Mahoney v. Beebe
| Decision Date | 10 May 1956 |
| Citation | 134 N.E.2d 126,334 Mass. 165 |
| Parties | John D. MAHONEY v. Anna L. BEEBE and another. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John J. Ryan, Jr., Haverhill, for plaintiff.
George Karelitz, Haverhill (Jason S. Cohen, Haverhill, with him), for defendants.
Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ. RONAN, Justice.
These are appeals from interlocutory decrees overruling a demurrer and confirming a master's report, and from a final decree ordering the defendants, who are husband and wife, to convey a parcel of land upon the payment of a certain sum to them, and ordering the female defendant to pay $300 to the plaintiff on account of chandeliers which she has failed to deliver to him.
It appeared from the report of a master that the defendant on April 29, 1950 entered into a written contract to convey to the plaintiff a parcel of land situated on the corner of Mill Street and Arlington Place in Haverhill for $18,000. The land contained a ten-room house and also a building comprising six rooms and a garage. The contract provided for a conveyance of the large house for $14,000 on or before June 1, 1950. The agreement left a blank space in which to insert either August 29, 1950, or September 1, 1950, as the date for the conveyance of the cottage house and garage for $4,000. Mrs. Beebe had brought a writ in a summary process for possession against the tenant of the cottage on the ground that she needed this house for immediate personal occupancy. The tenant moved out before December 1, 1948, and the defendants moved into the cottage on June 17, 1950. Mrs. Beebe refused to sign the agreement with August 29, 1950, or September 1, 1950, as the date of conveyance of the cottage because, as she asserted, the owner in getting possession for personal occupancy in a summary process would have to live in the cottage for at least six weeks. The agreement so far as it related to the terms of the transfer of the cottage was changed to read, 'It is also agreed and understood that when grantor vacates the grantor agrees to sell and convey said six-room apartment and garage on 2 Arlington Place to the grantee for the sum of $4000, at which time the entire property located at the above address will be vested in the grantee, as soon as grantor vacates.'
The defendants conveyed the large house to the plaintiff on or about June 15, 1950, upon the payment of a total of $14,000 by a warranty deed free from all encumbrances except building and zoning ordinances, and moved into the cottage where they still reside, and refused to transfer the cottage and garage as they agreed to do.
We do not agree with the defendants that they were not compelled to deed the cottage and garage to the plaintiff until they saw fit to vacate the premises. It is true that the written agreement fixed no definite date when they should leave the cottage and garage. It must be assumed that both parties were acting in good faith, and there was nothing to show that the parties understood that any essential item remained to be agreed upon. If, as appears here, nothing remained to be agreed upon but the time for making the transfer, that would be supplied by the law. Consequently there was no error in overruling the demurrer or in ordering the conveyance of the property to the plaintiff upon the payment in accordance with the written agreement. Buono v. Cody, 251 Mass. 286, 291, 146 N.E. 703; Laidlaw v. Vose, 265 Mass. 500, 505, 164 N.E. 388; Lieberman v. Cohn, 288 Mass. 327, 331, 193 N.E. 6; Church v. Lawyers Mortgage Inv. Corp. of Boston, 315 Mass. 1, 6, 51 N.E.2d 450.
The female defendant was ordered by pay the plaintiff $300, the value of the two chandeliers she removed from the big house when she vacated around June 17, 1950. Each of them was attached to a piece of pipe which screwed into a bolt in an iron box in the ceiling and was easily removed. One had been given to Mrs. Beebe as a birthday gift by her husband when she acquired the property in 1934 and the other was previously used by her mother and was installed in the...
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