Magwood v. Jones, Civil Action No. 2:97cv629-MHT.

Decision Date02 February 2007
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 2:97cv629-MHT.
Citation472 F.Supp.2d 1333
PartiesBilly Joe MAGWOOD, Petitioner, v. Charlie E. JONES, Warden, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

James A. Power, Jr., Marguerite Del Valle, Power Del Valle LLP, New York City, for Petitioner.

OPINION AND ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

This case presents, among other things, the interesting question of whether and when the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to separate federal habeas cases arising out of the same state criminal proceeding.

Petitioner Billy Joe Magwood brings this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentence of death, imposed at a 1986 resentencing hearing in Alabama state court for the 1979 murder of the Sheriff of Coffee County, Alabama. This court determined that the case should proceed in two stages: in Stage I, the court would determine which claims had been procedurally defaulted and which non-defaulted claims warranted an evidentiary hearing; and in Stage II, the court would reach the merits of the non-defaulted claims. The case is currently before the court on Magwood's objections to the magistrate judge's Stage I report and recommendation, which addressed which claims this court should consider on the merits.

In an order dated January 27, 2004, the court overruled Magwood's objections to the magistrate's recommendation, with one exception: the court would consider further argument about whether Magwood's claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), are barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." Following additional briefing on whether the Brady claims are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b),1 the court acknowledged that "[w]hether this court is precluded from reviewing petitioner's Brady claims on the merits remains open."2

After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and the relevant case law, the court will overrule Magwood's objections and not allow the Brady claims to proceed to Stage II.

I. BACKGROUND
A. 1981 Conviction and Sentence

Magwood was convicted on June 2, 1981, for the capital murder of the Sheriff of Coffee County, which occurred on March 1, 1979. Thereafter, he was sentenced to death by electrocution. Following exhaustion of his remedies in the state-court system, Magwood filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama challenging his 1981 conviction and sentence ("Petition I"). Petition I contained no claims for violations of Brady v. Maryland.

The district court denied Petition I as to Magwood's conviction, but found that he should be resentenced based on the sentencing court's failure to consider the following two circumstances as mitigating: (1) the capital felony was committed while Magwood was under the influence of extreme mental or emotion disturbance, and (2) the capacity of Magwood to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Magwood v. Smith, 608 F.Supp. 218, 225 (M.D.Ala. 1985) (Hobbs, C.J.). The district court's decision was affirmed on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1986).

B. 1986 Resentencing

A resentencing hearing was held in the Circuit Court of Coffee County, and Magwood was again sentenced to death by electrocution. Following exhaustion of his remedies in the state-court system, Magwood simultaneously filed two petitions in federal court on April 23, 1997. He submitted a request for permission to file a second habeas petition challenging his 1981 judgment of conviction to the Eleventh Circuit ("Petition II"). He also filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this court seeking relief from his 1986 resentence ("Petition III"), which is now before this court. Both petitions contained Brady claims. Petition II alleged that the State suppressed evidence favorable to Magwood during the 1981 trial and sentencing, and Petition III alleged that the State suppressed the same evidence at the 1986 resentencing. The Eleventh Circuit denied Petition II after concluding that Magwood's Brady claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), in part because Magwood failed to "state a constitutional error" under Brady. In re Magwood, 113 F.3d 1544, 1548-49 (11th Cir.1997).

C.Brady Claims

Because the precise nature of the Brady claims is crucial to this court's determination of whether to review them on the merits, the court will set them out at some length.

1. The Brady claims in Petition III

Magwood alleges that "the prosecution withheld important evidence of the manifestations of [his] mental disease which created at least a reasonable probability of reaching a different result at petitioner's resentencing."3 He contends that the resentencing court would not have relied on the jury's finding that Magwood was not mentally ill at the time the offense occurred if this evidence had been available.4 The alleged Brady evidence falls into two categories.

