Makowski v. City of Naperville

• Decision Date: 02 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 2-92-1181,2-92-1181
• Parties: , 187 Ill.Dec. 530 Steven MAKOWSKI, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF NAPERVILLE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1251

617 N.E.2d 1251

249 Ill.App.3d 110, 187 Ill.Dec. 530

Steven MAKOWSKI, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF NAPERVILLE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-92-1181.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Aug. 2, 1993.

Peter H. Jagel, Knuckles & Jagel, Naperville, for Steven Makowski, Richard Swanson, Ronald Calaway, and Kent Novatny.

Marvin J. Glink, Jeffrey D. Greenspan, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Cope & Bush, P.C., Chicago, for City of Naperville.

Justice UNVERZAGT delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Steven Makowski, Richard Swanson, Ronald Calaway and Kent Novatny, appeal from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County denying their motion for partial summary judgment and granting defendant's, the City of Naperville's (City's) motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that: (1) the trial court's refusal to provide findings of fact or law regarding the basis for its summary judgment decision was reversible error; (2) the trial court erred in reaching its summary judgment decision if it considered certain affirmative defenses raised by defendant; and (3) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.

The relevant facts, as gleaned from the record, are as follows. Plaintiffs are each owners of residential property located along River Road within the City's municipal boundaries. Plaintiffs' properties are all located in the Countryside subdivision (Countryside).

Countryside was developed in four phases after it was annexed by the City in 1977. Plaintiffs contracted for the construction of their homes in Countryside between December 1985 and February 1986 in phase two of the Countryside development. Three plaintiffs took possession of their homes in June 1986, and the fourth took possession of his home in September 1986.

To the immediate south of Countryside is land within the City's municipal boundaries known as the Fields subdivision (Fields). In 1976, the Naperville city council (City Council) approved a planned unit development (PUD) preliminary plat for the Fields by enacting ordinance 76-53. The Fields preliminary plat shows an unnamed, generally north-south roadway running north from the proposed Book Road extension through the Fields to the then-undeveloped Countryside. As depicted in the preliminary plat, the roadway abruptly curves to the west as it approaches the northern boundary of the Fields. The Fields preliminary plat remained in place until December 1, 1986, when the City Council approved a final plat for the Fields. In the Fields final plat, the roadway shown in the preliminary plat has been realigned.

The development of the Fields included the construction in 1987 of the north-south roadway shown in the Fields plats. The road became part of River Road. River Road in the Fields was designed and constructed as a local street. Plaintiffs contend that the extension of River Road from the Countryside through the Fields to the Book Road extension has resulted in severe traffic problems and safety concerns for them as homeowners along River Road.

In 1988, plaintiffs first sought judicial relief from these purported problems by filing a claim in Federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). In a memorandum opinion and order, dated December 20, 1989 (Makowski v. City of Naperville, No. 89-C-5043, 1989 WL 157474), the Federal court dismissed count I (the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 count) of plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, and found no reason to retain the pendant State claims which constituted counts II through VII of plaintiffs' complaint.

On May 10, 1990, plaintiffs filed a six-count complaint in State court. Plaintiffs' amended complaint contains seven counts. Counts I and II seek mandamus. Counts III and IV allege common-law negligence. Count V alleges statutory negligence. Count VI alleges public nuisance. Count VII seeks a declaratory judgment.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (plaintiffs' motion was for partial summary judgment, reserving the question of damages). The trial court subsequently entered a final order denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs appeal from the final order on the summary judgment motions.

The first issue is whether the trial court's failure to provide findings of fact or law as a basis for its summary judgment rulings prevents effective appellate review and is therefore reversible error. The trial court issued a letter ruling concerning, inter alia, plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and defendant's motion for summary judgment. The letter ruling indicated that the trial court had "read and considered everything tendered to it" regarding the summary judgment motions. The letter ruling also indicated that the rulings were made in the light of the attorneys' oral arguments at a prior hearing. The trial court provided no further explanation for its rulings and made no explicit findings of fact or law.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to clarify and for findings. At a hearing on that motion, plaintiffs' counsel explained to the trial court that plaintiffs sought clarification because the letter ruling granted defendant partial summary judgment when defendant had made an unqualified motion for summary judgment. The trial court responded that it had understood that the matter concerned cross-motions for partial summary judgment and then stated it would enter the written order as tendered (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment).

At the same hearing, plaintiffs stated that they assumed the trial court's ruling was based on the court's conclusion that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Plaintiffs then asked the trial court whether it had made some legal conclusions or findings based upon those undisputed facts, and whether that could be a part of the order to clarify exactly what the basis of the decision was. The trial court replied "I can't say that I had done that," and, despite plaintiffs' request for elaboration, the trial court entered the order with no further explanation for its ruling.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court did not understand the relief requested by defendant in its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court stated that it had not made any legal conclusions or finding of fact. Plaintiffs argue that such silence prevents effective review and cite two Federal cases (Smith v. Village of Maywood (7th Cir.1992), 970 F.2d 397; Freeman v. Franzen (7th Cir.1982), 695 F.2d 485) for the principle that such silence is reversible error.

In general, in a nonjury case, "[n]o special findings of fact, certificate of evidence, propositions of law, motion for a finding, or demurrer to the evidence is necessary to support the judgment or as a basis for review." (134 Ill.2d R. 366(b)(3)(i).) In appeals from summary judgment rulings, a reviewing court conducts a de novo review. (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 154 Ill.2d 90, 102, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204.) It is the judgment and not what else may have been said by the lower court that is on appeal to the reviewing court. (Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill.2d 382, 387, 75 Ill.Dec. 219, 457 N.E.2d 9.) The reviewing court's function in reviewing a summary judgment is to determine whether the trial court correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the trial court correctly entered judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. (Fitzwilliam v. 1220 Iroquois Venture (1992), 233 Ill.App.3d 221, 237, 174 Ill.Dec. 371, 598 N.E.2d 1003.) In the light of the record made at the time the trial court ruled (Rayner Covering Systems, Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co. (1992), 226 Ill.App.3d 507, 509, 168 Ill.Dec. 634, 589 N.E.2d 1034), a reviewing court may sustain the decision of the trial court on any grounds called for by the record, regardless of whether the trial court made its decision on the proper ground. Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill.2d 496, 502, 117 Ill.Dec. 47, 520 N.E.2d 37.

Based on these principles, we conclude that it is not reversible error for a trial court to fail to provide findings of fact or law when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. While such a failure can leave the nonprevailing party in a quandary as to exactly why the trial court ruled as it did, it is the ruling which is being appealed, not the reasons for the ruling.

Because the reviewing court conducts a de novo review of the entire record in reviewing a summary judgment, the trial court's reasons for its ruling are not absolutely necessary for effective appellate review. A reviewing court must determine whether the record reveals disputed issues of material fact or errors in entering judgment as a matter of law. In making this determination, a reviewing court may rely on any grounds called for by the record and is not bound by the trial court's reasoning.

Plaintiffs' reliance on the Federal cases cited is unavailing. Those cases involve questions of the reasonableness of the amount of trial court awards for attorney fees and whether the trial court abused its discretion in making the awards. (Village of Maywood, 970 F.2d at 399; Freeman, 695 F.2d at 494.) Under those circumstances, the failure of the trial court to provide the reasoning behind its decision prevented effective appellate review. Village of Maywood, 970 F.2d at 399.

Here, we are reviewing the trial court decision granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. As seen above, our review is de novo and based on the entire record, and our determination is not dependant upon the trial court's reasoning. Consequently, the trial court's failure to provide the reasoning behind its decision does not prevent effective ...