Maldonado v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 11–1473 (BAH).

• Decision Date: 21 February 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1473 (BAH).
• Citation: 924 F.Supp.2d 323
• Parties: Jose Luis MALDONADO, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

924 F.Supp.2d 323

Jose Luis MALDONADO, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–1473 (BAH).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Feb. 21, 2013.

Raleigh W. Bynum, II, Bynum Firm, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

James Anthony Towns, Sr., Darrell Chambers, Office of the Attorney General for DC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Jose Luis Maldonado brings this action against the District of Columbia (“the District”) and Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officers D. Hong, L. Webb, A. Salleh, and other unknown officers (the “Defendant Officers”), seeking recovery for injuries allegedly sustained when the Defendant Officers arrested the plaintiff following an altercation on the streets of Washington, D.C. in August 2008. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 6–11, ECF No. 18. The plaintiff alleges four separate causes of action: use of excessive force (Count I) and unlawful arrest (Count II) in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as negligent supervision (Count III) and negligent failure to train (Count IV) by the District. Id. ¶¶ 36–56. The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of not less than $250,000 and punitive damages of not less than $250,000. Id. at 8.

The District has filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment,¹ seeking to dismiss all claims against it. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J. (“Def.'s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 22. As to Counts I and II, the District argues that the plaintiff has failed to plead adequately that a government policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations, as required to secure municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Mem. of P & A in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Mem.”) at 5, ECF No. 22–1 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Reply”), at 3, ECF No. 26. As to Counts III and IV, the District argues that the plaintiff failed to comply with D.C. Code § 12–309, which requires a plaintiff to notify the Mayor of the District of Columbia “within six months after the injury or damage was sustained ... of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.” Def.'s Mem. at 7 (citing D.C. Code § 12–309). Finally, the District contends that it is immune from the plaintiff's claim to punitive damages. Id. at 8–9. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the District's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

On or about August 15, 2008,² the plaintiff was walking with a group of co-workers along 7th Street, NW, in Washington, D.C. SAC ¶¶ 12–13. The plaintiff alleges that, while walking together, one member of the group named Jeff Kenny made “loud and disparaging comments regarding ... a group of transvestites,” and a verbal confrontation ensued. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. The plaintiff says that he told Kenny to leave the group alone, but as he “was in the midst of calming the situation, the transvestites inexplicably sprayed him with mace.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17. The plaintiff was escorted to a nearby McDonald's to attempt to wash his eyes out with water, but this was unsuccessful, leaving the plaintiff “essentially blind and defenseless.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. The plaintiff was then allegedly “led back outside to an escalating confrontation, then altercation” between certain members of his group and the group of transvestites that had allegedly sprayed the plaintiff with mace. Id. ¶ 20. The SAC alleges that the plaintiff then found himself “in the midst of a violent physical altercation between two parties involving multiple people.” Id. ¶ 22. During this altercation, the plaintiff claims to have “shouted some profanities as he attempted to protect himself and retrieve personal items dropped in the melee, including monies, a work knife, and a phone.” Id. ¶ 23.

The plaintiff says that a chase ensued, with members of his group pursuing the transvestites, but he claims that he did not participate in this chase “due mainly to his effective blindness.” Id. ¶¶ 24–25. At this point, the plaintiff alleges that he was tackled by Defendant Officers and was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon (knife), assault on a police officer, and simple assault, and placed in a police transport van. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. The plaintiff also alleges that, following his detention, the Defendant Officers “became violent and excessively physical” while one of his associates—Marcus Moulcrie—tried to explain to the officers that the plaintiff had not been involved in the physical altercation. Id. ¶ 29. Relatedly, the plaintiff claims that Moulcrie tried to record the arrest on his cellular phone—which led to Moulcrie's arrest and the confiscation of his phone—and, after Moulcrie's phone was returned to him, “all saved pictures and video had been removed.” Id. ¶¶ 30–31. The plaintiff alleges that he was taken out of the transport van and “assaulted and battered” by the Defendant Officers. Id. ¶ 32. In particular, while the plaintiff was in detention, he alleges that Defendant Officers “violently struck [him] in the rib area, twisted his arms, and ... kicked him in the face, resulting in severe mouth trauma and tooth avulsion.” Id. ¶ 33. He was then allegedly taken to George Washington Hospital for treatment. Id. ¶ 34. The charges of assault with a deadly weapon and assault on a police officer were later dropped, and on January 26, 2009, the plaintiff was acquitted, at trial, of simple assault. Id. ¶ 35.

On February 10, 2009, the plaintiff, through counsel, sent a pre-suit notification letter to then-Mayor Adrian Fenty, which notified the District that, as a result of the events on August 16, 2008, the plaintiff “may assert civil claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, negligence and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress.” See Letter from Raleigh W. Bynum, II to Adrian M. Fenty (Feb. 10, 2009) (“Notice Letter”) at 1, ECF No. 22–2. The plaintiff originally filed his Complaint on August 15, 2011. See Compl., ECF No. 1. After the District filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on January 3, 2012, see ECF No. 5, the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 20, 2012, see ECF No. 9. The District once again filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on February 6, 2012, see ECF No. 10, and after seeking leave of the Court on March 19, 2012, see ECF No. 16, the plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on March 29, 2012, see ECF No. 18.

The Second Amended Complaint states four separate causes of action. The first cause of action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the Defendant Officers “wrongfully and unlawfully used excessive and unreasonable force” on the plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the District “approved and/or condoned the actions of the Defendant Officers,” which the plaintiff claims “impute[s] [liability] to all Defendants.” SAC ¶¶ 36–40. The second cause of action, also brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the Defendant Officers “committed acts which deprived Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights to be free from an unreasonable seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. As to both Counts I and II, the plaintiff alleges that, as a proximate result of the conduct alleged, he suffered “severe personal injuries,” and “severe emotional distress and mental anguish.” Id. ¶¶ 41, 44. The third cause of action alleges that the District “created an unreasonable risk of harm to the Plaintiff by failing to supervise, control, or otherwise monitor the actions of its employees,” which proximately resulted in “physical and mental injury, damages, and loss of liberty” to the plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 45–50. The fourth cause of action alleges that the District “created an unreasonable risk of harm to the Plaintiff by failing to adequately train its employees,” which resulted in the same injuries alleged in Count Three. Id. ¶¶ 51–56. Currently pending before the Court is the defendant District of Columbia's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.³ For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the District's motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Instead, the complaint must plead facts that are more than “ ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[T]he plaintiff [must] plead [ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; accord Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C.Cir.2012). The Court “must assume all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... [and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment,” and if a motion is so converted, “[a]ll parties must be...