First, Magwood alleges that the State suppressed prison and parole records that demonstrate "that [his] insanity had manifested itself prior to the offense."5 Specifically, he contends the State suppressed (1) a transcript of a July 27, 1976, probation revocation hearing in which the judge stated he was revoking probation because of Magwood's poor mental condition; (2) a September 1978 report by Sheriff Doug Whittle of Geneva County recommending against parole because of Magwood's mental illness; (3) an internal report prepared by William Chesser of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles on September 25, 1978, calling Magwood "mentally ill" and "disoriented;" and (4) a September 20, 1978, memo from Al Smith, Magwood's probation officer, about Magwood's attempted escape that calls attention to Magwood's mental instability.

Second, Magwood claims that the State suppressed the pretrial statements of Drs. Crook and Cooper, made at a sanity hearing held three months after his arrest, wherein they "deemed themselves wholly unable to assess petitioner's mental state." Magwood alleges that the court at resentencing relied upon the record at trial "insofar as it supported the jury's rejection of petitioner's insanity defense," and the record reflects that the jury rejected Magwood's insanity defense, at least in part, due to the testimony of Drs. Crook and Cooper at trial that Magwood was not insane, which conflicted with their earlier acknowledgment that they were unable to assess Magwood's sanity.6

2. The Brady claims in Petition II

In Petition II, Magwood claimed the State suppressed the same evidence of his preexisting mental disorder during the 1981 trial and sentencing, and he sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit to file a second petition challenging his conviction on this ground. In In re Magwood, 113 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir.1997), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) prohibited Magwood from raising the Brady claims in a second habeas petition challenging his 1981 conviction.

With respect to the prison and parole records indicating that the State knew Magwood was insane prior to the offense, the court found that Magwood made no showing why documents, which were in the possession of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles and were produced pursuant to a 1991 discovery order, could not have been located prior to Petition I using these same procedures. Thus, the court concluded that Magwood had failed to exercise the due diligence required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 1549. The court further concluded that Magwood had failed to demonstrate "constitutional error" required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). According to the Eleventh Circuit, Magwood's Brady claims failed because he could not demonstrate that the State "suppress[ed] the documents, which could have been requested by either party at any time." Id. Furthermore, because he was present during the parole revocation, the transcript of that hearing could not have been suppressed. Id. The appellate court also concluded that Magwood had failed to establish by "clear and convincing evidence that admission of the documents would have prevented a reasonable factfinder from convicting him of the underlying offense" as required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). Id.

With respect to the pretrial statements of Drs. Crook and Cooper, the appellate court concluded that Magwood had failed to meet § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) because he and one of his counsel were present at the pretrial sanity hearing where these doctors testified. Therefore, Magwood could not demonstrate that the pretrial statements "could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence." Id. at 1548. The court further concluded that Magwood had failed to demonstrate "constitutional error" required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) because he could not demonstrate "that the State suppressed pretrial statements made in his presence and that of his attorneys." Id.

II. DISCUSSION

There are two separate reasons why Magwood's Brady claims might fail. First, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or successive habeas petitions are allowed only in limited circumstances. Magwood already filed Petition I in 1981; if Petition III is considered a second or successive petition, Magwood can pursue his Brady claims only if he meets the requirements of the AEDPA. Second, in In re Magwood, the Eleventh Circuit already ruled that the Brady claims in Petition II, which were based on the same allegedly suppressed evidence as the Brady claims contained in Petition III, are without merit (that is, that Magwood cannot state a constitutional violation). Because this court is bound to follow decisions of the Eleventh Circuit, this court may be precluded from even considering an argument that calls the circuit court's decision into...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Magwood v. Culliver
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • April 9, 2007
    ...that were not procedurally defaulted). Having found at Stage I that some claims were procedurally defaulted, Magwood v. Jones, 472 F.Supp.2d 1333 (M.D.Ala.2007) (Thompson, J.), this court now goes on to consider the claims that are not D. Alabama's Death-Penalty Scheme In order to understan......
  • Cooper v. Sec'y, Case No. 8:08-CV-5-T-27MAP
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • March 1, 2011
    ...the case number assigned to the instant petition, this Court is persuaded by the conclusion reached by the court in Magwood v. Jones, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2007) that "all federal habeas challenges arising from a state-criminal trial, regardless of whether the defendant was resent......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT