Maguire v. Monaghan
| Decision Date | 24 September 1954 |
| Citation | 206 Misc. 550 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
| Parties | Edward C. Maguire et al., Copartners Doing Business under the Name of Maguire, Frutkin, Waldie & Rippe, Plaintiffs,<BR>v.<BR>George P. Monaghan, as Commissioner of and Constituting The State Harness Racing Commission, et al., Defendants. |
Edmond B. Butler for plaintiffs.
Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (Samuel Hirshowitz of counsel), for defendants.
The plaintiffs herein are partners in the law firm of Maguire, Frutkin, Waldie and Rippe, Esqs., and they have brought an action for a declaratory judgment. As to this action, they now seek summary judgment. They seek to know whether or not they may render legal services to the owner of a harness racing track, and yet not effect the automatic forfeiture of a public office held by one of their partners, the Honorable Edward C. Maguire, commissioner of the board of water supply of the City of New York.
The applicable statute, chapter 514 of the Laws of 1954, which is section 63 of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law, provides in part as follows: Among those firms, associations or corporations which are so specified in paragraph "(b)" are any "which owns or leases to any licensed association or corporation a race track at which pari-mutuel racing is conducted." This latter category includes plaintiffs' former client, Algam Corporation. Plaintiffs have shown, on this motion for summary judgment, under rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice, that they represented as lawyers the said Algam Corporation, owner of a harness racing track at which pari-mutuel racing is conducted but that they withdrew from such representation before May 1, 1954, when the said statute took effect, in order to avert the peril of forfeiture of the public office held by Commissioner Maguire. The peril is lodged in the following provision, which is subdivision 2 of the said section 63:
The plaintiffs have instituted their cause of action for a declaratory judgment against two named defendants: George F. Monaghan, the Commissioner of and constituting the State Harness Racing Commission of the State of New York, and Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General of the State of New York. But it is immediately apparent that there is no justiciable controversy between plaintiffs and the State Harness Racing Commission. Commissioner Monaghan has no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs. He cannot bring about the forfeiture of the plaintiff Maguire's public office. Commissioner Maguire is removable only for cause by the Mayor of the City of New York, or as the statute (Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law, § 63) provides, "at the suit of the attorney-general". Nor does the Harness Racing Commission exercise any supervisory or visitorial powers over the plaintiffs as members of the Bar. No administrative determination of the Harness Racing Commission could have any effect upon the plaintiffs as lawyers or upon one of them as a public officer. As was said in Anderson on Actions for Declaratory Judgments (2d ed., Vol. 1, ch. 2, § 14):
Plaintiffs contend that the State Harness Racing Commission is a proper party defendant because by administrative action it could deny a license to plaintiffs' client, or deprive the latter of the license, simply because it chose to be represented by the plaintiffs. However, plaintiffs' said client has not joined in this action, and its rights are therefore not in controversy here.
Therefore the court holds that the defendant Monaghan, as Commissioner of and constituting the State Harness Racing Commission of the State of New York, is not a proper party defendant, and as to him the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied and summary judgment is granted in favor of the said defendant. The complaint against him is dismissed.
A more difficult question is presented when we are called upon to determine whether or not a justiciable controversy exists as between the plaintiffs and the State of New York. This court feels that it is properly called upon to declare the meaning of the statute (, the minatory words of section 63 of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law as they apply to the plaintiff firm of attorneys) and to define the rights of the plaintiffs which have been placed in jeopardy. Involved are the rights of the plaintiffs to practice freely their profession, without the impediment imposed by the statute insofar as it applies to Commissioner Maguire. This jeopardy gives rise to the essential "`controversy'", between the plaintiffs and the State of New York, which justifies the maintenance of an action for a declaratory judgment. (Quaker Oats v. City of New York, 295 N.Y. 527, 537.) Nor is it unusual for a declaratory judgment to be rendered for the purpose of accomplishing a statutory construction which would affect the State (cf. Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 293 N.Y. 315). Indeed it is desirable that, particularly in the case of public officers, their rights and duties be judicially determined at the earliest practicable time (Wingate v. Flynn, 139 Misc. 779, affd. 233 App. Div. 785, affd. 256 N.Y. 690). And further, it has been held that the remedy of declaratory judgment is peculiarly appropriate where the meaning of a statute is at issue. (German Masonic Temple Assn. of City of N. Y. v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 452; Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198.)
In the instant case, it is of supreme importance to Commissioner Maguire to know beforehand whether or not, by his firm representing an owner of a race track, an automatic forfeiture of his public office will ensue. Since courts traditionally do not look with favor upon forfeiture by statute, and will strive to avoid such a penalty, it would appear reasonable and appropriate to invoke the remedy of a declaratory judgment before the happening of an event that would imperil the commissioner's office. In line with the views of Professor Borchard, this court feels the instrument of declaratory judgment aptly serves the present situation. Compare Borchard on...
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