Mahai v. State

• Citation: 474 Md. 648,255 A.3d 1050
• Decision Date: 20 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 41, Sept. Term, 2020,41, Sept. Term, 2020
• Parties: Kenneth MAHAI v. STATE of Maryland
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

474 Md. 648

255 A.3d 1050

Kenneth MAHAI

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 41, Sept. Term, 2020

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 20, 2021

Argued by Nancy S. Forster (Forster & LeCompte, Towson, MD), on for Petitioner.

Argued by Daniel J. Jawor, Assistant Attorney General (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief for Respondent.

Steven M. Klepper, Esquire, Kramon & Graham, P.A., One South Street, Suite 2600, Baltimore, MD, Erica J. Suter, Esquire, Law Offices of Erica J. Suter, LLC, 6301 Ivy Lane, Suite 700, Greenbelt, MD, Megan E. Coleman, Esquire, MarcusBonsib, LLC, 6411 Ivy Lane, Suite 116, Greenbelt, MD, Booth Marcus Ripke, Esquire, Nathans & Biddle, LLP, 120 East Baltimore Street, Suite 1800, Baltimore, MD, J. Bradford McCullough, Esquire, Lerch, Early & Brewer, Chtd., 7600 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 700, Bethesda, MD, for Amicus Curiae Maryland Criminal Defense Attorneys' Association.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ.

Getty, J.

The Court of Special Appeals’ denial of an application for leave to appeal is a "winnowing device[ ] designed to sift precious metal from ordinary silt[,]" similar to this Court's denial of a petition for writ of certiorari. Conaway v. State, 464 Md. 505, 524 n.18, 212 A.3d 348 (2019). The "objective of both processes is the ascertainment of whether there is something about the questions raised in either context that merits further consideration." Id. at 523 n.18, 212 A.3d 348. In this case, we address the constitutionality of § 12-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ") of the Maryland Code, which precludes this Court from reviewing the Court of Special Appeals’ denial of an application for leave to appeal in a postconviction proceeding. After considering the plain language and history of the adoption of Article IV, § 14A of the Maryland Constitution (" Article IV, § 14A"), we hold that Mr. Mahai has failed to demonstrate that CJ § 12-202 clearly violates the Maryland Constitution and thus has failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality that is afforded to CJ § 12-202. We therefore dismiss this appeal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to CJ § 12-202.

BACKGROUND

A. Stabbing and Police Investigation.

The murder of Jermaine Morrison occurred in broad daylight on Nome Street at the Holabird Park Apartments in Woodmere, Baltimore City, Maryland. Several witnesses in the vicinity of the murder recounted their observations to investigators from the Baltimore City Police Department about a street fight that resulted in deadly violence.

One witness, Angel Rodriguez, stated that he left for lunch about noon on October 25, 2005, from his job in the maintenance department of the Holabird Park Apartments. He also lived in the same apartment complex at 1717 Nome Street. On the walk to his apartment, he encountered two individuals that he knew, Mr. Morrison and Kenneth Mahai. Mr. Rodriguez could see and hear Mr. Morrison and Mr. Mahai arguing about "being on the same street."

A second witness, Stephen Smith, was walking from his residence at 1719 Nome Street to a nearby gas station. Mr. Smith observed Mr. Mahai and Mr. Morrison engaged in a fistfight. A third person, unknown to Mr. Smith, broke up the fight, and Mr. Smith watched Mr. Morrison leave on foot.

Phyllis Becote, who lived near Nome Street, was a third witness. About the same time that the first two witnesses saw the street fight, she was alerted by her son that a man had just fallen down on the street. Ms. Becote went outside and saw Mr. Morrison laying on the ground. She instructed her son to call for emergency assistance and then attempted to determine what was wrong with Mr. Morrison. Moving his shirt aside, she saw "a lot of blood." In response, Ms. Becote covered the bleeding wound and waited for an ambulance to arrive.

A fourth—and key—witness, Sharon Mosely, was also a resident of Nome Street. While Ms. Mosely was visiting a friend who lived in the same apartment building as she did, Mr. Mahai entered the apartment and told Ms. Mosely and her friend that he had "just got in a[n] altercation with this guy and he stabbed the guy three times." Mr. Mahai then cleaned a knife off, threw the knife into the trash, took the trash out, and dumped it by a nearby shop.

