Rayner Covering Systems, Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co.
Decision Date | 20 March 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 2-91-0609,2-91-0609 |
Citation | 168 Ill.Dec. 634,589 N.E.2d 1034,226 Ill.App.3d 507 |
Parties | , 168 Ill.Dec. 634 RAYNER COVERING SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. DANVERS FARMERS ELEVATOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Frederick J. Steffen (argued), Steffen & Carroll, Elgin, for Danvers Farmers Elevator Co.
William H. Weir (argued), Daniel E. Compton, Brittain, Ketcham, Strass, Terlizzi, Flanagan, Weir, Johnson & David, P.C., Lawrence I. Crisanti, Muscarello, Crisanti & Young, Elgin, for Rayner Covering Systems, Inc.
Danvers Farmers Elevator Company (Danvers) appeals after a full trial in this contract damages action. Danvers argues that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the seller, Rayner Coverings Systems, Inc. (Rayner). The court found that a limitation of damages clause in the contract for the sale of a corn storage tarpaulin insulated Rayner from liability for consequential damages. We affirm.
In the summer of 1986, Danvers contracted with Rayner for the custom manufacture and delivery of a tarpaulin intended to cover a temporary outdoor corn storage facility. Rayner delivered the tarpaulin late and it was the wrong size. Much of the unprotected corn spoiled due to heavy rain showers. Rayner sued Danvers for the remainder of the purchase price and costs. Danvers filed a counterclaim for return of the $7,000 down payment and other damages.
After a full trial on the merits, Danvers appeals from a partial summary judgment order that the trial court granted to Rayner prior to trial. In that partial summary judgment order, the trial court interpreted a contract clause as insulating Rayner from liability for consequential damages. This court dismissed an earlier appeal from that partial summary judgment order for lack of jurisdiction (Danvers Farmers Elevator Co. v. Rayner Covering Systems, Inc. (1990), 196 Ill.App.3d 1104, 164 Ill.Dec. 210, 582 N.E.2d 773, (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)). In the final order of the case, the trial judge found that Rayner had breached the contract because it delivered an improperly sized tarpaulin. He ordered Rayner to return the $7,000 down payment to Danvers in exchange for Danvers' return of the tarpaulin. The trial judge found that the late delivery was immaterial since Danvers did not start filling the storage facility until three days after actual delivery. Danvers made a timely appeal.
Danvers argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the clause at issue barred recovery of consequential damages from Rayner. Rayner urges this court to affirm the partial summary judgment order as a proper interpretation of the clause based on the record before the trial court at that time. Rayner also urges this court, in a motion that we ordered to be taken with the case, to strike certain portions of Danvers' brief which Rayner claims are not supported by the record.
As a preliminary matter, we first address Rayner's motion to strike all or part of Danvers' brief. Rayner argues that Danvers' brief contains citations to material not of record at the time of the summary judgment hearing and new arguments that were not presented or heard at the hearing. Danvers summarily argues that the material and arguments used in its brief are in the record as a whole and should therefore be considered by this court. Danvers did not submit any depositions or affidavits in opposition to Rayner's motion for partial summary judgment. However, Danvers argues that the affidavit of James Vierling, the manager of the Danvers Company, which was submitted to the trial court with Danvers' motion to reconsider the partial summary judgment order, should be considered by this court.
Rayner correctly states that upon appellate review of a summary judgment ruling the appellant may only refer to the record as it existed at the time the trial court ruled, outline the arguments made at that time, and explain why the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. (See Certified Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Wight & Co. (1987), 162 Ill.App.3d 391, 397, 113 Ill.Dec. 888, 515 N.E.2d 1047.) We agree with Rayner that Danvers' brief improperly refers to various parts of the record which were not yet of record at the time the trial court granted Rayner's motion for partial summary judgment. We note that the statement of facts and argument section in Danvers' brief contains citations to trial testimony and to Vierling's affidavit, all of which were not of record when the trial court decided Rayner's motion. For purposes of this opinion, we will therefore limit our review of the record to the record as it existed when the trial court granted Rayner's motion for partial summary judgment. We will also limit our reading of Danvers' brief to those sections which rely on the record as it existed at that time.
Rayner also argues that Danvers should be limited to the arguments that it presented to the trial court at the hearing on Rayner's motion. As authority, Rayner cites Rahill Corp. v. Urbanski (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 769, 79 Ill.Dec. 211, 463 N.E.2d 765, where the court stated a two-tier standard of review for summary judgment cases. Initially, the appellate court reviews de novo the initial summary judgment decision ( Rahill, 123 Ill.App.3d at 777, 79 Ill.Dec. 211, 463 N.E.2d 765), that is, whether the trial court here erred as a matter of law in interpreting the contract clause. The Rahill court then stated:
Rahill, 123 Ill.App.3d at 777, 79 Ill.Dec. 211, 463 N.E.2d 765.
We find Rahill instructive in that it states that the parties should make a full presentation of evidence and arguments at the initial summary judgment hearing, rather than at a later hearing on a motion to reconsider or, even later yet, when the case is on appeal. Danvers' response to Rayner's motion consisted of a two-page memorandum which contained minimal invocation of supporting case law, and to which no deposition excerpts or affidavits were attached. Danvers could have easily attached an affidavit or the relevant sections from the deposition of James Vierling. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Danvers' motion to reconsider. We also limit our consideration of Danvers' arguments on appeal to those which were also made to the trial court at the initial summary judgment hearing. See Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill.2d 223, 225, 230 N.E.2d 831 ( ); Cardamone v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 435, 441, 7 Ill.Dec. 299, 364 N.E.2d 460 ( ).
We now address the substance of this appeal. Danvers argues that the trial court erred by granting Rayner's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue whether the limitation of damages clause insulated Rayner from liability for consequential damages. The clause at issue is on page 2 of the three-page contract, the second of 11 "Terms and Conditions," and states:
We briefly note the parameters of our review. Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment may be granted as a matter of law. (Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores (1990), 142 Ill.2d 152, 165, 154 Ill.Dec. 606, 568 N.E.2d 827.) The court must construe all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions strictly against the movant. (Mitchell, 142 Ill.2d at 165, 154 Ill.Dec. 606, 568 N.E.2d 827.) Where other facts are not in dispute, construing a contract clause as a matter of law may be suitable for partial summary judgment. See National Underground Construction Co. v. E.A. Cox...
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