Manatee Educ. Ass'n v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee County
| Citation | 268 Ed. Law Rep. 1058,62 So.3d 1176 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D09–1435.,1D09–1435. |
| Parties | MANATEE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, FEA, AFT (Local 3821), AFL–CIO, Appellant,v.SCHOOL BOARD OF MANATEE COUNTY, Florida and Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas W. Brooks and Jennifer S. Blohm of Meyers, Brooks, Demma, Aspros & Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.Paul A. Donnelly, Laura A. Gross, and Jung Yoon, Gainesville, for Amici Curiae Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO and Professional Firefighters of Ocala, IAFF Local 2135; G. Hal Johnson, Tallahassee for Amicus Curiae Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc.; Richard A. Sicking, Coral Gables, for Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc.; Noah Scott Warman of Sugarman & Susskind, Coral Gables, for Amicus Curiae Government Supervisors Association of Florida, OPEIU, Local 100 & Teamsters Local 769. John W. Bowen, Bradenton, and Thomas M. Gonzalez, Brian C. Ussery, and Christopher M. Bentley of Thompson, Sizemore, Gonzalez & Hearing, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee School Board of Manatee County, Florida.Joey D. Rix, Staff Attorney, Public Employees Relations Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee Public Employees Relations Commission.Thomas M. Gonzalez, Brian C. Ussery, and Christopher M. Bentley of Thompson, Sizemore, Gonzalez & Hearing, P.A., Tampa, for Amici Curiae Florida School Boards Association, Inc. and Florida Association of District School Superintendents.BENTON, C.J.
A union that represents teachers and paraprofessionals, the Manatee Education Association, FEA, AFT (Local 3821), AFL–CIO (the union), appeals a final order of the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) dismissing an unfair labor practice charge the union filed against the School Board of Manatee County (School Board), alleging that the School Board had committed an unfair labor practice by improperly invoking section 447.4095, Florida Statutes (2008). Concluding that PERC erred in dismissing the unfair labor practice charge without determining whether a “financial urgency” within the meaning of section 447.4095 existed, we reverse the final order in part, and remand for further proceedings.
A public employer may declare a “financial urgency” pursuant to section 447.4095, and proceed accordingly. But the employer's mere declaration cannot conclusively resolve the question. Absent some compelling state interest—determined to be such in a neutral forum, ultimately subject to judicial review—a public employer cannot unilaterally abrogate a collective bargaining agreement, consistently with public employees' constitutional right to bargain collectively. See Art. I, § 6, Fla. Const. ().
Once the fourteen-day period specified in section 447.4095 has run, the union is free to file an unfair labor practice charge disputing the employer's claim of “financial urgency.” In that event, it is incumbent on PERC to decide whether a “financial urgency” within the meaning of the statute—construed in keeping with the Florida Constitution—actually existed. If so, PERC should dismiss the charge. If not, PERC should order appropriate relief.
The public employer does not have to obtain a ruling that a genuine “financial urgency” exists before it proceeds under section 447.4095. If the union chooses not to participate in negotiations contemplated by section 447.4095, it runs the risk that PERC will find that a “financial urgency” did exist, and dismiss its unfair labor practice charge, with the result that any changes implemented pursuant to section 447.4095 will remain in effect. But the union need not participate in proceedings under section 447.4095 as a precondition to obtaining a decision on whether there was in fact a “financial urgency.”
In the present case, the School Board and the union entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in 2007. The CBA provided that eligible employees would receive an automatic, annual “step” increase in salary, including an increase which was to have become effective for the 2008/2009 fiscal year on August 15, 2008. But the CBA also provided for the “reopening” of negotiations on its compensation provisions on or before June 1 of each year in which it was in force.
