Management Investors v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 25 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-1428,78-1428
• Citation: 610 F.2d 384
• Parties: 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2653, 87 Lab.Cas. P 11,630, 5 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 913 MANAGEMENT INVESTORS and Norman C. Reid, f/d/b/a Lewis Coal Company and James W. Brummett f/d/b/a Southern Belle Trucking Co. Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 384

610 F.2d 384

102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2653, 87 Lab.Cas. P 11,630,

5 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 913

MANAGEMENT INVESTORS and Norman C. Reid, f/d/b/a Lewis Coal Company and James W. Brummett f/d/b/a Southern Belle Trucking Co. Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 78-1428.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 21, 1979.

Decided Oct. 25, 1979.

Terry M. Brooks, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Nashville, Tenn., Charles A. Edwards, Lovic A. Brooks, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.

E. H. Rayson, James Ridley, III, Kramer, Johnson, Rayson, McVeigh & Leake, Knoxville, Tenn., Harrison Combs, Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellee.

Before CELEBREZZE, KEITH and MERRITT, Circuit Judges.

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

James W. Brummett and Lewis Coal Company ¹ appeal from judgments below dismissing their claims for damages against the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) under Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187, as amended. ² Lewis Coal Company also appeals from the district court's dismissal of its state law claims. We affirm.

FACTS

This action arises out of a labor dispute that occurred in Morgan and Scott Counties, Tennessee in early 1975. The parties involved in the dispute were plaintiff Lewis Coal Company, ³ plaintiff James W. Brummett, a coal hauler operating under the incorporated name Southern Belle Trucking Co., Inc. (Southern Belle), and defendant United Mine Workers of America.

Plaintiff Lewis Coal Company commenced mining operations at the primary site of the dispute in December, 1974. On January 27, 1975, the Company terminated all of its employees, except for mechanics and a few helpers, and temporarily closed down for equipment repairs. The terminated employees, disgruntled by the Company's actions, contacted UMW representatives and subsequently authorized the UMW to seek to become their bargaining representative.

On February 3, 1975, a group of former employees began picketing the mine site. A UMW representative reportedly identified himself to Lewis Coal Company's assistant supervisor and informed him that the former employees had been told that the Company had a new crew and that the pickets were seeing to it that the new crew was not going to work. On this first day of picketing, plaintiff Brummett ⁴ allegedly was halted at the picket line and informed In late February and early March, 1975, violence, both at and away from the mine site, resulted in unfair labor practice charges being filed against the UMW. In addition, a suit brought by the Company in state court resulted in injunctive relief and subsequent findings of contempt against a number of the more active pickets.

that he, as well as the Company, was being picketed by the UMW. On February 11, 1975, the UMW filed a petition with the N.L.R.B. for certification as the employees' bargaining representative.

The Company terminated Brummett's contract in February or early March, 1975. After Lewis Coal Company terminated him, Brummett hauled coal for other operators until December, 1975. On December 30, 1976, both Brummett and Southern Belle were adjudged bankrupts.

The picketing continued and the UMW gave the pickets weekly strike benefits from February 3 to July 18, 1975. However, the violence was ended by an April 7, 1975, stipulation between the UMW and the NLRB. In July, the Union abandoned the strike and withdrew its petition for an election. In June, 1976, Lewis Coal Company ceased its mining operations. ⁵

On January 30, 1978, Brummett and Lewis Coal Company initiated the present action for damages under Section 303. Additionally, plaintiffs sought treble damages under Section 47-15-113, Tenn.Code Ann., ⁶ and punitive damages for alleged violations of Tennessee common law.

The trial in this case was originally scheduled to commence on June 6, 1978. Pursuant to a pretrial order, the trial was rescheduled to July 25, 1978, with trial briefs and jury charges to be filed on or before June 15, and witness lists to be exchanged by May 10, 1978. ⁷ Pursuant to the terms of a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court on June 8, 1978, trial On July 14, eleven days prior to trial, plaintiffs filed their pretrial briefs. Three days later, on July 17, the date specified in the court's order of June 8, plaintiffs filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On July 18, 1978, the Union filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Brummett's claims on grounds that the right to pursue these claims had vested exclusively in the trustee of Brummett's bankrupt estate.

