Mallett v. State
| Decision Date | 03 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 01-20-00026-CR |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER MALLETT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 228th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1463856
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Hightower, and Rivas-Molloy.
A jury found appellant, Christopher Mallett, guilty of capital murder and assessed his punishment at life in prison without the possibility of parole. In two issues, Mallet argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have a jury member struck for cause and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he was acting in self-defense.
We affirm.
The conflict leading up to the murder of the complainants, Glen Williams and Carl Williams, began at a convenience store several hours before the shootings occurred. A group of people, including Glen Williams and Mallett's girlfriend Tiffany Oliver, were playing gaming machines at a convenience store. Glen Williams and Oliver had a verbal conflict, and Mallett intervened on Oliver's behalf. Two witnesses Vickie Rhodes and Jennifer Lockett, saw Mallett with a gun at that time, and video from security cameras outside the store showed Mallett with a gun.
Oliver became concerned about Mallett's state of mind. She testified that he had been drinking and that he "has a temper" when he has been drinking. She decided to leave the store and hide from Mallett at a washeteria across the street. When Mallett finally decided to leave the store, she rode home with him. Mallett decided not to stay home however. He drove to the Crystal Springs Apartments where Glen Williams lived.
Meanwhile, Glen Williams had also returned to the Crystal Springs Apartments, where he was spending time with his son, Carl Williams, and friends, Lisa Brass and Alexis Oluwo. Glen Williams and Brass were attempting to leave the parking lot together when Mallett arrived. Mallett had brought his gun with him and displayed it while he made verbal threats to Glen Williams. Brass stated that Glen Williams was unarmed at the time. When Mallett fired his gun into the ground, Brass ran away to Williams's apartment. She told Carl Williams that someone was threatening Glen Williams with a gun. They heard some gunshots and Carl Williams picked up a gun of his own and ran to his father's side. Oluwo followed, and she saw Glen Williams kneeling in front of a nearby apartment. She also saw Mallett walking toward Carl and firing his gun. After Carl fell, Mallett sped away again. Both Glen and Carl Williams died from gunshot wounds.
Mallett was charged with capital murder. During voir dire, the trial court questioned the venire panel, asking, Venireperson 23 responded that her "[f]ather's spouse was shot." She further stated that the shooting occurred 23 years ago in Houston. The following exchange then occurred:
No further questions were asked of this venireperson on this topic. Mallett's trial counsel attempted, unsuccessfully, to have a different venireperson struck for cause, and several other venirepersons were excused for unspecified reasons. Trial counsel used one of his peremptory strikes on Venireperson 23.
At trial, the State presented evidence from various witnesses, including Oliver, Brass, and Oluwo, about events leading up to the shooting and after. The State also presented forensic evidence indicating that two different calibers of guns were fired. Two casings came from the weapon used by Carl Williams. The remainder were all fired from the gun that was associated with Mallett. There was no gun recovered in or around the crime scene that was associated with Glen Williams. Finally, a gunshot-residue expert testified that both Glen and Carl Williams were tested for gunshot residue and had a limited amount of gunshot residue on their hands. The gunshot-residue expert testified that the limited result indicated that Glen and Carl Williams "could have had an association" with a firearm. The expert clarified that this "association" could have been caused by transfer of residue rather than by their own discharge of a weapon. She stated that the limited result could have occurred because they had been shot, or touched 4 something that contained gunshot residue, or had "somehow fallen with that cloud of gunshot residue of a gun when it was fired."
Mallett made a statement to police that was presented to the jury. In his statement, Mallett denied seeing Glen Williams that day, denied shooting either Glen or Carl Williams, and blamed a drug addict known as "Man" for the murders. Mallett testified at trial on his own behalf. His trial testimony contradicted his statement to police, and he admitted at trial that his statement to police was a lie. Mallett admitted to the altercation at the convenience store and that he later shot Glen and Carl Williams at the apartment complex. He testified that he shot them in self-defense because they both had guns and shot at him first before he returned fire.
The jury was charged on the offense of capital murder and on the defense of self-defense. The jury found Mallett guilty of capital murder. No motion for new trial or other evidence regarding counsel's strategy were adduced. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, Mallett asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to have Venireperson 23 struck for cause and instead used a peremptory challenge.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to the reasonably effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.05. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show that (1) his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The appellant has the burden to establish both prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). And an appellant's "failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other prong." Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
In reviewing trial counsel's performance, we look to the totality of the representation to determine the effectiveness of counsel, indulging a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance or trial strategy. See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 482-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To rebut that presumption, a claim of ineffective assistance must be "firmly founded in the record," and "the record must affirmatively demonstrate" the meritorious nature of the claim. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). The trial record alone is rarely sufficient to show ineffective assistance. Williams v. State, 526 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd). Generally, a silent record that provides no explanation for trial counsel's actions will not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ().
Mallett contends that Venireperson 23 was biased or prejudiced against him, and thus, his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ask the trial court to strike her for cause and instead using a peremptory strike to keep her from the jury. The record, however, does not support Mallett's contentions. We first observe that he has failed to establish that Venireperson 23 was biased against him. When the trial court asked prospective jurors about their past experiences with violent offenses, Venireperson 23 indicated that her father's spouse had been shot a number of years earlier. The trial court asked whether this experience would impact her ability to serve on the jury in a capital murder case and she had answered equivocally that she would "[p]robably not [be] able to stand-to see the whole thing-I don't know," and ultimately concluded that it "might affect" her. This equivocal language does not, as Mallett contends, compel a conclusion that Venireperson 23 ought to have been challenged for cause. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(a)(9) (providing that juror may be challenged for cause if she "has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant"); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ( ...
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