Magnuson v. Rupp Manufacturing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 41610,41610
• Citation: 171 N.W.2d 201,285 Minn. 32
• Parties: Edgar MAGNUSON, Respondent, v. RUPP MANUFACTURING, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 201

171 N.W.2d 201

285 Minn. 32

Edgar MAGNUSON, Respondent, v. RUPP MANUFACTURING, INC., Appellant.

No. 41610.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 3, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The rule of strict liability does not require plaintiff to prove negligence or that the injured party be in privity with manufacturer. It is however necessary under this rule to prove a defect in the product Before it left defendant's factory. Even under the principle of strict liability the manufacturer is liable only if the plaintiff proves the accident was caused by delivery of the article in a 'defective condition,' which is to say not 'safe for normal handling and consumption.' If an article is defective, not reasonably fit for ordinary purposes for which it was sold or used, a defect arises out of the manufacture and if it proximately causes the injury, then liability exists.

2. Clearly associated with the question of defect is the 'awareness' of it, if it is 3. For the doctrine of strict liability to apply, there must be no mishandling after manufacture. Under the circumstances in the instant case, the snowmobile was not in the same condition at the time of the accident as when delivered in so far as the spark plug and its insulating cover are concerned.

a defect. Plaintiff must not be aware of the defect in order to recover. What has been claimed to be a defect in the instant case was an item of which plaintiff, who was a mechanic, was entirely aware from the time he started to operate the snowmobile and every time he removed, cleaned, and repaired the spark plug.

4. Plaintiff being at all times aware of the spark plug and the protective shield covering it and claiming it to be defective and then doing what he did to bring about the accident, it would appear that defendant herein would be insulated from responsibility because the direct and proximate cause of the injury was plaintiff's operation of the snowmobile.

5. Even though strict liability may be adopted, it is nevertheless necessary to prove that plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own safety. There appears to be no reason to doubt that strict liability has made no change in the rule, well settled in negligence cases, that the seller of the product is not to be held liable when the consumer makes an abnormal use of it.

6. If the basis of responsibility is primarily reliance on the manufacturer to put out a product in accordance with his express or tacit representation as to its nature, in accordance with the latest scientific knowledge and discoveries, and by the exercise of reasonably developed skills, then perhaps the product is not regarded as defective if it is no different from what the consumer expected it to be.

P. M. Meehl and Irving J. Wiltrout, Marshall, for appellant.

Prindle, Maland & Ward, Montevideo, for respondent.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the district court which vacated a jury verdict for defendant and granted a new trial on all issues upon the exclusive ground that the court committed an error of law in not submitting to the jury an instruction on strict tort liability.

The action out of which the appeal arose was instituted for damages sustained by plaintiff, Edgar Magnuson, as a result of an accident on March 5, 1967. The accident occurred while plaintiff was operating a snowmobile manufactured by defendant, Rupp Manufacturing, Inc., a corporation located at Mansfield, Ohio. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged three counts of liability: (1) Negligence in the manufacture and design of the snowmobile; (2) breach of express and implied warranties; and (3) strict liability. The case was tried before a jury and was submitted on a general verdict. The theory submitted was negligent manufacture and design by defendant and proximate cause. Plaintiff made no request for an instruction on strict liability, and none was given.

The trial court's order granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial states in part:

'* * * It is the Court's recollection that on the morning that the case was to go to the jury instructions were discussed in chambers. The Court read to counsel what was proposed to be submitted to the jury as to the negligence of the manufacturer, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the Court's recollection is that counsel for plaintiff was asked specifically whether the case was to be submitted on the question of negligence of the manufacturer and that counsel for plaintiff responded in the affirmative. However, the court reporter's notes do not show this. No requested instructions were submitted. At the conclusion of the charge to the jury the Court asked counsel whether they wished to call the Court's attention to any error or omission or inadvertent statement, and there was no response.'

