Magullion v. Magee
| Decision Date | 18 May 1922 |
| Citation | 241 Mass. 355 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | MARY E. MAGULLION & another, trustees, v. JOHN E. F. MAGEE. |
March 7, 1922.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., BRALEY, DE COURCY, CROSBY, & CARROLL, JJ.
Equity Pleading and Practice, Master: exceptions to report, Motion to recommit. Partnership.
In a bill in equity by trustees under the will of one of two partners against the surviving partner to establish an interest of the plaintiffs' testator in certain real estate purchased by the defendant in his own name and alleged by the plaintiffs to have been held by him for the partnership, there were allegations that, during the term of the partnership, the defendant gradually assumed charge of the finances of the partnership, that at the time of dissolution he had entire charge of the finances and of purchasing supplies and paying bills, and that during that time the plaintiffs' testator, "who was a man of many friends, devoted his time and efforts to procuring patronage and customers for the partnership business." The defendant in his answer admitted "that the duties of business manager of the firm were largely assumed by him, but" denied "that he had charge of the finances of the partnership." A master who heard the suit found that the defendant "was a good business man and for the most part attended to the general management of the business." The plaintiffs excepted to the report on the ground that the master had made no findings on the issues raised by the above described portions of the bill and answer. Held, that
(1) The issues in question were covered by the report; (2) A master is not required to state every subsidiary circumstance which brings his mind to its ultimate determination as to the facts.
An interlocutory decree in a suit in equity denying a motion to recommit a report to a master must be affirmed upon appeal unless the record shows an abuse of judicial discretion.
In the suit above described, the master found, without a report of the evidence, that premises purchased by the defendant adjoined the firm's principal place of business which was on property owned by the plaintiffs' testator, and that the firm had used a part thereof as lessees before the purchase that a day or two after the purchase the defendant told the plaintiffs' testator of it and he was "greatly disturbed" and "expressed his disappointment" to the defendant and several others; that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs' testator made any demands on the defendant to give him an interest in the property or that he offered to pay any part of the purchase price and that "whatever chagrin or disappointment he may have suffered appears to have quickly passed, and the entirely friendly relations of the partners continued;" that the defendant "bought in expectation that this property would continue to be used by the partnership;" that by agreement of the partners later extensive alterations and repairs were made upon the property in connection with the other property used by the partnership, the expense thereof being paid by the partnership and carried on the books as a partnership asset; that during the life of the plaintiffs' testator "he never questioned the legal right of" the defendant "to purchase this property as he did, and never asserted in any manner any interest in the property as belonging either to the partnership or himself; . . . that neither of the . . . plaintiffs . . . nor any beneficiaries under the trust, ever asserted any claim to have any right, title or interest in or to the "property in question until this suit was brought over five years after the purchase, although the facts in regard to the purchase were known to some of them from the first; that after the alterations above described an attorney for the plaintiffs' testator presented to the defendant an agreement as to a party wall between the properties, owned then respectively by the partners as individuals, and that after the death of the plaintiffs' testator, in leasing their testator's real estate to the defendant, they inserted a provision in the lease which recognized him as owning the premises in question. A final decree was entered dismissing the bill.
The plaintiffs appealed. Held, that (1) Upon the findings of the master, it could not be said as a matter of law that either partner ever intended that the real estate in question should belong to the firm;
(2) The decree must be affirmed.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on August 16, 1917, by trustees under the will of John R. Magullion against John E. F. Magee seeking to have property numbered 6 Dover Street in Boston, which on January 25, 1912, when a partner with the plaintiff under the firm name of Magullion and Company, the defendant had purchased in his own name, declared to be partnership property, for an accounting as to rents and profits and for a determination of the plaintiffs' interest therein and its payment to them.
In the Superior Court, the suit was referred to a master. Material findings of the master are described in the opinion. The plaintiffs filed seven exceptions to the report, and in this court relied only upon the first and second, which were as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial