Main v. Scholl
Citation | 54 P. 1125,20 Wash. 201 |
Parties | MAIN ET AL. v. SCHOLL ET AL. |
Decision Date | 22 November 1898 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; W. H. H. Kean, Judge.
Action by E. Main and C. H. Winchester, partners under the firm name of Main & Winchester, against John D. Scholl and others, to subject certain property to the lien of a judgment. From a judgment for defendants, and an order denying plaintiffs' petition to reopen the case and the denial of a motion for new trial, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Frank D. Nash, for appellants.
Campbell & Powell, for respondent William Virges. G. W. H. Davis, for other respondents.
Appellants concede that the principal question in this case is as to whether property purchased by a married woman having no separate estate, with borrowed money, is, under the law of this state, her separate property or that of the community. The property in controversy was a number of shares of stock in the Puget Sound Brewing Company, which were exposed for sale under an execution issued upon a judgment against the husband on a separate liability, and were bid in by the wife, she at the time obtaining the money to pay therefor by hiring it from a bank, and pledging the property purchased as security for its payment. Section 1398 Hill's Code, provides that the property and pecuniary rights owned by a woman at the time of her marriage, or afterwards acquired, by gift, devise, or inheritance, with the rents, issues, and profits thereof, shall not be subject to the debts or contracts of her husband, etc. There was some attempt in this case to show that the wife had a prior separate estate, and there are other questions presented upon this appeal relating thereto, but, under the view of the first question taken by the court, it will not be necessary to consider them. Sections 1408, 1409, and 1410 are as follows:
The several sections relating to the rights of married women are somewhat conflicting, and in construing them the scope of some is necessarily enlarged and of others restricted. We are of the opinion that, while the property in question was not acquired strictly within the terms of section 1398, she not having owned it at the time of her marriage, and it not having been acquired by gift, devise, or inheritance, or...
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