Major v. City of Hartsville

• Decision Date: 17 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 27446.,27446.
• Citation: 410 S.C. 1,763 S.E.2d 348
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Alberta MAJOR, Petitioner, v. CITY OF HARTSVILLE, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2012–212740.

410 S.C. 1

763 S.E.2d 348

Alberta MAJOR, Petitioner

v. CITY OF HARTSVILLE, Respondent.Appellate Case No. 2012–212740.

No. 27446.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted Sept. 10, 2014.

Decided Sept. 17, 2014.

Michael T. Miller, of Smith Haughey Rice & Roegge, PC, of Ann Arbor, MI for Petitioner.

William Bailey Woods, of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before this Court by way of a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Appeals' decision in Major v. City of Hartsville, 398 S.C. 257, 728 S.E.2d 52 (Ct.App.2012). We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, dispense with further briefing, and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner fell and sustained an ankle injury while walking across an unpaved area of an intersection, which was owned and maintained by respondent. Petitioner asserted her injury was a result of a rut in the ground created by vehicles frequently driving over the unpaved area. Petitioner brought suit against respondent alleging negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton conduct.

Prior to trial, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not liable under the South Carolina Torts Claims Act (SCTCA)¹ because it was not on notice of any rut at the location where petitioner allegedly sustained her injury. At the summary judgment hearing, petitioner presented testimony that respondent was aware drivers often cut the corner at the intersection where the unpaved area was located, leaving ruts. Testimony established that in the past, respondent had a procedure for correcting the issue by filling the ruts with sand or clay. However, further testimony revealed that prior to petitioner's injury, respondent ceased efforts to correct the issue since, according to an employee of respondent, “it was a fruitless effort because a few days later ... it was right back to the same condition.”

The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, finding respondent's knowledge of vehicles cutting the unpaved corner at the intersection did not create a continual condition and did not place respondent on constructive notice of the actual rut.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, referring to the SCTCA and finding although petitioner presented evidence that respondent had notice of circumstances it knew would eventually lead to a rut, there was no evidence respondent had notice of the specific rut petitioner alleged caused her injury. The Court of Appeals further found there was no continual condition sufficient to establish constructive notice and impute liability to respondent.

Constructive notice is a legal inference, which substitutes for actual notice. Strother v. Lexington Cnty. Recreation Comm'n, 332 S.C. 54, 504 S.E.2d 117 (1998). “Constructive notice arises when a condition has existed for such a period of time that a municipality in the use of reasonable care should have discovered the condition.” Fickling v. City of Charleston, 372 S.C. 597, 609–10 n. 34, 643 S.E.2d 110, 117 n. 34 (Ct.App.2007) (quoting Jindra v. City of St. Anthony, 533 N.W.2d 641 (Minn.Ct.App.1995) ). Where a recurring condition is of such a nature as to amount to a continual condition, when coupled with other factors, the recurring condition may be sufficient to create a jury issue as to constructive notice. Fickling, 372 S.C. at 601 n. 37, 643 S.E.2d at 117 n. 37 (citing Wintersteen v. Food Lion, Inc., 344 S.C. 32, 542 S.E.2d 728 (2001) ); see also Henderson v. St. Francis Cmty. Hosp., 303 S.C. 177, 399 S.E.2d 767 (1990) (finding JNOV improper where evidence was presented that debris from trees created a maintenance problem and the defendant failed to use a regular maintenance...