De Maio v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.
Citation | 230 A.2d 279,247 Md. 30 |
Decision Date | 02 June 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 376,376 |
Parties | Louis J. DE MAIO v. LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Louis J. De Maio, Baltimore, for appellant.
William W. Cahill, Jr., Baltimore (Weinberg & Green, Baltimore, on the brief) for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, BARNES, McWILLIAMS and FINAN, JJ.
De Maio, the appellant, obtained a judgment in Harford County against one McGuire for damages resulting from a collision between automobiles. McGuire was insured by Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, the appellee. De Maio asked Lumbermens to pay the judgment and it refused on the ground that McGuire had failed to notify it of the suit and otherwise had not cooperated. De Maio then recorded his judgment in the People's Court of Baltimore City and issued an attachment in that court against Lumbermens which pleaded nulla bona, asserting in answers to interrogatories that it was not indebted to McGuire, that it had no money or property of his in its possession and had not delivered any to another. To use De Maio's words: Judge Rhynhart found for Lumbermens. De Maio appealed to the Baltimore City Court. The issue on appeal was the same as it has been in the People's Court. After a hearing at which testimony on the point of failure of McGuire to cooperate with Lumbermens was taken, Judge Cullen found for the insurance company on November 18, 1965, as follows:
'Therefore, since the plaintiff is a third party beneficiary of the insurance contract, and, as such, stands in no better position than the insured, this Court will enter a judgment in favor of the Defendant, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, for costs.'
De Maio filed a motion for a new trial, claiming (a) that the insurance policy considered by the trial judge never had been introduced in evidence and therefore was not competent evidence; (b) that the court failed to apply properly § 482 of Art. 48A of the Code, dealing with the necessity for an insurer to show actual prejudice if it is to escape liability on the ground of failure to cooperate; and (c) that there was no showing of actual prejudice by the insurer. After consideration of the memorandum of each party, Judge Cullen held that the insurance policy had come in without objection and rejected De Maio's version of the law as to prejudice.
In February 1966 De Maio filed suit against Lumbermens in the Superior Court of Baltimore City 'for money payable,' alleging the accident, the insurance policy, the suit in Harford County, the notification to Lumbermens by De Maio of the obtention of his judgment against McGuire, Lumbermens refusal to pay, the recording of the judgment in the Superior Court and De Maio's right to judgment. Lumbermens pleaded res judicata by reason of the prior proceedings and judgments in the People's Court and Baltimore City Court. Each side moved for a sumnmary judgment. Judge Sodaro granted judgment for Lumbermens in an opinion which set forth in full Judge Cullen's opinion in deciding the case and his opinion refusing a new trial and held that the suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata 'in that the alleged contractual relationship between Lumbermen's and the defendant, Robert Dale McGuire, was litigated to a conclusion in the Peoples Court of Baltimore City and on appeal in the Baltimore City Court.'
In arguing that Judge Sodaro was in error, De Maio's first contention is that res judicata does not apply because the earlier cases were attachments on a judgment in which the decision necessarily was only that Lumbermens had no funds belonging to McGuire and that such a limited determination does not bar the later successful prosecution of a suit 'to try the case on the merits.' His second contention is that the judgment in the Baltimore City Court was founded on a number of errors committed by Judge Cullen in the course of the trial and that 'the criterion in this matter is...
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