The trial court in its memorandum attached to the order points out that in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., Inc., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488, this court was fully mindful of the fact that plaintiff there did not directly plead the theory of strict tort liability, request the court to instruct on it, nor urge the theory until appeal. Nevertheless, this court discussed the theory, stating that it perceived no prejudice to defendant as its liability was adequately established on the ground of negligence.

Whether this case was decided on the theory of strict tort liability is unimportant, since the issues were, according to the pleadings and plaintiff's approach to the issues throughout the trial, fairly and adequately presented to the jury pursuant to the facts disclosed by the record. It is difficult to perceive how the exclusion of instructions on strict tort liability, under all the circumstances, has prejudiced plaintiff to the extent of denying him a fair trial.

The issue before this court is whether the trial court committed an error of law in not submitting to the jury an instruction on strict liability.

Plaintiff at the time of trial was 33 years of age, married, had four children, and resided in Granite Falls, Minnesota. He is employed as a mechanic, and his employment background is that of a mechanic. In December 1966 he and one Pat Oliger purchased a 'Sno-Sport 300' snowmobile from Lyle Monson Motors, Inc., Granite Falls, Minnesota. This snowmobile was manufactured by defendant in such a manner that the motor was located under the hood in the front part of the snowmobile and the cylinder or piston of the motor was positioned so that it was almost horizontal with the seat of the snowmobile. The spark plug of the motor was located at the top of the cylinder and faced towards the operator and is 6 to 8 inches above the seat. The spark plug extends three-fourths of an inch to one inch beyond the metal cowling or air shroud that surrounds the motor.

Plaintiff was well aware of the position of the spark plug. He had worked on the motor and removed the spark plug 5 to 10 times before the accident. He had also removed the pistons of the motor. Plaintiff identified the spark plug which was installed in the motor when it was received and this spark plug had a protective rubber insulator thereon. Plaintiff did not know if this type of protective insulator was present at the time of the accident. The evidence on that issue would indicate that it was not. Plaintiff had been hunting with the snowmobile 10 to 12 times before the accident occurred. During the course of his testimony the plaintiff identified other parts of the snowmobile which protruded toward the operator, particularly the choke button.

On March 5, 1967, plaintiff and some companions were fox hunting in the Murdock-Kerkhoven, Minnesota, area. Plaintiff was driving the snowmobile over a plowed field, which was covered with snow, at a speed of approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour. He was chasing a fox. He drove up a small knoll and then saw a ditch 10 to 12 feet deep in front of him. He went into the ditch with the snowmobile and the left ski of the machine caught in the snow, stopping the snowmobile abruptly. As it stopped, plaintiff flew off the left side of the snowmobile, striking his right knee against the spark plug and injuring himself. He was treated by Dr. Paul Schmidt in Granite Falls. Plaintiff still has the snowmobile and has raced it one time since the accident in the same condition as it was at the time of the accident. At the time of trial, he had built a guard for the spark plug.

Plaintiff's witness, David Conkey, a professional engineer, testified that the spark plug was not guarded and was unsafe. However, as the record shows, it had been guarded prior to the accident, to the extent of having a protective insulator thereon. The spark plug was entirely visible, of course, because the original protective insulator, according to the record, was missing at the time of the accident.

During cross-examination Conkey agreed that The degree of safety involved in the snowmobile was somewhat dependent upon the speed of the snowmobile. He also agreed that A highly important factor in so far as danger and safety are concerned is the operator. As the testimony stands, this admission seriously weakens his testimony in view of the actual fact that the snowmobile went into a 10- or 12-foot-deep ditch before any injury occurred.

Defendant commenced manufacturing snowmobiles in 1965 and of seven models produced to date the only model with a horizontal positioned motor was the 'Sno-Sport 300' manufactured in 1966. The purpose for the horizontal or nearly horizontal motor positioning, according to Thomas Earhart, defendant's director of engineering, is to keep the center of gravity low and also to give this machine a low profile.

Defendant contends that the evidence in the case did not justify an instruction on strict tort liability for the reason that strict liability is said to require evidence of a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user which causes injury to him. We agree that these elements were not...