Mahon v. Bd. of Educ. of New York

• Citation: 171 N.Y. 263,63 N.E. 1107
• Parties: MAHON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK.
• Decision Date: 20 May 1902
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

171 N.Y. 263

63 N.E. 1107

MAHON

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 20, 1902.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

In the matter of the application of Catherine F. Mahon for a writ of mandamus against the board of education of the city of New York. From an order of the appellate division (74 N. Y. Supp. 172) reversing an order of the special term granting the writ directing defendant to place the name of the relator on the list of retired teachers, she appeals. Affirmed.Jacob F. Miller and Charles A. Decker, for appellant.

George L. Rives, Corp. Counsel (Theodore Connoly, of counsel), for respondent.

CULLEN, J.

By chapter 296 of the Laws of 1894 there was enacted a provision for retiring and pensioning on half pay male teachers in the city of New York who had served 35 years, and female teachers in that city who had served for 30 years. The fund for the payment of these pensions was to consist of fines and deductions from teachers' wages made for any cause, and from donations or legacies that might be made to it. Chapter 91 of the Laws of 1898 added to the fund 5 per cent. of the excise money or license fee belonging to the city of New York. The relator had been a teacher in a public school in the city of New York, from which position she retired in September, 1892. In 1900 an act was passed (chapter 725, Laws of that year) by which the board of education of the city was directed to place the relator and 32 other teachers, who had also been retired before the establishment of the pension system, on the list of retired teachers entitled to receive as annuities one-half the salaries paid to them while in service, and to pay to them such annuities from the time of their respective retirements, not earlier than the enactment of the statute of 1894. The respondent having declined to place the relator's name on the list, this proceeding was instituted to compel it to take such action.

We agree with the learned appellate division in the view that the statute of 1900 is unconstitutional, and approve the able opinion delivered by that learned court. That the excise money appropriated to the pension fund is public money is plain. People v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367, 44 N. E. 146,32 L. R. A. 344;Fox v. Society, 165 N. Y. 517, 59 N. E. 353,51 L. R. A. 681, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767. I think it is equally plain that the proceeds of the fines and deductions from teachers' wages are also public moneys. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U. S. 464, 10 Sup. Ct. 149, 33 L. Ed. 426. They certainly were the moneys of the city of New York before they were appropriated to the payment of teachers' wages, and when that appropriation failed because through misconduct or absence the teachers were no longer entitled to receive them they necessarily remained the property of the city. I do not see, however, how a contrary view would help the relator. If they are to be regarded as belonging to the teachers, the legislature could not alter the purpose towards which they were originally devoted. Being the moneys of the city of New York, the question is presented whether the legislature could lawfully appropriate them for pensions to persons who had been employés of the city at a time when no pension system was provided by law. We think not. In Town of Guilford v. Board of Sup'rs of Chenango Co., 13 N. Y. 143, the broad doctrine was laid down that: ‘The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which a legal demand exists against the state. It can thus recognize claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these terms, or ingratitude or charity. Independently of express constitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money whenever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and it is the judge of what is for the public good.’ This remained the law till 1875, when the people thought it necessary to impose restrictions, which was done by the constitutional amendments adopted in that year. Section 10 of article 8 provides that ‘no county, city, town or village shall hereafter give any money or property, or loan its money or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, or corporation,’ and section 28 of article 3, ‘The legislature shall not, nor shall the common council of any city, nor any board of supervisors, grant any extra compensation to any public officer, servant, agent or contractor.’ These amendments eliminated all considerations of gratitude and charity as grounds for the appropriation of public moneys, except so far as by article 8 it is provided that these restrictions shall not prevent the municipalities named from making such provision for the aid and support of their poor as may be authorized by law. The claim of the relator falls in direct terms within the restrictions of section 28 of article 3. The relator was a public servant or employé of the city, and the legislature has sought to grant her extra compensation. The argument of her counsel only emphasizes the conflict between the statute and the Constitution. He contends. ‘The act of 1900 is as though the state said to the worn-out and decrepit teachers, ‘You have not been paid enough for your services, and we will now pay you what...