by jury was waived; the parties were ordered to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by July 17, 1978. ⁸

It appears that plaintiff's counsel learned of the Union's motion purely by accident while making inquiry to the clerk on July 19 as to the status of the Union's overdue pretrial brief and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon discovering that the motion and a brief in support thereof had been filed the previous day, plaintiff's counsel opposed the motion in a telegram delivered to the court on July 20, 1978. ⁹ On that same day, the court entered an order granting the Union's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Brummett as a party plaintiff. ¹⁰

When the cause came on for trial as scheduled on July 25, 1978, the court declined in its discretion to exercise pendent jurisdiction over that portion of the complaint alleging violations of state law. The court, therefore, Sua sponte dismissed Lewis Coal Company's claims arising under the laws of Tennessee. Following the court's dismissal of its state law claims, Lewis Coal Company requested and was granted a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of its Section 303 claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), F.R.Civ.Pro. ¹¹

I. Summary Judgment

A

Brummett contends that the district court acted improperly in granting the Union's two-day-old motion for summary judgment. We agree.

Summary judgment does serve a worthwhile cause. As the Fourth Circuit has noted:

Summary judgment is to avoid a useless trial. It is a device to make possible the prompt disposition of controversies on their merits without a trial, if in essence Bland v. Norfolk and Southern Railroad Company, 406 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1969). To facilitate this purpose, Rule 56(b), ¹² F.R.Civ.Pro., allows a motion for summary judgment to be made by a defendant at any time. But this Court has often cautioned

there is no real dispute as to the salient facts.

. . . that a trial judge should be slow in disposing of a case of any complexity on a motion for summary judgment, that while such a judgment wisely used is a praiseworthy and timesaving device, yet such prompt dispatch of judicial business is neither the sole nor the primary purpose for which courts have been established, and that a party should not be deprived of an adequate opportunity to fully develop his case by witnesses and a trial, when the issues involved make such procedure the appropriate one. . . .

S. J. Groves & Sons v. Ohio Turnpike Com., (6th Cir.) 315 F.2d 235, 237, Cert. denied, 375 U.S. 824, 84 S.Ct. 65, 11 L.Ed.2d 57 (1963). See Smith, et al. v. Hudson, et al., 600 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1979); Tee-Pak, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 491 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1974); Hart v. Johnston, 389 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1968).

Even where otherwise warranted, courts have uniformly held that such motions are inappropriate on the eve of trial. See Williams v. Howard Johnson's Inc. of Washington, 323 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1963); Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1948); Clark v. Hancock, 45 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.Ga.1968). And where no leave to respond is accorded, the inherent prejudice of a belated motion for summary judgment is even further accentuated. Kistner v. Califano, 579 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1978); Bowdidge v. Lehman, 252 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1958); Ailshire v. Darnell, 508 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1974); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973); Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 373 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 389 U.S. 851, 88 S.Ct. 69, 19 L.Ed.2d 120 (1967). See also, Enochs v. Sisson, 301 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1962); Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1971); Macklin v. Butler, 553 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1977).

In choosing to act as it did on this two-day-old motion for summary judgment, the district court disposed of a complex case without even permitting plaintiffs the benefits of applicable procedural rules. Local Rule 12(b) ¹³ allows a party five days after a motion is served to respond. And where the motion is determinative of the case on the merits, Local Rule 12(c) ¹⁴ provides for an oral hearing upon request by either party. Under rule 56(c), F.R.Civ.Pro., ¹⁵ a litigant has a minimum of ten days within which to respond to a motion for summary judgment.

In this case, however, the Union's motion was not served upon Brummett's counsel until July 20, the same day the district court rendered its decision granting the motion. We are of the view that these precipitous acts by the trial court denied plaintiff his due process right to be heard. ¹⁶

Ordinarily, our finding here would require that we reverse and remand this cause in order that plaintiff might be permitted an opportunity to properly oppose the motion. But as the question presented here is purely one of law, we go on to decide it. And while we do not approve of the district court's conduct, our review of the pertinent law persuades us that the error committed here was harmless.

B

Considering the motion on the merits, the district court held that title to Brummett's right of action vested exclusively in the trustee of his bankrupt estate under Section 70a(6) of the (old) Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110a(6), upon his filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. ¹⁷ ...