta......