Luke v. Cataldi

• Decision Date: 26 September 2007
• Citation: 932 A.2d 45
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: John R. LUKE and Diane C. Luke, John C. and Lynn Holetich, Dr. Philip Gelacek, Mary Biesuz, Thomas and Jean Woods, Dr. William R. Balash, John and Joan Wintgens, George and Lori Gatto, Mr. and Mrs. John M. George, Thomas and Mary Ann Timney, Mary Ellen Austin, Mr. and Mrs. Wilbert Woods, Mr. and Mrs. Clarence Conway, Robert and Sheila Gahagan, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Selinger, Regis McGuire and John McGuire, Rodney H. Hartman, Scott J. Hartman, Clifford and Jean Campbell, Harold Burton, William Findon, jointly and severally, Appellants, v. Randy J. CATALDI, David Brestensky, Ron Covone, Supervisors of South Buffalo Township and Mark A. Nesbit, Zoning Officer of South Buffalo Township, Appellees.

932 A.2d 45

John R. LUKE and Diane C. Luke, John C. and Lynn Holetich, Dr. Philip Gelacek, Mary Biesuz, Thomas and Jean Woods, Dr. William R. Balash, John and Joan Wintgens, George and Lori Gatto, Mr. and Mrs. John M. George, Thomas and Mary Ann Timney, Mary Ellen Austin, Mr. and Mrs. Wilbert Woods, Mr. and Mrs. Clarence Conway, Robert and Sheila Gahagan, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Selinger, Regis McGuire and John McGuire, Rodney H. Hartman, Scott J. Hartman, Clifford and Jean Campbell, Harold Burton, William Findon, jointly and severally, Appellants, v. Randy J. CATALDI, David Brestensky, Ron Covone, Supervisors of South Buffalo Township and Mark A. Nesbit, Zoning Officer of South Buffalo Township, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 16, 2007.

Decided September 26, 2007.

John R. Luke, Esq., Utah Legal Services, Pittsburgh, for John R. Luke and Diane C. Luke, et al.

James Anthony Favero, Esq., Kittanning, for Randy Cataldi, et al.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BALDWIN and FITZGERALD, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

We granted allowance of appeal in this matter to address the impact of this Court's decision in Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Board of Weisenberg Township, 578 Pa. 177, 850 A.2d 619 (2004), on conditional land use permits approved in violation of applicable notice and hearing requirements.

On April 26, 2000, Buffalo Valley, Ltd., and McVille Mining Company filed applications for conditional use permits in order to conduct coal mining operations in South Buffalo Township (the "Township"). Buffalo Valley is the owner of a 230-acre tract of land located in the Township, and McVille Mining owns or leases the coal under this tract and adjacent lands, totaling approximately 1,000 acres. Rosebud Mining Company has an option to purchase McVille Mining and will operate the proposed facilities. Following a hearing, the Township's Planning Commission issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that the applications be approved. On June 12, 2000, at a regularly scheduled meeting, the Township's Board of Supervisors (the "Supervisors") adopted a motion to grant the requested permits, and mining activities commenced in December of that year.

On June 7, 2001, Appellants, a group of aggrieved neighboring landowners, filed a petition for review with the Commonwealth Court, challenging the Supervisors' grant of the conditional use permits and asserting that they had not received notice of the mining operations until they had commenced, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court granted the Supervisors' preliminary objections, however, and dismissed the case, as the matter did not fall within the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction.

Subsequently, Appellants filed a complaint in mandamus with the common pleas court, contending, inter alia, that the procedures utilized during the application and approval process of the conditional use permits granted to McVille Mining and Rosebud Mining did not comply with the applicable requirements of the Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805 (as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202) (the "MPC"), which rendered the permits void ab initio. More specifically, Appellants asserted that the Supervisors did not provide public notice of their intention to act on the permit applications and did not conduct a public hearing prior to the issuance of the conditional use permits, in violation of Sections 603(c)(2) and 913.2(a) of the MPC. See 53 P.S. §§ 10603(c)(2), 10913.2(a). Further, Appellants asserted that, due to these violations, they had not been permitted to express their concerns regarding the consequences of the mining operations and the effects of such activities on their own properties, an opportunity to which they were entitled pursuant to Section 913.2(a) and the Township's zoning ordinance. See South Buffalo Township Zoning Ordinance, § 401 (1990). Accordingly, Appellants sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Supervisors to hold public hearings on the permit applications, following adequate public notice, and to order all mining activities to cease pending the outcome of such hearing. The Supervisors filed preliminary objections, asserting that Appellants' complaint was essentially a land use appeal that should have been filed within thirty days of the decision granting the conditional use permits pursuant to Section 1002-A of the MPC. See 53 P.S. § 11002-A.

