Malott v. Miller, 2

Decision Date03 October 1989
Docket NumberCA-SA,No. 2,2
Citation162 Ariz. 239,782 P.2d 715
PartiesJohn Davies MALOTT, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Leslie B. MILLER, a Judge for the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, County of Pima, Respondent, and The STATE of Arizona, Real Party in Interest. 89-0106.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals
OPINION

HOWARD, Judge.

Petitioner brought this special action after the trial court overruled his objection to the questioning of the jury and its returning for further deliberation, eventually resulting in a verdict of guilty of burglary in the second degree. Because we believe the trial court's actions were an abuse of its discretion and in excess of its jurisdiction, we assume jurisdiction and grant relief.

Petitioner is the defendant in Pima County Cause Number CR-24625, and was charged by indictment with attempted sexual assault, burglary in the second degree, two counts of public sexual indecency with a minor and public sexual indecency with an adult. Following closing arguments the respondent court read jury instructions regarding the five counts. During its deliberations, the jury sent out two questions to the court, the one pertaining to this case stating:

Are all the charges felonies? If not which ones are felonies please. Based on the burglary charge of attempt to comit [sic] felony.

After conferring with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court responded: "Public sexual indecency as to [adult victim] is a misdemeanor." No mention was made of the other counts, all of which were felonies. Shortly after the question was answered, the jury returned with a verdict finding petitioner not guilty of attempted sexual assault, not guilty of the burglary, guilty of two counts of sexual indecency with a minor and guilty of the charge of public sexual indecency with the adult victim. Before announcing the verdict in open court, but after apprising herself of the verdict, the trial judge called a bench conference where the following discourse occurred:

THE COURT: I think we've got a real problem. They have found him guilty of all aspects of public sexual indecency, and not guilty of burglary, which leads me to believe that they misunderstood and I'm going to have to inquire of them if their verdicts would be the same if they knew that public sexual indecency to a minor was, in fact, a felony.

I will take the four that are not a problem, and before I ask them about the burglary I'm going to have to inquire. This is an inconsistent verdict.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Judge, you're right, but I'm concerned. What I'm concerned about is that we inquire of them individually as opposed to have one spokesman for the whole group.

THE COURT: Certainly the foreperson can say if they need further time for deliberation, knowing that public sexual indecency to a minor is a felony. If they need additional time--

MR. HERNANDEZ: If they found him not guilty of burglary, but guilty of the--

THE COURT: Public sexual indecency to a minor.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Then I'm going to object. They have found him not guilty, and I think because he's been found not guilty--

THE COURT: Well, before I say anything I'm going to take the verdicts that make sense. If you think it's improper to do that, I will tell you, it becomes clear to me when I sent back an order that said public sexual indecency was a misdemeanor that there is error in this Court's decision. And the record should reflect that the reason that was done was to avoid--

MR. HERNANDEZ: Right.

THE COURT: --setting forth specific felonies and answering any more than absolutely necessary.

Had we, as the State requested, done some other thing or set forth each felony, then, I think, we would have had different verdicts.

It is the Court's explanation, I think, that has caused the problem here.

I'm going to go ahead and read these, and you can note an objection.

MS. HANSEN: But you are going to give them an opportunity--

THE COURT: Yes.

(End of bench conference).

* * * * * *

THE COURT: Ms. Long, as Foreperson, I'm going to ask you if you feel that there would have been a different verdict as to the remaining charge of burglary had it been the knowledge of the jury that public sexual indecency to a minor is, in fact, a felony.

JUROR LONG: Yes, there would have. There was confusion on that point.

THE COURT: Knowing public sexual indecency to a minor is a felony offense, would it remain the verdict of each and every one of you--and we can poll you--as to a not guilty verdict to the charge of burglary in the second degree?

JUROR LONG: I think we would need to repoll on that one.

THE COURT: And I think that clearly there seems to have been some confusion in the Court's response, and we need to be very delicate in responding to the kinds of questions you ask. It seems that we perhaps created greater confusion in the case.

That being the case, I'm going to allow the jury to recess to determine whether they're able to reach a verdict as to the charge of burglary in the second degree.

(The jury retires to deliberate).

THE COURT: If you would hand the form of verdict to the bailiff, please.

JUROR LONG: Yes.

THE COURT: The verdict reads, omitting the formal caption: We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled action, upon our oaths, do find the defendant, John Davies Malott, guilty of the offense of burglary in the second degree. Signed by Deborah Long, Foreperson.

Is this the verdict of each and every one of you?

(All indicate in the affirmative).

THE COURT: Do you wish to have the panel polled?

MR. HERNANDEZ: No, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the hearing on prior convictions was held).

THE COURT: Mr. Hernandez, did you want to place something on the record?

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like to put some things on the record with regard to the forms of verdict.

Your Honor, I think that the verdicts, as they came back, should stand as to the burglary. I think he was found not guilty of the other felony conviction.

The questions came from the jury, we answered the questions as the law was, and yet when they came back and find him not guilty of the burglary, but guilty of the other things, we automatically assume they made a mistake rather than look at the other possibilities.

The other possibilities, Your Honor, include--and now we have hindsight--but at the time, the other possibilities included maybe Mr. Malott didn't enter with the intent to commit the felonies upon the children but it happened once he got there.

Or, that maybe Mr. Malott entered the house at the invitation of [the adult victim], yet ends up going beyond his invitation and ends up standing there naked in the room.

These are just as viable as the ones that the Court believes happened after the verdicts. They were unanimous verdicts and there's no indication on the record, Judge, prior to your question that everybody was insecure or...

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5 cases
  • State v. Hansen
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 10 Marzo 2015
    ...authorize a court to reinstruct jurors and resume deliberations. See Webb, 186 Ariz. at 563, 925 P.2d at 704 ; Malott v. Miller, 162 Ariz. 239, 242, 782 P.2d 715, 718 (App.1989). A court must simply accept the verdicts without probing into the jurors' thought processes or demanding adherenc......
  • State v. Anaya
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 19 Septiembre 1991
    ...merit. Arizona permits inconsistent verdicts. State v. Zakhar, 105 Ariz. 31, 32-33, 459 P.2d 83, 84-85 (1969); Malott v. Miller, 162 Ariz. 239, 782 P.2d 715 (App.1989). DEFENDANT'S The defendant argues that the court erred when it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the ad......
  • State v. Webb
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 29 Marzo 1996
    ...and coerced them into reaching the ultimate verdicts. See State v. McCutcheon, 150 Ariz. 317, 723 P.2d 666 (1986); Malott v. Miller, 162 Ariz. 239, 782 P.2d 715 (App.1989). He also argues that, because the original verdicts on count one included an acquittal of the greater offense, requirin......
  • State v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 14 Diciembre 1989
    ...jury and the public interest clearly favors protection of the integrity of the jury's deliberative processes. Malott v. Miller, 162 Ariz. 239, 242, 782 P.2d 715, 718, (App.1989). This interest warrants suspension of the requirements of Rule 31. This petition will be allowed to proceed as a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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