Manatt v. State

• Decision Date: 09 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 92-566,92-566
• Citation: 311 Ark. 17,842 S.W.2d 845
• Parties: Scott MANATT, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 845

842 S.W.2d 845

311 Ark. 17

Scott MANATT, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. 92-566.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 9, 1992.

Scott Manatt, Corning, for appellant.

Teena L. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

DUDLEY, Justice.

Shortly after midnight on September 1, 1991, State Trooper Steve Shults was driving his police car on Highway 67 near the Missouri state line when he saw a pickup truck exceeding the speed limit while traveling south toward Corning. The trooper followed the truck, as it continued to exceed the highway speed limit, into a 45 m.p.h. zone in Corning, where he saw it veer across a yellow line. The trooper thought the driver of the truck might be intoxicated and stopped the truck at 12:26 a.m. The trooper got out of his car, and, as he was approaching the pickup, he glanced into the bed of the truck and saw a case of beer in cans, six bottles of beer, and four wine coolers. The trooper asked the driver for his license, looked at it, and saw that the driver, appellant Scott Manatt, Jr., was only sixteen years old. There were three other teenagers in the truck. The trooper asked to whom the beer and wine belonged, and appellant responded that it was his. The trooper satisfied himself that appellant had not been drinking and shortly afterwards issued a citation to appellant as being a minor in possession of intoxicants, and let him go. The case was processed in the juvenile division of chancery court. The chancellor found that appellant was a delinquent juvenile because he had violated the statute prohibiting minors from possessing intoxicants. He entered an order denying appellant's driving privileges for one year, but allowed him to drive to and from work and school. Court costs amounted to $35.00. Appellant makes five assignments of error, and those assignments, in turn, contain many subpoints. Some of the subpoints are not easily followed, but we are satisfied that there is no merit in any of them and, accordingly, affirm.

Appellant's first point is:

UNDER RULE 29(1)(A), IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENJOIN THE USE OF THE JUVENILE CODE AS FAILING IN EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ALSO FAILED TO ACCORD TO PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES WHICH UPON THE SAME TERMS SHALL BELONG TO ALL CITIZENS UNDER ARTICLE 2, SECTION 18 OF THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION, JURISDICTIONALLY TREATING CITIZENS 18 TO 21 DIFFERENTLY THAN THOSE 16 TO 18 FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.

In this point appellant contends that the juvenile code is unconstitutional and that we should enjoin its use because, when a juvenile violates a criminal statute, he is subjected to more severe penalties than would be an adult for violating the same statute. We do not reach the merits of the argument because appellant was not sentenced under the juvenile code. Appellant was given a citation for being a minor in possession of intoxicating liquor. See Ark.Code Ann. § 3-3-203 (1987). The chancellor found that he violated the statute and consequently found him to be a delinquent juvenile. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(11) (Repl.1991). Without objection, the chancellor applied Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-710 (Supp.1991), a part of the criminal code, and suspended his driving privileges. The criminal code provides that the trial court shall deny driving privileges when a person who is less than eighteen years old is found guilty of a criminal offense involving the illegal possession of alcohol. This penalty, denial of a driver's license, "shall be in addition to all other penalties." Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-710 (Supp.1991).

The salient fact is that there was no "disposition," such as commitment to a youth services center, probation, or fine, as provided for in Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-330 (1987), the statute that appellant contends unconstitutionally provides excessive punishment for juveniles. Instead, the only "disposition" was to deny appellant the privilege of holding a driver's license as provided for in the criminal statute and driver's license statute, and, by statute, that is to be "in addition to all other penalties."

In order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, a party must demonstrate that the challenged statute had a prejudicial impact on him. Montgomery v. State, 277 Ark. 95, 640 S.W.2d 108 (1982). Here, the challenged statute had no impact on appellant, and, therefore, he has no standing to challenge it. In his reply brief the appellant contends that he has standing because court costs were assessed against him under the juvenile code, but he has not shown that court costs are discriminately applied in juvenile court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's refusal to enjoin the use of the juvenile code.

