Malacina v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Merit Bd.
| Docket Number | 1-19-1893 |
| Decision Date | 23 June 2021 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (1st) 191893,197 N.E.3d 182,458 Ill.Dec. 769 |
| Parties | Walter MALACINA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S MERIT BOARD; James P. Nally ; Byron Brazier; Gray Mateo-Harris; John J. Dalicandro; Jennifer E. Bae; Kim R. Widup; Patrick Brady; Vincent T. Winters; and Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Christopher Cooper, of Law Offices of Christopher Cooper, Inc., and Lilia M. Malacina, both of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Lyle K. Henretty, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for appellee Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board.
Stephanie A. Scharf and George D. Sax, of Scharf Banks Marmor LLC, of Chicago, for appellee Thomas J. Dart.
No brief filed for other appellees.
¶ 1 In March 2016, the Cook County sheriff filed disciplinary charges against plaintiff Walter Malacina, a deputy sheriff, before defendant Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board (Board). The Board ultimately decided to terminate Malacina. Malacina then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. Initially, the circuit court affirmed, finding that the Board's findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that its punishment was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
¶ 2 Malacina moved to reconsider, arguing that the Board's decision was invalid because the composition of the Board was illegal under this court's holding in Taylor v. Dart , 2017 IL App (1st) 143684-B, 414 Ill.Dec. 735, 81 N.E.3d 1, which invalidated a Board decision because one of the Board's members was serving an unauthorized term. Here, Malacina argued, two other members of the Board (Patrick Brady and Gray Mateo-Harris) were likewise serving unauthorized interim terms, and, thus, the Board's adverse decision against him was invalid, too. The circuit court granted reconsideration, found the Board's composition invalid, and remanded for a new hearing before a properly constituted Board.
¶ 3 Those remanded proceedings were stayed, however, on the sheriff's motion and with the consent of Malacina, to await pending decisions from this court in Lopez v. Dart , 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, 427 Ill.Dec. 379, 118 N.E.3d 580, and Cruz v. Dart , 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, 431 Ill.Dec. 388, 127 N.E.3d 921. Those cases ultimately held that later Taylor challenges to the composition of the Board were not actionable under the de facto officer doctrine, which confers validity on an official's public actions, even though it is later discovered that the official's appointment to public office was deficient. Those decisions relied on the "first challenger" proviso to the de facto officer doctrine, such that, while Mr. Taylor was entitled to relief under Taylor , any later challengers raising the same claims—such as Lopez and Cruz—were barred by the de facto officer doctrine from collaterally attacking completed administrative proceedings. See Lopez , 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, ¶ 59, 427 Ill.Dec. 379, 118 N.E.3d 580 ; Cruz , 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, ¶ 38, 431 Ill.Dec. 388, 127 N.E.3d 921.
¶ 4 Armed with those decisions, the sheriff returned to the circuit court and asked for reconsideration of its order remanding the case for a new hearing. The sheriff argued that, in light of Lopez and Cruz , Malacina's challenges to the Board's composition were barred by the de facto officer doctrine.
¶ 5 The circuit court agreed. The court reconsidered its judgment once more and ruled in favor of the sheriff on the question of the Board's composition. The court thus reinstated its original judgment in favor of the Board and against Malacina and denied Malacina's motion to amend his complaint.
¶ 6 On appeal, Malacina claims that the circuit court was wrong in its application of the de facto officer doctrine; that the court should have allowed him to amend his complaint; that the Board's findings should be reversed; and that the Board violated state law in delaying its disposition of the matter.
¶ 7 We affirm in all respects. The circuit court correctly navigated a shifting body of law and landed properly on denying Malacina's claim regarding the Board composition under the de facto officer doctrine. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The Board's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and its ultimate discipline was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Nor did the Board violate state law.
¶ 10 Because we begin with our discussion of Malacina's challenge to the Board's composition and related arguments, we will only outline here the procedural sequence below, reserving for later the substantive discussion of the evidence at the administrative hearing.
