Mahaffey v. Broglin, S 85-697.
| Decision Date | 28 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. S 85-697.,S 85-697. |
| Citation | 630 F. Supp. 1280 |
| Parties | Homer MAHAFFEY, Petitioner, v. G. Michael BROGLIN, Indiana Attorney General, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Homer Mahaffey, pro se.
William Patrick Glynn, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondents.
This petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Homer Mahaffey, an inmate incarcerated at the Westville Correctional Center, in Westville, Indiana. The matter is now before this court on respondents' motion to dismiss, filed as part of their Return to Order to Show Cause. In accord with the dictates of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), the complete state court record has been filed with, and carefully examined by, this court.
A careful examination of the underlying state court record and the opinion of the Supreme Court, Mahaffey v. State, (Ind. 1984), 459 N.E.2d 380, reveals that petitioner has exhausted his available state court remedies per 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982). Both sides having briefed their respective positions, this petition is now ripe for ruling.
Petitioner was convicted in a state court jury trial of Child Molesting, for which he received a determinate sentence of twenty (20) years. This conviction was unanimously affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Indiana. Petitioner now brings this petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner raises the following issues in this application for habeas relief:
Petitioner claims that the trial court's reference during the sentencing to medical reports, submitted earlier in the case, resulted in an enhancement of his sentence by ten (10) years, and thus, violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner was charged with child molesting and entered a special plea of insanity. The trial court, pursuant to state statute I.C. § 35-5-2-2, appointed two physicians to evaluate the petitioner. One of the doctors filed his report dated May 12, 1981, prior to the trial which commenced on May 26, 1981, and the other doctor filed his report dated May 28, 1981, after the trial started. Petitioner's special plea of insanity was withdrawn on the date of trial.
Petitioner contends that the state trial court's later use of the doctors' reports at the sentencing was improper and could not be used as a basis for enhancing his sentence, since at the time he made the disclosures he was required to do so by state statute because of his special plea of insanity. The reports filed by the physicians were not used in the trial, nor were the physicians called at trial to testify. The State never offered nor referred to the medical reports of the physicians concerning the petition.
It is the petitioner's contention that his disclosures to the physicians were confidential and protected by the constitutional provisions against compelling criminal defendants to make disclosures which might be used in the criminal prosecution. He cites Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) as supporting authority.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in its published opinion, fully considered both the state and federal constitutional provisions when affirming the trial court.
Petitioner claims that he should have been warned, prior to or at the time of the examinations, of his Miranda rights, particularly that his disclosures could be used against him at the trial or at sentencing. The trial court referred to the physician's statement (in his report to the court concerning petitioner's sanity at the time of the crime) that Mr. Mahaffey is prone to violence. Petitioner would have this court apply the Estelle v. Smith reasoning and find the trial court's conduct violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, analyzing the facts of this case under the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) standards.
In Estelle v. Smith, the Court determined that Smith's Fifth Amendment privilege was involved when the State used as evidence against Smith the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination. The State informed the trial court that it would be seeking the death penalty, and the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination of Smith to determine his competency to stand trial pursuant to the Texas Penal Code. Smith submitted to an examination conducted in the jail by the court-appointed psychiatrist which interview took 90 minutes. Dr. Grigson determined that Smith was competent to stand trial. Dr. Grigson was not listed as a witness for either the guilt portion or the penalty portion of the trial. However, the State called Dr. Grigson to testify during the penalty portion of the trial, over the objection of counsel, as to Smith's future dangerousness, and the trial court admitted the testimony. Dr. Grigson was the only State witness during the penalty portion of the trial. The jury responded to the questions concerning the penalty in the affirmative and the trial court was required to sentence Smith to death.
The Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith found that the psychiatrist went beyond reporting to the court on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase. The psychiatrist changed his role and became like that of any agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a post-arrest custodial interrogation setting. Id., 451 U.S. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 1875. The Court went on to say that Smith had been given no indication that the compulsory examination would be used to gather evidence necessary to decide whether, if convicted, he should be sentenced to death. He was not informed of his constitutional right to remain silent. Id. Particularly important to the facts in this case is the Court's holding in Estelle v. Smith at 468, 101 S.Ct. at 1876:
Justice DeBruler writing for the Supreme Court of Indiana found that petitioner here had initiated the examinations when he entered his special plea of insanity and that petitioner, in doing so, accepted the fact that he would be then subject to psychiatric examination and evaluation for the purpose of generating evidence admissible in the oncoming trial and useful to the prosecution in defeating his position. Mahaffey v. State, supra at 382. The State Supreme Court found the record before it disclosed that petitioner participated fully and freely in those examinations and voluntarily made the disclosures upon which the doctor based the challenged medical report to the court. Id. The State Supreme Court's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981).
Petitioner asserts that since he withdrew his special plea of insanity the day of the trial, the doctor's report submitted for purposes of determining competency should not have been relied upon by the state trial court judge in determining the sentence. It is the petitioner's position that once he withdrew his special plea of insanity the doctors' reports could not be used for any purposes since he was not warned at the time of the examinations that the disclosures could be used against him. He claims he was required by state statute to submit to the examination and that he did not voluntarily and freely submit to the examinations.
The key distinguishing factor between this case and the Estelle v. Smith is that here petitioner initiated the examination and the State never attempted to use the report in a manner adverse to the petitioner in the trial on the merits. Petitioner entered a special plea of insanity which triggered the state statute requiring the trial court to appoint a psychiatrist to examine and evaluate the petitioner to determine whether he was competent at the time of the alleged acts. Petitioner then freely and voluntarily submitted to the examination making the disclosures to the physicians. In this case, petitione...
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Wolfe v. State
...heard the information at the competency hearing and had the doctor's report before him at the sentencing hearing. In Mahaffey v. Broglin (N.D.Ind.1986), 630 F.Supp. 1280, it was held the trial court was not precluded from relying on such reports at sentencing where the defendant had volunta......