Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America

• Decision Date: 13 November 1962
• Citation: 185 A.2d 595,409 Pa. 175
• Parties: Nicholas MAMULA v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated labor union, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 595

185 A.2d 595

409 Pa. 175

Nicholas MAMULA v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated labor union, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 13, 1962.

James Craig Kuhn, Jr., Arnold D. Wilner, Wilner, Wilner & Kuhn, Ernest G. Nassar, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Harry Alan Sherman, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and KEIM, JJ.

COHEN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree granting a preliminary injunction to Nicholas Mamula, appellee, ordering the appellant, United Steelworkers of America, through its appropriate officers and representatives to postpone an election of officers of Local Union 1211.

The decree, granted at approximately 9:00 p. m. June 18, 1962, required that the preliminary injunction issue 'forthwith' and stated that 'this order of preliminary injunction * * * be effective immediately.' The court also decreed that the appellant furnish a bond of $1,000 'within forty-eight hours.' Immediately thereafter the appellant appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to our court and obtained a supersedeas.

Mamula was elected president of the Aliquippa, Beaver County Local in 1960, and served in that capacity until his removal for misconduct in office on July 20, 1961 by a Trial Committee of the Local specially selected to preside over the disciplinary proceedings. At that trial and on appeal to the International Executive Board Mamula vigorously contended, inter alia, that he was not accorded a fair trial, that the procedures set forth in the union constitution were not complied with, and that he was the victim of a conspiracy to oust him by officers of the International who disagreed with his policies. The International Executive Board in affirming some of the findings and reversing others declared Mamula ineligible to hold any office in the union until July 20, 1966. It is not necessary to examine the merits of Mamula's allegations of an unfair trial since they are not material to our disposition of this case.

The procedural steps in this case have been presented in detail since our decision ultimately hinges upon the propriety of the procedure appellee followed. ¹

Equity Rule 1531(b) of the Pa. P.C.P., 12 P.S.Appendix requires that a bond be filed before a preliminary injunction shall issue. We have said repeatedly that the equity rules promulgated by this court have the force of a statute and must be strictly complied with. Rose Uniforms v. Lobel, 408 Pa. 421, 184 A.2d 261 (1962); Baur v. Wilkes-Barre Light Co., 259 Pa. 117, 102 A. 430 (1948).

The injunction decree issued in the case before us was issued 'forthwith' to forestall the election scheduled nine and a half hours later. (Emphasis supplied) The decree--unfortunately for appellee--contained the proviso that bond was to be furnished 'within forty-eight hours.' In fact, the filing of a bond could be delayed until after the election had been enjoined. The injunction, therefore, was issued without the filing of a bond and hence was a nullity. No power resided in the court below to issue an injunction where the party applying for it had not filed an appropriate bond.

In a series of recent cases we have invalidated injunction decrees which were not accompanied by the proper filing of bond. Rose Uniforms v. Lobel, Pa., 184 A.2d 261 (1962); Surco Products, Inc. v. Kieszek, 367 Pa. 516, 80 A.2d 842 (1951). We hope that these cases emphasize both to the Bench and Bar the necessity of filing a bond contemporaneously with the issuance of an injunction. Hence, we must vacate the order of the court below for lack of jurisdiction.

There is present, however, in this case an additional jurisdictional problem which requires our attention. Even though the supersedeas we granted permitted the election to continue, we cannot ignore the preemption of our jurisdiction by Title IV, § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 of the Landrum-Griffin Act.

Where the Congress of the United States enacts a comprehensive statute which is intended to occupy the filed, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the state legislature and judiciary defer to the superior command of Congress. This doctrine is particuarly applicable in the area of labor law which is covered in detail by numerous comprehensive federal statutes. E. G., Terrizzi Beverage Company v. Local Union No. 830, Pa., 184 A.2d 243 (1962); Navios Corporation v. National Maritime Upon of America, 402 Pa. 325, 166 A.2d 625 (1960); Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603 (1960). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a companion to the present case, recently held that Title IV, § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 of the Landrum-Griffin Act 'governs the procedures for nominating and electing officers and sets forth exclusive remedies for violation of these procedures.' Mamula v. United Steel Workers of America, 304 F.2d 108, 109 (3d Cir.1962). Although the issue of federal-state relations was not before it, the court indicated that once an election has taken place an aggrieved member must follow the procedures and remedies prescribed in Title IV of the Act. ² Mamula v. United Steel Workers of America, 304 F.2d 108, 112, n. 19 (3d Cir.1962). In fact, the express congressional mandate contained in Title IV provides that '[t]he remedy provided by this sub-chapter for challenging an election already...