Malone v. Meekins
| Citation | 650 P.2d 351 |
| Decision Date | 03 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | 6436,Nos. 6429,s. 6429 |
| Parties | Hugh MALONE, Terry Gardiner, Brian Rogers, Jim Duncan, Fred Brown, Don Clocksin, Sam Cotten, Sally Smith, Mike Miller, Tony Vaska, and Fred Zharoff, individually and on behalf of the citizens of the State of Alaska, Appellants, v. Russ MEEKINS, Jr., Richard Halford, Mitchell Abood, Albert Adams, Charles Anderson, Ramona Barnes, Betty Cato, Jack Fuller, Michael Beirne, Robert Bettisworth, Bernard Bylsma, David Cuddy, Kenneth Fanning, E. J. Haugen, Joe Hayes, Vernon Hurlbert, Terry Martin, Ray Metcalfe, Joe Montgomery, Patrick O'Connell, Randy Phillips, Richard Randolph, Eric Sutcliffe, Dennis Jennings, Irene Cashen, and M. R. Charney, Appellees. Russ MEEKINS, Jr., Richard Halford, Mitchell Abood, Albert Adams, Charles Anderson, Ramona Barnes, Betty Cato, Jack Fuller, Michael Beirne, Robert Bettisworth, Bernard Bylsma, David Cuddy, Kenneth Fanning, E. J. Haugen, Joe Hayes, Vernon Hurlbert, Terry Martin, Ray Metcalfe, Joe Montgomery, Patrick O'Connell, Randy Phillips, Richard Randolph, and Eric Sutcliffe, Cross-Appellants, v. Hugh MALONE, Terry Gardiner, Brian Rogers, Jim Duncan, Fred Brown, Don Clocksin, Sam Cotten, Sally Smith, Mike Miller, Tony Vaska, and Fred Zharoff, individually and on behalf of the citizens of the State of Alaska, Karla Hart, Irene Cashen, and M. R. Charney, Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Douglas Pope, R. Collin Middleton, Wagstaff, Middleton & Pope, Anchorage, for appellants/cross-appellees.
James T. Robinson, David A. Devine, Groh, Eggers, Robinson, Price & Johnson, Anchorage, for Legislative appellees/cross-appellants.
James L. Baldwin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Wilson L. Condon, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for Nonlegislator appellees/cross-appellees.
Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.
In proceedings conducted on June 12 and June 16, 1981, the House of Representatives of the Twelfth Alaska State Legislature removed the existing Speaker and selected a new one. There followed a reorganization of the House with respect to leadership and standing committee assignments. This case was brought by the former Speaker, Representative Jim Duncan, and ten other state representatives seeking a declaration that the removal and replacement of Representative Duncan was illegal and unconstitutional.
The superior court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment that while "the procedures used by the majority in accomplishing its will lacked woefully in decorum and the orderly parliamentary process by which the business of a public legislative body should be conducted," the replacement of the Speaker was nevertheless lawful.
An appeal was taken to this court on an expedited basis. We entered an order affirming the judgment of the superior court following oral argument on January 4, 1982. This opinion explains the reasons for our affirmance.
The facts needed to understand this opinion are as follows. The Alaska State House of Representatives has 40 members. In 1981, 22 representatives were Democrats, 16 were Republicans and 2 were Libertarians. Representative Duncan was elected Speaker on February 2, 1981, the twenty-second day of the legislative session, on the votes of twenty-one representatives, all Democrats.
On June 12, 1981 the House was scheduled to meet at 10:00 a.m. 1 The customary ten minute and one minute warning bells were sounded, but Representative Duncan failed to convene the House at 10:00 a.m. This was because at about 8:30 a.m. that day he learned that there was an ongoing movement to replace him as Speaker. After consulting with several other representatives, Representative Duncan called a caucus of all Democratic representatives for 10:00 a.m. During the caucus it became apparent that at least three members of the Democratic caucus and presumably all of the Republicans and Libertarians would support a move to replace Representative Duncan as Speaker in favor of Representative Oral Freeman, another Democrat.