The common pleas court agreed with the Supervisors and dismissed the complaint. The court reasoned that, because the Township's grant of the conditional use permits in the present matter fell within its powers under Section 909.1(b)(3) of the MPC, see 53 P.S. § 10909.1(b)(3), the exclusive method by which Appellants could obtain review of the Supervisors' decision was by appeal within thirty days. See 53 P.S. § 11002-A. Noting that the complaint was filed sixteen months after the permit applications had been approved, the common pleas court determined that the action was untimely. In addition, the court explained that Appellants' reliance on Section 610 of the MPC, see 53 P.S. § 10610, which requires notice of all proposed zoning ordinances, was misplaced, as the present matter involved the grant of a conditional use permit, not the enactment of a zoning ordinance.

The Commonwealth Court affirmed, observing that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is appropriate only in cases where no adequate remedy at law exists. See Luke v. Cataldi, 830 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (en banc) ("Luke I") (citing Delaware River Port Authority v. Thornburgh, 508 Pa. 11, 20, 493 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1985)). The court noted that Appellants could have challenged the Supervisors' grant of the conditional use permits at issue via an appeal pursuant to Article XI of the MPC, see 53 P.S. § 11002-A, which provides a right to appeal from all land use decisions within thirty days, including challenges to the procedures by which such decisions are made. Relying on its decision in Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Board of Weisenberg Township, 814 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Pa. Cmwlth.2003) ("Schadler I"), the Commonwealth Court concluded that procedural challenges, no matter what defect is alleged, must be brought within the time limits specified by the MPC. The court found the concerns of finality elucidated in Schadler I, which addressed a challenge to the enactment of a zoning ordinance, to be equally applicable in situations, like the present matter, that concern the quasi-judicial act of permit approval. See Luke I, 830 A.2d at 658 n. 9. Further, the court noted that a mandamus action may not be used as a guise to file an otherwise untimely appeal. See Lizzi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 466 Pa. 450, 452, 353 A.2d 440, 441 (1976). Thus, because the statutorily provided land use appeal adequately protected Appellants' procedural rights, the Commonwealth Court held that the complaint was properly dismissed.

President Judge Emeritus Colins, joined by Judges Smith-Ribner and Friedman, dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Schadler I, which included his view that the majority's reliance on Section 1601(a) of the Second Class Township Code,¹ see 53 P.S. § 66601(a), in that case was erroneous, as the statute placed only noncompliance with the filing and recordation requirements within the thirty-day appeal period and did not render the reasoning of prior caselaw concerning the void ab initio doctrine inapplicable. See Luke I, 830 A.2d at 659-60 (Colins, J., dissenting) (citing Schadler I, 814 A.2d at 1270-72 (Colins, J., dissenting)).²

Subsequently, this Court granted Appellants' petition for allowance of appeal and remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of our decision in Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Board of Weisenberg Township, 578 Pa. 177, 850 A.2d 619 (2004) ("Schadler II"), which held that the thirty-day limitations period set forth in Section 909.1(a)(2) of the MPC, see 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a)(2), and Section 5571(c)(5) of the Judicial Code, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(2), did not bar Schadler's procedural challenge to a zoning ordinance that was void ab initio. See Schadler II, 578 Pa. at 183, 850 A.2d at 623.

Reaffirming its earlier decision, the Commonwealth Court held that Schadler II did not affect the outcome of the case. See Luke v. Cataldi, 883 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) ("Luke II"). More specifically, the court reasoned that there is a broad distinction between a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance, the situation in Schadler, and a challenge to the grant of a conditional use permit, the circumstance that gave rise to the present litigation. The court further explained that decisions of administrative agencies are subject to strict appeal deadlines, see, e.g., 53 P.S. § 11002-A, while legislative enactments may be set aside or reinterpreted at any time without voiding every decision made in accordance with the invalid statute; instead, generally only parties whose cases remain active may take advantage of changes in the law. See Luke II, 883 A.2d at 1119 n. 12. This principle of finality, in the Commonwealth Court's view, required Appellants to contest the Supervisors' action on the permit applications by filing a timely appeal from the decision granting the conditional use permits. Although the court recognized that prior cases had held that statutes of limitation did not apply to zoning ordinances rendered void ab initio by procedural defects, see Cranberry Park Assocs. v. Cranberry Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 561 Pa. 456, 462, 751 A.2d 165, 168 (2000); Valianatos v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Richmond Twp., 766 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), the court found such decisions inapplicable to the present situation, given the distinction between the enactment of ordinances and individual permit approvals. See Luke II, 883 A.2d at 1119 n. 13.

Acknowledging that the MPC required the Supervisors...