Maine Cent. R. Co. v. BROTH. OF MAINTENANCE, Civ. No. 86-0311-P.

• Decision Date: 07 October 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 86-0311-P.
• Citation: 646 F. Supp. 367
• Parties: The MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY and the Portland Terminal Company, Plaintiffs, v. BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES and National Mediation Board, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

646 F. Supp. 367

The MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY and the Portland Terminal Company, Plaintiffs, v. BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES and National Mediation Board, Defendants.

Civ. No. 86-0311-P.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

October 7, 1986.

John Spelman, Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Philadelphia, Pa., Charles S. Einsiedler, Jr., Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Portland, Me., for plaintiffs.

John B. Clarke, Jr., Highsaw & Mahoney, Washington, D.C., Craig J. Rancourt, Biddeford, Me., for Brotherhood.

David R. Collins, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, Me., Thomas Millet, Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Washington, D.C., for National Mediation.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

GENE CARTER, District Judge.

In this action for a Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiffs Maine Central Railroad Company and Portland Terminal Company (the "Railroad") seek to enjoin the enforcement of a special act of Congress, Pub.L. 431, 100 Stat. 987 (September 30, 1986) (the "Second Act"), that imposes a settlement of the ongoing labor dispute between Plaintiffs and the Defendant, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (the "Organization").

The Second Act is the successor to a previous special act, Pub.L. No. 385, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat. 819, the enforcement of which this Court declined to enjoin in Maine Central R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Civil No. 86-00263-P, slip op. (D.Me. Sept. 10, 1986). The previous act extended the statutory "cooling off" period under the Railway Labor Act in the dispute until September 18, 1986. In the Second Act, Congress purports to settle the parties' labor dispute by enacting in its entirety the report and recommendations of Presidential Emergency Board No. 209 (the "Board").

The Railroad contends that the Second Act: (1) violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment by impermissibly imposing burdens on a class of one; (2) deprives the Railroad of property without due process; (3) violates separation of powers by adjudicating the rights of the parties; and (4) violates the nondelegation doctrine by delegating legislative authority without established standards. Finding that the Railroad has not met its burden for temporary relief at this juncture, this Court denies the requested relief.

In order to prevail on its motion for a temporary restraining order, the Railroad must satisfy each of four essential requirements. This Court has articulated these requirements on many prior occasions. They are:

"It is well settled law that, in the ordinary case, a plaintiff must satisfy four criteria in order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction. The Court must find: (1) that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury outweighs any harm which the granting of injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3) that plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of the injunction."

Stanton by Stanton v. Brunswick School Dept., 577 F.Supp. 1560, 1567 (D.Me.1984) (quoting UV Industries, Inc. v. Posner, 466 F.Supp. 1251, 1255 (D.Me.1979) (per Gignoux, J.)). Before discussing each of these requirements, the Court first notes the principles of equity that govern the issuance of injunctive relief. Professor Wright has described them as follows:

The classic principles governing availability of injunctions were summarized by Justice Baldwin, sitting at circuit, in 1830: `There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction: but that will not be awarded in doubtful cases, or new ones, not coming within well established principles; for if it issues erroneously, an irreparable injury is inflicted, for which there can be no redress, it being the act of a court, not of the party who prays for it. It will be refused till before them is a right about to be destroyed, irreparably injured, or great and lasting injury about to be done by an illegal act; in such a case the court owes it to its suitors and its own principles, to administer the only remedy which the law allows to prevent the commission of such act.'

"To this day courts continue to stay their hand until there has been a clear showing of irreparable injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.'

3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright Ed.) § 1431.

It is with these principles in mind that the Court considers, in their order of significance to the present motion, the four requirements that the Railroad must meet to prevail.

A. The Public Interest

There are two distinct public interests at stake in this action. One is the general public interest in the validity of a congressional enactment. The other is the public interest in the stability of essential transportation services.

Congress expressly enacted the challenged legislation under its Commerce Clause powers "to ensure the uninterrupted operation of essential transportation services." ¶ 9, Pub.L. 431 (September 30, 1986). It has long been recognized that Congress receives a grant of plenary authority through the Commerce Clause and can exercise this power "to its utmost extent" within the other limitations of the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). It has also long been accepted that Congress may regulate the activities of this nation's railroads. Virginia Railway v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937) (upholding validity of Railway Labor Act). As the Supreme Court explained in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981): "The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding." Id. at 276, 101 S.Ct. at 2360. (Emphasis added). Once the Court is satisfied that Congress has acted within the powers granted to it under the Commerce Clause, "the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether `the means chosen by Congress are reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.'" Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276, 101 S.Ct. at 2360 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964)). Given the circumscribed role of the Court in considering a challenge to commerce power legislation, this Court must hesitate before it overrules a clear expression of congressional policy.

The Court's reticence becomes more profound when the Court considers the effect of the Railroad's request on the second public interest at stake: the preservation of essential transportation services. The Court keeps foremost in mind that the purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo until a final adjudication can be had on the merits. Stanton, 577 F.Supp. at 1567 (citing Toledo, A.A. to N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730 (C.C.N. D.Ohio 1893)). The history of both the congressional and executive intervention in the parties' ongoing labor dispute, however, evidences one consistent theme: the prevention of a debilitating railroad strike by maintaining a status quo that has prohibited self-help. If the Court were to grant the Railroad's request, the temporary restraining order would not preserve the status quo; rather, it would upset a carefully engineered status quo designed by the Congress and the President.

It is clear to the Court that both the Second Act and its predecessor have been instrumental in preventing a resort to self-help by both parties: without the promise of congressional intervention, the Organization, as it has averred before this Court on many previous occasions, would clearly have called a strike in response to the Railroad's plan to implement its new rules. The threat of a railroad strike similar to that which began to paralyze East Coast railway service this past spring, and which arose out of this very labor dispute, is so serious a threat to the public interest that this Court must not act hastily to defeat Congress's policy decision that it should be avoided in the public interest. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 675, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) ("But where an injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest for whose impairment, even temporarily, an...