Maillet v. People
| Decision Date | 29 November 1879 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | HENRY MAILLET v. THE PEOPLE. |
In a prosecution for rape it is proper to lay before the jury the natural and actual relations of the accused and prosecutrix as also such other facts as bear fairly on the accusation. A prosecutrix, in proceeding for rape, may testify as to the fact of her making complaint directly after the alleged offence. Certain testimony held not improperly excluded as immaterial. Denial of certain requests of the defendant in this case, based on a rejection of the theory of the prosecution of operation of fear in aiding in overcoming the resistance of the prosecutrix, held properly refused. Charge given as to the effect to be given to evidence of a complaint made, held proper.
Error to Manistee.
Morris & Nelson, for plaintiff in error.
Otto Kirchner, Attorney General, for the people.
The jury found the plaintiff guilty of rape upon Ellen Maillet, a girl between 15 and 16 years of age, and he was sentenced by the circuit judge to imprisonment for a term of years.
He complains of rulings on his trial. The girl was allowed to testify that the prisoner was her father; that he was a man of great strength, had been abusive to his family, and had many times beaten her mother; that he was in liquor when he outraged her, and that she was frightened, and in great fear of him. Many particulars were given.
The admission of this evidence requires no discussion. The principles justifying such evidence have been fully explained and illustrated in this court.
It was proper to lay before the jury the natural and actual relations between the accused and prosecutrix, and also such other facts as bore fairly upon the accusation. Without such aids the charge could not be intelligently investigated. They were necessary clues to truth. Strong v. The People, 24 Mich. 1; People v. Lynch, 29 Mich. 274, 288; Turner v. The People, 33 Mich. 363; Rogers v The People, 34 Mich. 345.
The prosecutrix was asked if she told the priest or any one else about the affair, and if so, who was it she told, and what she said; and this was objected to as irrelevant and immaterial. In overruling the objection the judge remarked that it was competent to show when she first made complaint, and to whom and what she said. An exception having been taken an argument is now made which is not authorized by the record.
It is assumed that on this ruling being made the witness proceeded to repeat before the jury the details embraced in her alleged disclosure to the priest and her mother; but this is not so. And whether a repetition, had it been made in this case would have justified an exception, (People v Lynch, supra, 280, top; Brown v. The People, 36 Mich. 203,) a point upon which, as we express no opinion, it is quite enough that her answer, as given, went no further than to convey that she informed the priest, and at a later time, and after an offer to repeat the injuries, her mother also. This evidence was not objected to; neither was it worthy of objection.
During her cross-examination the prosecutrix testified that, on her leaving the priest's on the occasion when he told her to make a complaint, she found her mother in front of the lumberman's store, waiting to find out what the priest wished in sending for her. The judge interposed by saying that he thought this was entirely immaterial.
The prisoner's counsel claimed that it bore on the girl's credibility, and, in support of that view, added that he intended to prove that the girl did not make the accusation on account of anything the priest had told her, "but on account of what she and her mother made up before." The circuit judge repeated his opinion, and the defence took an exception.
After an attentive examination of the record we are not able to construe this ruling as intended to apply to anything beyond the statement which first prompted the judge to interfere; and while we think that that statement might with great propriety have been allowed to pass without comment, we are not able to hold that the...
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