Le Maire v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 03 October 1927
• Docket Number: (No. 186.)
• Citation: 298 S.W. 327
• Parties: LE MAIRE v. HENDERSON et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

298 S.W. 327

LE MAIRE v. HENDERSON et al.

(No. 186.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 3, 1927.

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Frank H. Dodge, Chancellor.

Suit by C. J. Le Maire against D. T. Henderson and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

C. J. Le Maire brought this suit in equity against D. T. Henderson and other members of the county board of education to keep them from proceeding with the consolidation of the school districts of this county under the provisions of an act of the Legislature of 1927, commonly known as the county unit school system. The chancery court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and, the plaintiff declining to amend his complaint or to plead further, it was decreed that his complaint be dismissed for want of equity. The case is here on appeal.

Ed B. Dillon and S. S. Jefferies, both of Little Rock, and J. H. Bowen, of Perryville, for appellant.

Emerson, Donham & Fulk, of Little Rock, for appellees.

HART, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).

This appeal questions the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature of 1927 providing, by a vote of the people, a county unit school system in counties having a population exceeding 75,000. Acts of 1927, p. 531.

Section 1 provides that the act shall apply only to counties, which according to the last federal census preceding the election herein provided for has a population of 75,000 or over.

Section 2 provides that, upon the petition of not less than 100 qualified electors of any county in this state, the county board of education shall within 30 days call an election to be held in said county, at which election the qualified electors shall vote on the question of whether said county, outside of the school districts pertaining to cities with a population exceeding 10,000 inhabitants as shown by the last federal census, shall be made into one school district.

Section 3 provides for the manner of giving notice of said election.

Section 4 provides how the election shall be conducted.

Section 5 provides that in case the county, outside of the districts organized in the cities named, is made into one school district, such district shall become owner of all the property of the former school districts composing it. Special school districts in cities of a population of more than 10,000 inhabitants are not affected by the act.

Section 6 provides that the consolidated district shall be a special or single school district, with all the powers of a single special school district of the first class.

Section 7 looks to protecting the obligations of the contracts of the consolidated districts.

Section 8 provides for a bond issue to borrow money for purchasing sites for school buildings and erecting, equipping, and repairing the same.

Section 9 provides that, for the purpose of administration, the county board of education shall divide the county school district into local divisions, and that the duties of the local trustees shall be outlined by the county board of education.

It is first earnestly insisted that the act is in violation of article 14 of our Constitution relating to the subject of education. That article makes it the duty of the Legislature to provide for the establishment, maintenance, and support of a system of common schools in this state. This court has recognized from the beginning that the Legislature must employ agencies to accomplish that object, and that a school district is a proper agency therefor. To effectuate the purposes of the Constitution, this court has recognized generally that the Legislature has what is commonly called a free hand in the establishment and division of the state into school districts. The power given to the Legislature to classify school districts in any reasonable manner is no longer an open question in this state, and a legitimate classification has been upheld generally unless it has clearly gone beyond reasonable limits in defining the classification. Such classification has been upheld when applied to both cities and rural territory being organized into single or special school districts and into common school districts. The Legislature recognizes the difference in population, wealth, and the topography of the country in the organization of school districts. School Dist. of Hartford v. West Hartford Sp. School Dist., 102 Ark. 261, 143 S. W. 895; Crow v. Sp. School Dist. No. 2, 102 Ark. 401, 144 S. W. 226; Bonner v. Snipes, 103 Ark. 298, 147 S. W. 56; Sp. School Dist. No. 2 v. Sp. School Dist. of Texarkana, 111 Ark. 379, 163 S. W. 1164; and Krause v. Thompson, 138 Ark. 571, 211 S. W. 925.

There is no constitutional objection to the classification of school districts any more than there is to the classification of cities. Classification may become as necessary for school districts as for cities. The needs of school districts may differ as substantially as those of cities. The density of population, the wealth of the country, the system of roads, and the topography of the country with reference to whether it is hilly or not may be taken into consideration. This is the legitimate office of classification, and, so long as the Legislature makes a reasonable classification which is uniform in its operation, its power is supreme in the matter. The uniformity of a system of public schools is not interfered with by providing a general method of the election of trustees and the division of the territory into school districts. State v. Long, 21 Mont. 26, 52 P. 645, and Minsinger v. Rau, 236 Pa. 327, 84 A. 902, Ann. Cas. 1913E, page 1324. In a note to the case last cited, it is said that with the right to create also inheres the right to classify school districts and to enact different...