Malolepszy v. Central Market

Decision Date07 May 1943
Docket Number31423.
Citation9 N.W.2d 474,143 Neb. 356
PartiesMALOLEPSZY v. CENTRAL MARKET, Inc., et al.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. "An owner is liable to invitee, for injuries occasioned by unsafe condition of premises, if known to him and not to invitee, and which was negligently suffered to exist without timely notice. In action by invitee, for injuries sustained by falling through open elevator shaft maintained in defendants' building, contributory negligence of invitee held for jury." Chichas v. Foley Bros. Grocery Co., 73 Mont. 575, 236 P. 361.

2. The visit of an invitee is, or may be, of financial benefit to the owner, and such a visitor is entitled to expect that the owner will take reasonable care to discover the actual condition of the premises, and either make them safe or warn him of dangerous conditions, so that he will have opportunity to decide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation.

3. The possessor of property is subject to liability while the invitee is upon that part of the premises where the owner gives the other reason to believe that his presence is permitted or desired because of its connection with the business. In determining this area, the nature of the business to be transacted is of great importance.

4. The customer is a business visitor thereon, unless the possessor exercises reasonable care to apprise him that the area of invitation is more narrowly restricted.

5. If the owner should realize that either of two doors might be taken by his business visitor to be the door to the business area, the visitor is entitled to the protection of a business visitor, even though he enters the wrong door, if he did what any reasonable man would have done under the circumstances.

MESSMORE, J SIMMONS, C. J., and YEAGER, J., dissenting.

Gaines &amp Shoemaker and H. A. Palmer, all of Omaha, for appellant.

Gross &amp Crawford and Harry L. Welch, all of Omaha, for appellees.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and PAINE, CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER CHAPPELL, and WENKE, JJ.

PAINE, Justice.

This is an action for personal injuries resulting from falling into an open elevator shaft in the back of a store. The jury returned a verdict of $5,583.77, for which amount judgment was entered. The defendant appealed. This case was first argued to this court on October 7, 1942, and the opinion then adopted reversed and dismissed the action, and is found in 142 Neb. ---, 7 N.W.2d 74.

Plaintiff had been employed for about four years at "Harkert's," a restaurant located at 1619 Farnam street, Omaha. The defendant, Central Market, Inc. conducts a large grocery store, in which there is a meat department, which sells at wholesale and retail, and salesmen solicit from hotels and restaurants for the wholesale meat department. The Central Market is located directly across the alley from the Harkert establishment. All the retail business of the Central Market was closed on Sunday, but it was a custom for favored restaurants and hotels, including Harkert's, to buy meat at wholesale on Sunday whenever an emergency arose. Such special customers would usually send some employee for the meat they needed, who would go to an entrance on the alley and pound on the door until some one inside answered the alarm and gave them the meat, and the charge ticket would be made as of Monday.

At 10:15 on Sunday forenoon, October 27, 1940, the manager of Harkert's sent the plaintiff across the alley to get meat at wholesale. He had often been sent for meat during the week, but this was the first time that he had been sent for meat on Sunday. He rattled the alley door nearest the street, and failed to attract the attention of any one on the inside. F. L. Hogan was engaged in the trucking business, operating his own truck with a helper, and regularly gathered up rubbish and trash, with the help of its employees, from the Central Market. Hogan was standing down the alley at another door into the Central Market, where he was breaking up boxes and bundling them up to be taken away. The plaintiff was dressed in white, with the word "Harkert's" on his uniform, and Hogan called to him to come down there and go inside where he was and call the elevator man. The plaintiff thereupon went to this second alley door and entered to go to the elevator shaft and call the elevator man. The place was very dimly lighted, and looking straight ahead he saw a slat gate in front of him, which he supposed closed the elevator shaft, and walked towards it to call up to the elevator man, who was on the second floor, but instead the slat gate on the side towards the plaintiff had not worked properly and had stuck and not fallen down as the elevator went up, and the plaintiff walked directly into the unlighted elevator shaft, which he could not see, and fell 15 feet to the bottom of the pit, causing fractures of several vertebrae and other serious injuries. The light was just bright enough so he could see the slats of the gate on the other side, but the floor was dark, and because the gate had failed to come down by gravity on his side, as it should have done, he walked right into the pit.

