Malone v. Capital Correctional Resources, Inc., No. 1999-CA-01451-SCT.

Decision Date28 February 2002
Docket NumberNo. 1999-CA-01451-SCT.
Citation808 So.2d 963
PartiesRobert M. MALONE, Individually and as Guardian, Natural Parent and Next Friend of Robert Ray Malone, Minor, Annette Michelle Clark Malone and Ashley Carter v. CAPITAL CORRECTIONAL RESOURCES, INC., and James Brewer, Individually and d/b/a Correctional Resources, Inc.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Wayne E. Ferrell, Jr., Andre Francis Ducote, Jackson, for appellants.

Terry R. Levy, George Ellis Abdo, III, Jackson, for appellees.

EN BANC.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

EASLEY, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is granted. The original opinions are withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted therefor.

¶ 2. Appellants Robert M. Malone, Robert Ray Malone, Annette Michelle Clark Malone and Ashley Carter (hereafter the Malones) filed suit in Hinds County Circuit Court, First Judicial District, seeking $4,900,000 in actual damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages for personal injuries and other damages resulting from a gear-up landing of a Piper Aztec airplane in which they were passengers. The suit was filed against the pilot, Todd Jones (Jones); the owner of the airplane, Capital Correctional Resources, Inc. (CCRI); and the vice-president and sole stockholder of CCRI, James Brewer (Brewer).

¶ 3. A motion for summary judgment filed by CCRI and Brewer contended that Jones was solely liable. The Malones responded to the motion and also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against Brewer, CCRI and Jones, contending that Brewer and CCRI were liable under the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3 & 61-11-1 (1996) and acknowledging that Jones's negligent acts and/or omissions solely caused the accident. Based on analysis and study of the pleadings, excerpts of depositions, various submissions by both parties and arguments and briefs of counsel, the circuit court found no genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of Brewer and CCRI and denied the Malones' cross-motion.

¶ 4. Aggrieved by the circuit court's decision, the Malones timely filed their notice of appeal raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BREWER AND CCRI?
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE MALONES?
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BREWER AND CCRI ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES?

FACTS

¶ 5. In early November 1995, the Malones asked Jones to fly them from Jackson, Mississippi, to Knoxville, Tennessee, for a football game. The night prior to the game, Jones called Brewer to request permission to borrow the aircraft owned by CCRI, a Texas corporation engaged in the business of managing correctional facilities, for the flight to Tennessee since the plane Jones had planned to use was unavailable. Jones was a licensed pilot who occasionally piloted the airplane for CCRI on a contract basis but who was not employed by CCRI at the time of the flight. Brewer allowed Jones to borrow the aircraft owned by CCRI. The trip was safely made to Knoxville where Jones and the Malones attended the football game, and afterwards Jones flew them back to Jackson.

¶ 6. Upon the return to Jackson, after being cleared to land at Hawkins field, Jones put the landing gear down in preparation for the landing. The control tower informed Jones that a single-engine plane was to land first, and he was to land after that plane. Jones then raised the landing gear, but when he was cleared to land, he failed to lower the landing gear. Upon impact, the airplane fishtailed, but Jones was able to bring it to a stop. An ambulance was called to the scene, but no one required medical treatment from the paramedics.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. This Court conducts de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment and looks at all the evidentiary matters before it—admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 70 (Miss. 1996). This Court is governed by the same standard used by the circuit court under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Cothern v. Vickers, Inc., 759 So.2d 1241, 1245 (Miss.2000); Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. Aetna, 669 So.2d at 70. If there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted in the moving party's favor. Cothern, 759 So.2d at 1245; Brown, 444 So.2d at 362. The burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists is on the moving party. Id. Any doubt as to whether a fact issue exists should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed where triable issues of material fact exist. Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So.2d 60, 61 (Miss.1997).

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BREWER AND CCRI?

¶ 8. This issue can be phrased simply as whether the owner of an aircraft can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-employee pilot who borrows the aircraft for the benefit of his personal friends. The Malones cite two statutes they believe were improperly construed by the trial court and which render Brewer vicariously liable for Jones's negligent acts. First, the Malones note the relevant definitions concerning the operation of an aircraft that are found in Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1996):

For the purposes of the laws of the state relating to aeronautics the following words, terms and phrases shall have the meanings herein given, unless otherwise specifically defined, or unless another intention clearly appears, or the context otherwise requires:
(a)"Aeronautics" means transportation by aircraft; the operation, construction, repair or maintenance of aircraft, aircraft power plants and accessories; the design, establishment, construction extension operation, improvement, repair or maintenance or airports or other navigation facilities and air instruction;
(b)"Aircraft" means any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used or designed for navigation or flight in the air;
. . .
(j)"Operation or aircraft" or "operate aircraft" means the use of aircraft for purpose of air navigation, and includes the navigation or piloting of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of the statutes of this state:
. . .

Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1996).

¶ 9. The Malones argue that CCRI and Brewer are liable under the definitions in § 61-1-3 because they authorized the use of the aircraft by Jones. They note the statute merely requires authorization and is silent as to whether the use would have to be within the course and scope of employment.

¶ 10. Second, the Malones cite Miss. Code Ann. § 61-11-1 which states in relevant part as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an aircraft in the air or on the ground or water, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics or other habit-forming drug, or to operate an aircraft in the air or on the ground or water, in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. In any proceeding charging careless or reckless operation of aircraft in violation of this section, the court in determining whether the operation was careless or reckless shall consider the standards for safe operation of aircraft prescribed by federal statutes or regulations governing aeronautics.

Miss.Code Ann. § 61-11-1(1) (1996).

¶ 11. The Malones argue these statutes have been interpreted by both the Fifth Circuit and this Court as meaning that the owner of an aircraft is also an operator and is vicariously liable for all acts of the pilot, citing Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.1955); Cannon v. Jones, 377 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1979); and Brunt v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 243 Miss. 607, 139 So.2d 380 (1962). The circuit court, however, in granting the motion for summary judgment, accepted CCRI's and Brewer's argument that these cases were distinguishable from the instant case.

¶ 12. We agree with Malones' argument and find accordingly that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Brewer and CCRI. The circuit court determined that the pilot or operator was liable. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j) (2000), the owner is also deemed to be engaged in the operation of the plane.1 Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the owner of the plane, and summary judgment should not have been rendered.

¶ 13. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j), any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft. The statute is clear that the owner of a plane will be treated as an operator just like the pilot actually operating the plane. Since the owner also stands as the operator of the plane, then logically if the pilot is found negligent then the owner of the plane will also be determined to be negligent as a co-operator of the plane. In Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir.1955), the Fifth Circuit stated that, "[t]he liability of the owner is there just as much as if he were the operator of the aircraft; [therefore] [t]he owner who authorizes a pilot to use his plane becomes liable for the negligence of the pilot in the operation of the plane." While Hays is a Fifth Circuit case, this Court has followed the interpretation provided by the Fifth Circuit in Hays. See Cannon v. Jones, 377 So.2d...

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