Mailer v. Mailer

• Decision Date: 08 September 1982
• Citation: 387 Mass. 401,439 N.E.2d 811
• Parties: Beverly Rentz Bentley MAILER v. Norman K. MAILER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 811

439 N.E.2d 811

387 Mass. 401

Beverly Rentz Bentley MAILER v. Norman K. MAILER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Barnstable.

Argued Feb. 4, 1982.

Decided Sept. 8, 1982.

Gerald L. Nissenbaum, Boston, for plaintiff.

Monroe L. Inker, Boston (Stephen C. Maloney and Michael H. Riley, Boston, with him), for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.

BY THE COURT.

At issue is whether a plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the financial aspects of a judgment nisi is "sufficient cause" to grant a plaintiff's motion to dismiss a complaint for divorce. See G.L. c. 208, § 21. Also at issue is the correctness of the Probate Court judge's dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal for failure to file a transcript, as required by Mass. R.A.P. 9(c)(2), as amended, 378 Mass. 935 (1979). Displeasure with the alimony and property settlement award is not "sufficient cause" for dismissal. We therefore hold that the judge properly denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss her complaint. However, since the judge had a copy of the transcript in her possession, we conclude that the judge should not have dismissed the appeal. Therefore, we reinstate the appeal and remand this case to the Probate Court for assembly of a record.

We summarize the facts. The plaintiff was granted a judgment of divorce nisi on March 21, 1980. On September 19, 1980, the plaintiff moved to dismiss her complaint. See G.L. c. 208, § 21. The judge found that the plaintiff wanted a divorce but was dissatisfied with the alimony award and property settlement. The judge also determined that the plaintiff was considering bringing a divorce action in New York in hopes of receiving a larger settlement. The judge concluded that these reasons did not justify dismissal of the complaint. See G.L. c. 208, § 21.

On April 18, 1980, the plaintiff had filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment nisi. Since the plaintiff had not filed a transcript of the proceedings with the register of the Probate Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal on September 4, 1980. See Mass. R.A.P. 9(c)(2). That day, the judge held a hearing on the defendant's motion. At the time of this hearing, the judge had a copy of the complete trial transcript. Pursuant to G.L. c. 215, § 18, she had obtained the transcript at public expense for use in preparing her findings of fact and conclusions of law. ¹ Nevertheless, the judge allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal. See Mass. R.A.P. 10(c), as amended, 378 Mass. 937 (1979).

The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of her appeal. On February 5, 1981, the judge held a hearing on this motion. The motion contained affidavits indicating that on appellate counsel's instructions a legal assistant from his office had telephoned the register's office at the Barnstable Probate and Family Court Department and was told that the transcript had been filed. ² Appellate counsel's claim was that he did not file a transcript of the trial because he relied on the information provided by the register's office. The judge refused to rule on the plaintiff's motion on the basis of the affidavits. Instead, she scheduled a second hearing for the taking of oral testimony. At the subsequent hearing, the judge prohibited the plaintiff's appellate counsel from testifying unless he discontinued representing the plaintiff. The plaintiff's appellate counsel declined to testify under that condition. On March 9, 1981, the judge denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider her dismissal of the appeal. The plaintiff appealed. We granted the plaintiff's application for direct appellate review.

1. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff claims that the judge erred in denying her motion to dismiss the complaint. ³ As the party who initiated the action for divorce, she claims that she has an absolute right to have the complaint dismissed at any time before the judgment becomes final. We disagree.

General Laws c. 208, § 21, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 400, § 26, provides that judgments of divorce nisi "shall become absolute after the expiration of six months from the entry thereof, unless the court within said period, for sufficient cause, upon application of any party to the action, otherwise orders." Under G.L. c. 208, § 21, a judge may only grant a plaintiff's motion to dismiss a complaint for divorce if there is "sufficient cause."

In the past, we have allowed the party who instituted the divorce action to dismiss the complaint. See, e.g., Sheffer v. Sheffer, 316 Mass. 575, 56 N.E.2d 13 (1944); Nicolai v. Nicolai, 283 Mass. 241, 186 N.E. 240 (1933). ⁴ We allowed these dismissals because "the State strongly desires a continuation of the marriage relation, is unfavorable to divorce and favors condonation." Nicolai v. Nicolai, supra at 247, 186 N.E. 240. Thus, we have said that "[a] person entitled to a divorce but not wanting one ought not to be compelled to accept one." ⁵ Sheffer v. Sheffer, supra 316 Mass. at 579, 56 N.E.2d 13.