On May 5, 2008, Dr. Dearing, the Superintendent of Schools for Manatee County, informed the union that, given legislative funding levels, the School Board was declaring a “financial urgency” requiring the modification of the CBA pursuant to section 447.4095. The statute provides:
In the event of a financial urgency requiring modification of an agreement, the chief executive officer or his or her representative and the bargaining agent or its representative shall meet as soon as possible to negotiate the impact of the financial urgency. If after a reasonable period of negotiation which shall not exceed 14 days, a dispute exists between the public employer and the bargaining agent, an impasse shall be deemed to have occurred, and one of the parties shall so declare in writing to the other party and to the commission. The parties shall then proceed pursuant to the provisions of s. 447.403. An unfair labor practice charge shall not be filed during the 14 days during which negotiations are occurring pursuant to this section.
§ 447.4095, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied). The union responded that any declaration of financial urgency was premature at best, but made it clear that it was willing to reopen negotiations on issues concerning compensation under the CBA's reopener clause, in light of the School Board's financial circumstances.
On May 7, 2008, the Superintendent reiterated his claim that the School Board was facing a financial urgency. The Board then went forward unilaterally under section 447.4095, informing the union of the Board's proposed modifications to the CBA on May 20, 2008. The union again responded that proceeding under section 447.4095 was unwarranted, but that it was willing to begin negotiations immediately under the reopener provision.1
On May 23, 2008, the School Board notified PERC that it was declaring an impasse, based on the union's refusal to bargain under section 447.4095 and the failure of the parties to reach an agreement within the fourteen-day statutory time period, and requested the appointment of a special magistrate pursuant to section 447.403, Florida Statutes (2007). The union objected to the declaration of impasse and to the appointment of a special magistrate, on grounds that section 447.4095 had been improperly invoked in the absence of a true “financial urgency.”
The union persisted in this view even after PERC appointed a special magistrate, and on that basis declined to participate in proceedings before the special magistrate. The special magistrate conducted a hearing without the union present and issued a report on July 11, 2008, which recommended acceptance of the School Board's position on all impasse issues.2 The special magistrate ruled that whether or not the School Board had properly declared financial urgency was not a question for him to decide.
On July 17, 2008, the Superintendent sent a letter to PERC ostensibly rejecting the magistrate's recommendations, while indicating he would advocate that the School Board, sitting as the legislative body to resolve the alleged impasse, adopt the selfsame recommendations. His stated purpose in taking this approach was to give the union an opportunity to present proposals to the School Board during an impasse resolution meeting conducted pursuant to section 447.403(4), Florida Statutes (2008). In a special meeting held August 4, 2008, the School Board approved the Superintendent's recommendation to impose the changes the special magistrate had recommended in the section 447.4095 process.3
On August 7, 2008, the union filed with PERC an unfair labor practice charge against the School Board. The union alleged the School Board violated sections 447.501(1)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (2008),4 when it improperly invoked section 447.4095 and refused to postpone the legislative body hearing so that then pending and already fruitful Interest Based Bargaining negotiations could go forward.5 The School Board asserted that the union had “waived its right to bargain the matters raised ... by failing to negotiate in good faith or at all, by refusing to take part in any of the [ section 447.4095] process, including the special magistrate's hearing, by failing to reject the special magistrate's recommendation and failing to participate in the public hearing conducted by the School Board.”
After a hearing on the union's unfair labor practice charge on October 3, 2008, the PERC hearing officer noted that the union had declined to participate in the section 447.4095 bargaining process, and determined that no unfair labor practice was committed when the School Board invoked that provision without first establishing it had no other viable alternative to meet a financial urgency. The PERC Final Order rejected the union's assertions that the School Board was required to demonstrate a compelling state interest, and no other possible source for funding contractual obligations, prior to proceeding under section 447.4095.
A majority of the PERC commissioners also concluded that the union was “required to engage in an insulated period of negotiations over the impact of the financial urgency,” and concluded that because the union “refused to engage in such negotiations, the School [Board's] declaration of an impasse, and subsequent modification to the collective bargaining agreements at issue pursuant to the impasse resolution procedures set forth in Section 447.403, was not unlawful.” The majority did not reach the merits of the union's contention that the School Board had improperly declared a financial...
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