Magwood v. Culliver

• Decision Date: 09 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2:97cv629-MHT.,2:97cv629-MHT.
• Citation: 481 F.Supp.2d 1262
• Parties: Billy Joe MAGWOOD, Petitioner, v. Grantt CULLIVER, Warden, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Page 1262

481 F.Supp.2d 1262

Billy Joe MAGWOOD, Petitioner, v. Grantt CULLIVER, Warden, et al., Respondents.

No. 2:97cv629-MHT.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

April 9, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James A. Power, Jr., Marguerite Del Valle, Power Del Valle LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Beth Jackson Hughes, James Clayton Crenshaw, Office of Atty. Gen., Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

This case is before the court on petitioner Billy Joe Magwood's third habeas petition, in which he challenges his 1986 death sentence on the grounds that it violates the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as this court's 1985 conditional grant of habeas corpus. Specifically, Magwood argues that the Alabama courts failed to conduct a proper proportionality review of his sentence; that the Alabama courts relied on arbitrary and non-statutory aggravating factors in finding that a death sentence was appropriate; that his mental illness rendered him ineligible for the death penalty; that his sentence violates the fair-warning principle of due process; that the state sentencing court's findings at his 1986 resentencing were inconsistent with this court's 1985 conditional grant of habeas corpus; that a jury should have been empaneled at his 1986 resentencing; that his counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective; and, finally, that he was involuntarily medicated in violation of due process.

For the reasons that follow, the petition will be granted as to Magwood's fair-warning claim and the aspect of the ineffective-assistance claim that flows from it, and the petition will be denied in all other aspects.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA provides that, where claims were originally adjudicated in state court, relief on claims included in an application for a writ of habeas corpus can be granted only under two circumstances. First, as to matters of law, relief may be granted only where the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as that law is set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Second, as to matters of fact, relief may be granted only where the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented to the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that a decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court has arrived at a conclusion opposite one reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court has decided a case differently from the way the United States Supreme Court has on materially indistinguishable facts. 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. An "unreasonable application" of that law occurs where the state court identifies the correct legal standard from the United States Supreme Court's cases, but unreasonably applies it; an "unreasonable application" also occurs where a state court unreasonably extends, or refuses to extend, a legal principle from those cases. Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Conviction and First Habeas Petition

Magwood was convicted on June 2, 1981, for the capital murder of the Sheriff of Coffee County, Alabama, C.F. "Neil" Grantham, which occurred on March 1, 1979. Thereafter, he was sentenced to death by electrocution. Following exhaustion of his remedies in state court, Magwood filed a federal-habeas petition in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction and sentence. This court denied the petition as to Magwood's conviction, but found that he should be resentenced based on the sentencing court's failure to find the existence of the following two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed while Magwood was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and (2) Magwood's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement's of law was substantially impaired. Magwood v. Smith, 608 F.Supp. 218, 225 (M.D.Ala. 1985) (Hobbs, C.J.), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir.1986).

According to this court, the state trial court's failure to find the existence of these mitigating circumstances was clearly erroneous in light of the overwhelming evidence regarding Magwood's mental condition at the time of the offense. Id. at 226. This court noted that the State's only evidence that Magwood was sane came from two general practitioners who examined Magwood for 15 and 30 minutes, respectively, and a clinical psychologist who conceded that Magwood suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that he examined Magwood two years after the offense conduct and while he was strongly medicated. Id. By contrast, the unanimous, opinion of the three physicians on the Lunacy Commission appointed by the trial court to examine Magwood was that Magwood was insane at the time of his admission to their hospital, at the time they issued their report, and probably at the time of the commission of the offense. Id. According to one psychiatrist on the commission, "Billy Joe Magwood falls into the category that would be called crazy in Stockholm; he would be called crazy in Calcutta, in Tokyo, any place. He is a schizophrenic. He is not in the borderline category." Id.

This court acknowledged that the jury's conclusion in the guilt phase of the trial that Magwood was not legally insane was due deference by the federal courts. "Accordingly, while in this Court's opinion the evidence seems particularly strong that petitioner was insane at the time of the offense, this issue is properly left to the state courts. The matter of the existence of mitigating circumstances, however, is an altogether different matter." Id. at 227. Because the state court committed clear error in not finding the mitigating circumstances related to Magwood's mental state, this court granted habeas relief conditional upon a resentencing in which the mitigating circumstances are found to exist and considered in determining whether Magwood should receive a sentence of death or life without parole.

B. 1986 Resentencing

In 1986, the state trial court conducted a "complete and new" sentencing hearing, including "a new assessment of all of the evidence, arguments of counsel, and law" and a "new ... opportunity for the parties to submit evidence." Sent. Tr., R. Tab 1, at R-25. The sentencing judge found that the mitigating factors found by this court were present, but that Magwood was not legally insane at the time of the crime and that his mental defect was not the sole cause of the murder. Id. at R-26. The court also found that Magwood knew right from wrong, and had the ability to refrain from killing the sheriff. Id. The trial court further found one aggravating factor: that Magwood killed a law enforcement officer because of official job-related acts. Id. at R-25. Magwood's attorney at resentencing, J.L. Chestnut, Jr., stated that the aggravating factor existed, submitting it in Magwood's proposed findings. Id. at R-17. After weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances as it found them, the sentencing court again sentenced Mag wood to death by electrocution. Id. at 28 to R-29.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court, Magwood v. State, 548 So.2d 512 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), and the Alabama Supreme Court, in turn, affirmed that decision, Ex parte Magwood 548 So.2d 516 (Ala.1988). The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Magwood v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 291, 107 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). Magwood then filed for post-conviction relief under Alabama's former Criminal Procedure Temporary Rule 20 (now Ala. R.Crim. P. 32). His petition was denied by the trial court and by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Magwood v. State, 689 So.2d 959 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996).

Magwood then simultaneously filed two petitions in federal courts. First, he submitted a request for permission to file a second habeas petition challenging the 1981 judgment of conviction to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eleventh Circuit denied this second petition. In re Magwood, 113 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir. 1997). Second, he filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this court seeking relief from his 1986 sentence. This third petition is the subject of this opinion.

C. Procedural Posture of this Petition

This court split the proceedings on the current petition into two stages: Stage I (determining whether the claims were procedurally defaulted) and Stage II (considering the merits of the claims that were not procedurally defaulted). Having found at Stage I that some claims were procedurally defaulted, Magwood v. Jones, 472 F.Supp.2d 1333 (M.D.Ala.2007) (Thompson, J.), this court now goes on to consider the claims that are not defaulted.

D. Alabama's Death-Penalty Scheme

In order to understand Magwood's claims, it is necessary to understand the development of Alabama's death-penalty scheme during the time period relevant here. There are essentially three eras of the Alabama death penalty during this period of time. See generally Colquitt, The Death Penalty Laws of Alabama, 33 Ala. L.Rev. 213 (1982). The first era involves the operation of Alabama's 1975 capital statute before the Alabama Supreme Court reinterpreted it in Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala.1981), and Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330 (Ala.1981). Relevant parts of that statute, set forth in Title 13, Chapter 11 of the former Alabama Code, are attached as an appendix to this opinion. Under the 1975 statute, a defendant was charged with one of 14 aggravated offenses enumerated in former 1975 Ala....