But that rationale does not apply to this case. In this case, the plaintiff wants a divorce. If the judge grants her motion to dismiss the complaint, she intends to start another divorce action in New York, where she hopes to receive a larger award. Dismissal of the complaint in these circumstances does not foster the continuation of the marriage. Thus, the judge correctly concluded that dissatisfaction with the financial aspects of the judgment nisi and a desire to institute another divorce action in a different forum are not "sufficient cause" to dismiss the complaint. See G.L. c. 208, § 21. Rather than moving to dismiss the complaint, a plaintiff who is dissatisfied with an alimony or property settlement should appeal the judgment nisi. ⁶

2. Motion to dismiss the appeal. The plaintiff concedes that she did not file a transcript of the proceedings in the lower court. Nevertheless, she claims that the judge erred in dismissing her appeal. We agree.

The Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that "each appellant in a civil case shall, within forty days after filing a notice of appeal, deliver to the clerk of the lower court either (i) a transcript of those portions of the transcript of the lower court proceedings which the appellant deems necessary for determination of the appeal, or (ii) a signed statement certifying that the appellant has ordered such portions from the court reporter." Mass. R.A.P. 9(c)(2). Further, Mass. R.A.P. 10(c), as amended, 378 Mass. 937 (1979), provides that a judge may allow an appellee's motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the appellant failed to comply with Mass. R.A.P. 9(c)(2). However, the judge may not dismiss the appeal if the appellant's error was the result of excusable neglect. Mass. R.A.P. 10(c). Cf. Vyskocil v. Vyskocil, 376 Mass. 137, 140, 379 N.E.2d 1090 (1978).

Excusable neglect calls for unique or extraordinary circumstances. Spound v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 534 F.2d 404, 411 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886, 97 S.Ct. 238, 50 L.Ed.2d 167 (1976). The concept of excusable neglect does not embrace "[a] flat mistake of counsel about the meaning of a statute or rule" or other "garden-variety oversight[s]." Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 181, ---, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1980) 2567, 2572, 414 N.E.2d 998. "Sloppiness in following a prescribed procedure for appeal is not encouraged or condoned, but at the same time a distinction is taken between serious missteps and relatively innocuous ones.... [T]he judge [should] consider how far [the mistakes] have interfered with the accomplishment of the purposes implicit in the statutory scheme and to what extent the other side can justifiably claim prejudice." Schulte v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 369 Mass. 74, 79-80, 337 N.E.2d 677 (1975). Thus, we have said that an appeal should not be dismissed for failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure if the procedural error was not attributable to the appellant, see Maurice Callahan & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 376 Mass. 135, 379 N.E.2d 1094 (1978); Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 273-274, 372 N.E.2d 242 (1978), or does not materially prejudice the appellee, Gilmore v. Gilmore, 369 Mass. 598, 341 N.E.2d 655 (1976).

Moreover, if the concept of excusable neglect is to have any meaning, a judge must give counsel for the appellant an adequate opportunity to explain his error. Cf. Beit v. Probate & Family Court Dep't, 385 Mass. 854, 434 N.E.2d 642 (1982). By insisting that the attorney discontinue representing the plaintiff-appellant before he could testify and explain his conduct, the judge denied him that opportunity. ⁷ The judge, therefore, could not properly determine whether the attorney's neglect was excusable.

Ordinarily, we would remand this matter to the trial court for a determination whether the attorney's neglect was excusable. However, we need not remand this case to the Probate Court for consideration of this issue. Rule 3(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that "[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal shall not affect the validity of the appeal, but shall be ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal." Mass. R.A.P. 3(a), as amended, 378 Mass. 927 (1979). "The significance of the quoted provision is that we are authorized to exercise our own independent judgment as to what is 'appropriate' in the circumstances of a given case." Tammaro v. Colarusso, 11 Mass.App. ---, ---, Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. (1980) 2191, 2195, 413 N.E.2d 1118. See Vyskocil v. Vyskocil, 376 Mass. 137, 140 & n. 3, 379 N.E.2d 1090 (1978); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 369 Mass. 598, 602-603, 341 N.E.2d 655 (1976).

The judge had in her possession a copy of the complete trial transcript at the time...