Meanwhile, Mr. Morrison was transported to Johns Hopkins Bayview Hospital by ambulance where he was pronounced dead. A postmortem examination was conducted by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of Maryland. The medical examiner concluded that Mr. Morrison died of stab wounds to his chest, abdomen, and arm.

While investigating Mr. Morrison's death, the police conducted witness interviews of Ms. Becote, Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Smith, and Ms. Mosely. Ms. Becote was interviewed in a neighborhood canvas. Mr. Rodriquez was later interviewed and told the police that Mr. Mahai and Mr. Morrison were "neighborhood drug dealers" who had an altercation "over territory." In his police interview, Mr. Smith stated that he observed Mr. Mahai hit Mr. Morrison twice in the "chest area" and additionally identified Mr. Mahai in a photo array. Finally, Ms. Mosely provided the police with a taped statement recounting her observations of Mr. Mahai's actions and statements on October 25. Ms. Mosely also identified Mr. Mahai in a photo array and wrote on the array form a short description of the same facts that she provided in the taped statement.

B. First Indictment.

Less than a month after Mr. Morrison's death, Mr. Mahai was arrested on November 20 and charged with the murder of Mr. Morrison. The following month, a grand jury indicted Mr. Mahai on December 19 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on charges of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure, and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon.

An initial trial date was set for April 24, 2006. However, the trial was repeatedly postponed. Mr. Mahai requested the first postponement due to a change in his counsel. The second postponement occurred at the request of Mr. Mahai's counsel because of additional discovery that had been provided by the State. The State then requested the third, fourth, and fifth postponements because of the State's continued difficulty in locating their key witness, Ms. Mosley. At the time of the fourth postponement, Mr. Mahai began asserting his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and that the delay in "bringing [him] to trial was now of constitutional proportion[.]"

On December 6, the State requested yet another postponement because of the ongoing problems in locating witnesses. The circuit court granted the State an additional twenty-four hours to produce its witnesses. However, the next day the State was still unable to produce its witnesses and again requested a postponement. The circuit court denied this request, and the State, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-247(a), entered a nolle prosequi on the record thereby terminating the prosecution and dismissing the charges against Mr. Mahai.

C. Second Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing.

On February 7, 2007, the court issued another warrant for Mr. Mahai's arrest for the same charges of the murder of Mr. Morrison. On April 13, Mr. Mahai was arrested. Six days later, a grand jury indicted Mr. Mahai in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on the same first-degree murder and weapons charges as the first indictment.

Mr. Mahai filed a motion to dismiss on May 17. In the motion, Mr. Mahai raised the identical arguments from his prior trial that his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated as a result of the eighteen-month delay from the time of his first arrest until the time of this motion. The circuit court judge denied Mr. Mahai's motion from the bench. The circuit court judge reasoned that the period of time and causes for the delay were not sufficient to warrant dismissing the case, and the judge had "heard nothing that would deny [Mr. Mahai] a right to a fair trial."

A three-day jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on August 8, 9, and 10. The jury found Mr. Mahai guilty of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure, and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. On September 28, the circuit court judge sentenced Mr. Mahai to life in prison for first-degree murder and a consecutive three-year term for carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. The remaining weapon conviction, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, was merged for sentencing purposes. Mr. Mahai timely noted an appeal.

D. Appeal and Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.

On September 8, 2009, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Mr. Mahai's murder conviction but reversed his weapon convictions. Mahai v. State , No. 1748, Sept. Term, 2007 (filed Sept. 8, 2009). The court first applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), that weighs both the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant, and the court held that Mr. Mahai's right to a speedy trial was not violated.

Next, the intermediate appellate court turned to Mr. Mahai's argument that various jury instructions were erroneous and misleading. Mr. Mahai conceded that his defense counsel at trial ("trial counsel") had not objected to these instructions at trial. However, he argued that on appeal the court should review the instructions for plain error. The court individually analyzed each jury instruction at issue.

On the issue of the opening and closing jury instructions pertaining to reasonable doubt, the court held that plain error review of these instructions was not warranted. On the issue of the opening and final instructions on the state's failure to use investigative techniques, the court held there was no plain error. Notably, on the issue of the jury instruction pertaining to whether a penknife is a dangerous weapon, the court held that the circuit court committed...