Maher v. Town of Brookline

• Decision Date: 14 May 1959
• Citation: 158 N.E.2d 320,339 Mass. 209
• Parties: James J. MAHER et al. v. TOWN OF BROOKLINE et al. ASPINWALL NURSING HOME, INC. v. TOWN OF BROOKLINE, et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 320

158 N.E.2d 320

339 Mass. 209

James J. MAHER et al. v. TOWN OF BROOKLINE et al.

ASPINWALL NURSING HOME, INC. v. TOWN OF BROOKLINE, et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued Feb. 4, 1959.

Decided May 14, 1959.

Charles C. Worth, Boston (Philip M. Cronin, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Daniel G. Rollins, Town Counsel, Brookline (Albert R. Mezoff, Boston, with him), for defendants.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and CUTTER, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

In the first of these cases, representatives of one hundred two lodging house owners in the town of Brookline challenge the validity of certain fire safety regulations passed by the selectmen of that town. In the second, a convalescent and nursing home seeks a determination that it is not within the purview of those regulations. Both cases have been reported without decision for adjudication by this court.

The First Case.

General Laws c. 143, §§ 44 and 45, require that the proprietors of hotels, boarding or lodging houses and family hotels take certain precautions in the matter of fire safety. Section 46 then provides (in part) that '* * * the selectmen of towns may prescribe * * * further provision for the prevention of fires and for the better protection of life in case of fire to be made by the keepers of hotels, boarding or lodging houses or family hotels within their * * * towns. * * *' Purporting to act under the authority of § 46, the selectment of Brookline passed a series of regulations, designated 'Lodging House Regulations,' the purposes of which are the prevention and the warning of fires and quick egress in case of fire. It is alleged in some instances that the structural alterations and installation of fire resistant materials made necessary by the regulations would involve substantial expenditures by the owners.

The plaintiffs contend that the legislative history of § 46 shows that it is intended to apply only to hotels, boarding houses or lodging houses of a minimum capacity and size rather than to all such buildings, and secondly, that the section is limited to the matter of 'watchmen, lighting, alarm systems and notices of means of escape'--nonstructural matters--and that it does not authorize the regulation of matters of construction and structure, dealt with elsewhere in G.L. c. 143.

Section 46 had its genesis in c. 251 of St.1883. Section 1 of that chapter set out certain requirements, the purpose of which was to facilitate egress in case of fire: Two night watchmen were to be kept in hotels, boarding or lodging houses having one hundred or more rooms and being four or more stories high; one night watchman, for such buildings being three stories high and having at least fifty but less than one hundred room; and a designated system of alarms and proper methods of egress for both categories of buildings. Section 2 of that chapter required fire escapes of approved construction for hotels, guest, boarding or lodging houses, and certain other buildings, being three or more stories high and housing or employing specified numbers of persons. Section 3, the ancestor of the present § 46 of G.L. c. 143, provided (in part) that ' * * * the selectment of towns, shall prescribe as they deem necessary, except so far as is specifically required in the preceding sections * * * what further provisions for the prevention of fires, and for the better protection of life in case of fire, shall be made by the several keepers of hotels, boarding or lodging houses within their respective limits * * *.' It is to be noted that the original statute was not limited, as the plaintiffs contend, to watchmen, alarms, notice of means of escape and the like, but dealt (in § 2) with structural matters relating to fire prevention and egress, and required the approval of the local building inspector in this matter of construction of fire escapes. It is to be noted also that § 3 of St.1883, c. 251, unlike and in contrast to §§ 1 and 2 thereof, was not limited to buildings of a specified minimum capacity or size; it applied to all hotels, boarding and lodging houses regardless of size.

Section 3 of St.1883, c. 251, has not been changed in respects here material in the course of achieving its present form in G.L. c. 143, § 46, and has always conferred upon selectmen the broad power to prescribe further provision for the prevention of fire and for the better protection of life in case of fire to be made by keepers of hotels and of boarding and lodging houses. Section 2 of the 1883 statute, through a succession of amendatory acts, is now found in G.L. c. 143, § 21. (Section 1 of the 1883 statute appears in § 44.) Nothing in the history of these sections since 1883 indicates any legislative intention (a) to cut down the authority of the selectmen under § 46 to prescribe additional regulations or (b) to impose any limitation of size or capacity of the facilities which may be made subject to such regulation. Nor do we interpret the history of this legislation as limiting the authority of the selectmen to nonstructural matters. The authority granted under § 46 necessarily includes the power to make regulations dealing with such matters as egress facilities, fire doors and stops, fire resistant walls and ceilings and the like, although such regulations may require that the facilities be altered structurally.

The plaintiffs contend, however, that the lodging house regulations are invalid because they conflict with other sections of c. 143, specifically §§ 3, 21, 22, and 24, the general sections dealing with the authority for local building codes and the sections dealing with fire escapes and fire extinguishers.

The provisions of §§ 44, 45, and 46 are designed to supplement these prior provisions in c. 143 by establishing certain standards relating to fire safety with respect to hotels and lodging houses beyond those applicable to buildings generally. Like other supplementary provisions in that chapter which relate to theatres and halls and to schoolhouses, the provisions are part of a statutory system to require that these facilities be as safe as their particular public use demands. That the implementation of such a legislative policy may be left to local authorities under an express delegation of power is well settled. City of Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass. 372; Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 190, 119 N.E. 687; Opinion of the Justices, 286 Mass. 611, 617-618, 191 N.E. 33.

The plaintiffs also contend that the lodging house regulations which by their terms apply only to lodging houses, are invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws for the reason that no similar regulations have been prescribed as applicable to hotels within the town. Equal protection of the laws requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike. Old Colony R. Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 439, 446, 35 N.E.2d 246; Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 779-780, 126 N.E.2d 795; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923. Equal protection does not, however, prohibit differences in treatment where there is a basis for those differences reasonably related to the purposes which the regulations seek to accomplish. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 157, 112 N.E. 853, L.R.A.1916F, 831; ...