MONTELIONE, RICHARD J., J.
In this action to recover damages from a breach of contract whereby plaintiff paid defendants for goods that were not delivered, plaintiff moves for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215. Defendants oppose.
On a motion for leave to enter judgment against a defendant for the failure to answer or appear, a plaintiff must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim by an affidavit made by the party, and proof of the defendant's default (see CPLR § 3215[f]; Mercury Cas. Co. v. Surgical Ctr. at Milburn, LLC, 65 A.D.3d 1102, 885 N.Y.S.2d 218).
A defendant who has failed to timely appear or answer the complaint must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action, when opposing a motion for leave to enter judgment upon its failure to appear or answer and moving to extend the time to answer or to compel the acceptance of an untimely answer (see Fried v. Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 A.D.3d 56, 58, 970 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262; Ennis v. Lema, 305 A.D.2d 632, 633, 760 N.Y.S.2d 197). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Mid-Hudson Props., Inc. v. Klein, 167 A.D.3d 862, 864, 90 N.Y.S.3d 264; White v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, 41 A.D.3d 709, 710, 838 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608).
In the instant case, plaintiff proffered proof of proper service and a verified complaint (CPLR 3215). In opposition, defendants contend, inter alia, that this matter should be stayed in light of the automatic stay triggered by the bankruptcy petition filed by defendant Kam Yee Wong a/k/a Pany Wong and subsequent adversary proceeding filed by plaintiff herein. However, "[t]he automatic stay provisions of the Federal bankruptcy laws apply only to the parties in the adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court and do not extend to nonbankrupt codefendants" (Maynard v. George A. Fuller Co., 236 A.D.2d 300, 653 N.Y.S.2d 349 [1st Dept. 1997]; Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 6 Cir., 710 F.2d 1194) and "it is in the discretion of the court to grant a severance (see, CPLR 603; King v. Northway Agencies, Inc., 127 A.D.2d955, 512 N.Y.S.2d 559; County of Broome v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 126 A.D.2d 818, 511 N.Y.S.2d 147), as well as a stay (see, CPLR 2201; Houston v. Trans Union Credit Information Co., 154 A.D.2d 312, 546 N.Y.S.2d 600)" (Rosenbaum v. Dane & Murphy, Inc., 189 A.D.2d 760, 592 N.Y.S.2d 391 [2nd Dept. 1993]; see also Maynard v. George A. Fuller Co., 236 A.D.2d 300, 653 N.Y.S.2d 349 [1st Dept. 1997]). As such, the bankruptcy stay in this matter is applicable solely to defendant Kam Yee Wong a/k/a Pany Wong.
Further, defendant's counsel affirms that the remaining defendants were not properly served and did not receive notice of this action. However, "[s]uch an affirmation by counsel is without evidentiary value and thus unavailing" (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 404 N.E.2d 718 [1980]). "[W]hen a defendant submits a sworn denial of receipt of service containing specific facts to refute the statements in the affidavit of the process server, the prima facie showing is rebutted and the plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing" (U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Peralta, 142 A.D.3d 988, 988-989, 37 N.Y.S.3d 308). "A hearing is not required where the defendant fails to 'swear to specific facts to rebut the statements in the process server's affidavits'" (U.S. Bank, N....