Appellant's second assertion of error is:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO TREAT THE OVERBROAD DEFINITION OF "JUVENILE DELINQUENT" AS VOID FOR VAGUENESS BY FAILING TO FIND ACA 9-27-303 SUB PARAGRAPH 11 AS VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND BEING OVERBROAD WHICH DEFINITION CREATES AS A DELINQUENT EVERY CHILD IN ARKANSAS AT SOME TIME BEFORE ITS 18TH BIRTHDAY AS A JUVENILE.

The primary contention under this point is that the definition of "delinquent juvenile" contained in Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(11) (1987) is facially void for vagueness. Appellant does not contend that the statute he was found to have violated, "minor in possession of intoxicants," is void for vagueness. Rather he argues that the definition of "delinquent juvenile" is void. Since there was no disposition of appellant under this definition, we do not need to reach the issue, but we do discuss it in a summary manner only as a prelude to another of his subpoints.

The statute defines the term "delinquent juvenile" as any juvenile ten years old or older who has committed an offense that would constitute a felony, misdemeanor, or violation for an adult, excepting traffic offenses and game and fish violations. The statute sets out the age of a juvenile offender, and it defines the type of behavior that will cause one to be classified as a delinquent juvenile. Under the definition, a juvenile would only have to look to the criminal code and city ordinances to find the proscribed acts. Thus, the statute is not facially void. See State v. Torres, 309 Ark. 422, 831 S.W.2d 903 (1992), for a complete discussion of the standard for determining whether a statute is void for vagueness.

Appellant alternatively argues that if the definition is not vague, and if it is literally followed, it is overbroad because it subjects every juvenile to being declared a delinquent. Appellant did not offer any empirical data to sustain this argument. The only data on the subject of which we are aware, and of which we can take judicial notice, are the statistical publications of the Administrative Office of the Courts and the United States Census, and this data does not sustain appellant's contention. Thus, the chancellor did not err in refusing to declare the juvenile code unconstitutional because the definition of "delinquent juveniles" is overbroad.

Also under the same point of appeal appellant contends that the statute he was convicted of violating, being a minor and possessing alcohol, is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Citing our legal drinking age of twenty-one, appellant contends that all persons who are under the age of twenty-one, and who possess alcohol, must be treated the same, but, under our statute, only persons less than eighteen years old lose their driver's license when they possess intoxicants. Such an argument loses sight of the fact that a person reaches majority in this State at the age of eighteen years, Ark.Code Ann. § 9-25-101 (1987), and it is only minors who are subject to losing their driving privileges under this act. It is adults over the age of eighteen, but under the age of twenty-one, who cannot purchase intoxicants, who might make a hollow equal protection argument. In addition, in Carney v. State, 305 Ark. 431, 808 S.W.2d 755 (1991), we set out the basis for this dichotomy, and we held that it is rational and, consequently, not unconstitutional. We need not repeat that reasoning here.

Appellant's third point of appeal is:

THE COURT ERRED IN EXERCISING JURISDICTION BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION BY ENFORCING ACT 93 OF 1989 ACA 5-65-116 WITHOUT REGARD TO ACT 1109 OF ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF 1991 ACA 27-16-915 AND FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 1989 ACT WAS AMENDED BY THE 1991 ACT AND BY IMMEDIATE IMPOSITION OF THE RULING OF THE COURT WITHOUT REGARD TO THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO APPEAL AND BY LETTER RULING DISALLOWS ANY STAY AGAINST IMPOSITION PENDING APPEAL.

Appellant contends that Ark.Code Ann. § 5-65-116 (Supp.1991), the part of the criminal code passed in 1989 that provides for the suspension of driver's licenses of juveniles under eighteen who commit offenses involving intoxicants, was repealed by implication by Ark.Code Ann. § 27-16-916 (Supp.1991), a part of the code dealing with driver's licenses that was passed in 1991.

The two statutes are not in conflict, and one does not repeal the other by implication. The criminal code section 5-65-116 provides that a person under eighteen who is convicted of driving while intoxicated, or who illegally possesses...