¶ 11 On March 18, 2016, Sheriff Dart filed disciplinary charges against Malacina over an incident on the evening of October 11 and the early morning of October 12, 2014, in Alsip, Illinois. In broad strokes, the sheriff claimed that Malacina, a deputy sheriff, committed multiple rule violations in that he left his duty weapon unsecured in his vehicle while drinking inside a bar; drove his car while intoxicated; while driving, narrowly avoided striking three women while they crossed the street and struck one of them in the hand; left his vehicle with his firearm, pointed it at one of the women, and threatened to kill them with impunity, given his status as a law enforcement officer; and did not truthfully respond to later questions about the incident from law enforcement.
¶ 12 In June 2016, the Board began conducting a hearing in Malacina's case. In October 2016, the Board found that Malacina had engaged in the complained-of conduct and that his infractions warranted dismissal. Board members Patrick Brady and Gray Mateo-Harris, both of whom were serving pursuant to interim appointments, participated in and signed the decision to terminate Malacina, as did members John Dalicandro and Vincent Winters.
¶ 13 Malacina filed a complaint for administrative review in circuit court in November, claiming only that the Board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court disagreed and upheld the Board's findings.
¶ 14 Malacina then moved for reconsideration, relying on the recent decision in Taylor v. Dart , 2017 IL App (1st) 143684-B, ¶¶ 53, 55, 414 Ill.Dec. 735, 81 N.E.3d 1, where we held that the Board had been illegally constituted—that is, the appointment of John Rosales to the Board was made in violation of the state law authorizing the appointment. Malacina raised two objections to the composition of the Board: (1) two other members (Mateo-Harris and Brady) were serving improper interim appointments and (2) two additional members (Dalicandro and Winters) were serving nonstaggered terms in violation of state law. Thus, Malacina argued, these improper appointments rendered the Board's decision against him null and void.
¶ 15 Though the circuit court expressed dismay that this argument was raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider, the court nevertheless felt bound by Taylor and thus vacated its original judgment and remanded the matter to the Board for a new hearing before a Board that was legally constituted.
¶ 16 Recognizing the pending decisions in Lopez and Cruz , however, the sheriff moved for a stay of those remanded administrative proceedings before the Board, and Malacina's counsel (at the time) told the hearing officer that Malacina had "no objection" to a stay.
¶ 17 Enter Lopez and Cruz . As noted, each decision held that, while the first person to challenge the Board's composition (Mr. Taylor of Taylor v. Dart ) was entitled to relief from the invalid composition, any subsequent challenger to a completed administrative decision by the Board was barred by the de facto officer doctrine from raising the same compositional defect. See Lopez , 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, ¶ 59, 427 Ill.Dec. 379, 118 N.E.3d 580 ; Cruz , 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, ¶ 38, 431 Ill.Dec. 388, 127 N.E.3d 921.
¶ 18 The sheriff then asked the circuit court to once again reconsider its judgment in light of Lopez and Cruz , arguing that the de facto officer doctrine barred Malacina's challenge to a completed Board decision. The circuit court agreed with the sheriff and reinstated its original judgment in the Board's favor. Malacina says this was legal error.
¶ 19 Since the briefing on this appeal was initially completed, both parties called our attention to our supreme court's holding in Goral v. Dart , 2020 IL 125085, 450 Ill.Dec. 384, 181 N.E.3d 736, which indeed contains an authoritative discussion of the de facto officer doctrine. Our discussion borrows heavily from that recent decision.
¶ 20 The de facto officer rule is a common law equitable doctrine that confers validity on acts performed by an official acting under the color of official title, even though it is later determined that the official's appointment to that position was legally deficient. Id. ¶ 71. The point is to avoid the chaos that would result from countless lawsuits challenging prior actions of that official—which could number in the hundreds or thousands—once it is determined that the official's appointment was invalid. Id. The need for stability and finality in governmental decisions outweighs the need to correct decisions by that (invalidly appointed) official that were issued months or even years earlier.
¶ 21 But the doctrine was never intended to preclude a timely challenge to an official's authority; it is, instead, a defense to a collateral challenge brought after the official's action has been completed. Id. ¶ 73. So if a litigant challenges that official's authority to act within that very administrative proceeding or contemporaneously with it—that is, before a final decision has been rendered—the de facto officer doctrine...
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