At about 11:00 a.m. Representative Richard Halford, a Republican, asked Representative Duncan when the session would begin. He received a non-committal response. 2 At approximately 2:00 p.m. Representative Russ Meekins, then House Majority Leader, assumed the chair of the House and called it to order. No advance notice of this meeting was given to Representative Duncan or his supporters, but they were immediately apprised of it because proceedings in the House Chambers were broadcast by a speaker system to various offices in the Capitol Building, including that of Representative Duncan. With Representative Meekins in the chair, the House voted, on a count of 21 to 0 with 19 not voting, to remove Representative Duncan as Speaker and, on a vote of 22 to 0 with 18 not voting, elected Representative Freeman as the new Speaker. The House then adjourned for the day. 3
The 12th of June was a Friday. Some time after the session of the 12th was adjourned, Representative Freeman announced that he would not assume the Speakership. On the 14th this lawsuit was filed and on the 15th a temporary restraining order was sought. A hearing on the motion for temporary restraining order was conducted on the 15th and was carried over to 9:00 a.m. on the 16th. During the court proceedings on the 16th counsel for the appellees announced that the House, which had not met since the 12th, would convene at 10:00 a.m. that day.
The House was convened by Representative Halford at 10:01 a.m. He first presented a document signed by 22 representatives stating:
We, the undersigned members of the Alaska State House of Representatives do hereby form a majority caucus and have elected Representative Rick Halford as our Majority Leader.
After the existence of a quorum was determined Representative Halford declared the position of Speaker to be vacant. Representative Patrick O'Connell moved that nominations be opened for Speaker. That motion was carried on a roll call vote of 22 yeas, no nays and 18 not voting. Representative Joe Hayes was then nominated as Speaker. A motion to close nominations was made and carried 22 to 0 with 18 not voting, and, by the same count, Representative Hayes was elected. On each of these motions appellants attempted to debate the legality of the proceedings, but their attempts were cut off by rulings that the motions were not debatable. 4
On appeal appellants raise four distinct issues:
(1) whether the removal of Representative Duncan from the Speakership required that two-thirds of each House vote to suspend or amend the legislature's Uniform Rules of Procedure;
(2) whether Representative Halford usurped the authority of the Speaker by convening the June 16th meeting of the House;
(3) whether reasonable notice of the June 16th meeting was given to appellants and the public;
(4) whether appellants were denied their right to speak freely on the floor of the House at the June 16th meeting.
Appellants assert that the proper resolution of these issues mandates that the removal and replacement of Representative Duncan as Speaker be declared invalid.
Uniform Rule 1 provides that the permanent presiding officer of each House shall be the nominee receiving a majority of the votes of the full membership and that he shall assume the chair for the two year period that the legislature is in session. 5 Rule 4 defines the duties of the presiding officer as follows:
The presiding officer of each house has the duties set forth in section 575, MASON'S MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, when not inconsistent with these Uniform Rules. In the absence of the regular presiding officer, the majority leader of the house serving ex officio as presiding officer pro tempore shall preside; except that the regular presiding officer may temporarily relinquish the chair to any member.
The Uniform Rules do not specifically address the subject of the Speaker's removal. However, Rules 52 and 53 provide that the Uniform Rules may be amended or suspended by a concurrent resolution approved by two-thirds of the membership of each House.
Appellants argued below that in order to remove Representative Duncan from his position as Speaker it was necessary to suspend or amend the Uniform Rules. They argued that this had not been accomplished since neither a two-thirds vote of the membership of the House nor of the Senate was obtained. At oral argument, however, appellants abandoned this argument. They acknowledged that a majority of the members of the House may remove the presiding officer at any time. 6
We accept appellants' concession as it is consistent with our reading of the second sentence of Art. II, § 12 of the Alaska Constitution which provides that "[e]ach house may choose its officers and employees." 7 At least two concepts are implicit in that grant of authority: (1) each House has the exclusive power to remove as well as choose its own officers without any participation by the other House; (2) a majority vote of the members of the body is all that is required to either elect or remove an officer. See In re Speakership of the House of Representatives, 15 Colo. 520, 25 P. 707 (1891); Cliff v. Parsons, 90 Iowa 665, 57 N.W. 599 (1894); Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 175, 278 A.2d 475 (1971). Each of these concepts disposes of the argument that the Uniform Rules barred the removal of Representative Duncan as Speaker. To require that a vote to remove the Speaker of one House be preceded by a vote of two-thirds of each House to suspend or amend the Uniform Rules would effectively frustrate the will of a majority of a legislative body and involve each House in the selection of officers of the other.
Appellants' next contention is that Representative Halford usurped power in convening the June 16th meeting of the House. They assert that AS 24.10.020 8 necessarily means that only the...
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