Plaintiff claims that his injury was caused by reason of the carelessness and negligence of the defendant in the following particulars: (a) Failing to keep its premises in the vicinity of the elevator properly and sufficiently lighted; (b) failing to place the safety gate across the open elevator shaft and pit when the elevator was not at the floor level; (c) moving the elevator from the floor level to the floor above and failing to lower the safety gate to prevent persons from walking into the open elevator pit; (d) failing to warn or caution plaintiff and other persons rightfully on the premises that the elevator pit and shaft were open and unprotected; (e) maintaining a trap and pitfall without properly lighting and guarding it to prevent persons from falling into it.

In its amended answer the defendant specifically denies the allegations in plaintiff's petition that plaintiff entered the place of business of defendant through the rear door which was one of the regular and customary places of entering defendant's place of business; denies that the plaintiff was an invitee on the defendant's premises, and in this connection alleges "that said entrance, through which the plaintiff entered the defendant's store on this occasion, was not a regular and customary entrance used either by its customers or by the public; that said entrance opened onto a loading platform and into an elevator room used solely and exclusively by this defendant in conducting his business, no part of which was conducted in furthering the sale of its merchandise either at wholesale or at retail; and that said platform, and elevator room, was constructed on the premises separate and apart from that portion of the premises used by this defendant for transacting business with its customers or the public."

Defendant further charges in his amended answer that the plaintiff, at the time of this accident, was a trespasser on the premises, and that the accident and the injuries, if any, were due solely and entirely to the carelessness and negligence of this plaintiff.

For assignments of error the defendant first submits that the court erred in overruling this defendant's motion to dismiss this action or to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of this defendant, made at the close of the plaintiff's case and again when all parties had rested.

From an examination of the conflicting evidence in this case, we conclude that the trial court was right in overruling these motions for an instructed verdict.

The next assignments of error relate to the giving of four of the instructions to the jury. An examination of these instructions shows that No. 3 sets out the substance of the answer filed by the defendant, and nothing is pointed out in the brief to call our attention to any important allegation which was omitted by the court. We find no error therein.

The giving of instructions No. 9, on amount of recovery, if any, and No. 10, on mortality tables, is set out as error, but as they are not argued in the brief, and as no error appears, or is pointed out, we hold that these two instructions were properly given.

Now, the particular instruction which is argued at length by the defendant is No. 5, reading as follows:

"You are instructed that the following definitions are to be used by you in determining the status of the plaintiff in his relationship to the defendant Central Market, Inc.:

"The word 'trespasser' is legally defined as a person who enters or remains upon premises in possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent, either express or implied.

"An invitee is a person who enters or remains upon the premises in the possession of another after having been expressly or impliedly invited to do so, such as a person who enters a premises in the possession of another for the purpose of transacting some business with the possessor of the premises.

"You are further instructed that it is the duty of a person in possession of premises, in respect to an invitee or business customer, to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which they are intended to be used.

"You are further instructed that a person in possession of premises owes no duty whatever to a trespasser who is on his premises without his knowledge or consent, either express or implied, in respect to keeping his premises in a safe condition."

It is insisted in the defendant's brief that this instruction did not cover a licensee, and that this omission is reversible error.

This court has clearly defined the three terms as follows: "The law places those...

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3 cases
  • Kenney v. Barna
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • December 9, 1983
    ...or remains upon premises in possession of another without the express or implied consent of the possessor. Malolepszy v. Central Market, 143 Neb. 356, 9 N.W.2d 474 (1943). But what of the age of the alleged trespasser? "While the age of the child will not protect him from liability if his a......
  • Brown v. Slack, 33540
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • July 23, 1954
    ...the owner exercises reasonable care to apprise him that the area of invitation is more narrowly restricted.' Malolepszy v. Central Market, 143 Neb. 356, 9 N.W.2d 474, 478. The evidence shows the appellant put a 'Closed' sign on the door of his store before he started cleaning the refrigerat......
  • Burks v. Packer
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • May 7, 1943
1 books & journal articles
  • Premise Liability
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 76, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...552 N.W.2d 51 (1996). 119. See Bosiljevac v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 182 Neb. 199, 153 N.W.2d 864 (1967); Maloepszy v. Central Mkt., 143 Neb. 356, 9 N.W.2d 474 (1943); Haley v. Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938). Nebraska requires that two criteria be met for conduct to be willful an......

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