Manchanda v. Attorney Grievance Comm. Chief Abigail Reardon

• Docket Number: 23 Civ. 9292 (JPC) (KHP)
• Decision Date: 22 December 2023
• Parties: RAHUL MANCHANDA, Plaintiff, v. ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE CHIEF ABIGAIL REARDON, STAFF ATTORNEY REMI SHEA, CHIEF COUNSEL JORGE DOPICO, JUDGE ROLANDO ACOSTA, NYPD, and FBI NYC FIELD OFFICE,Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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RAHUL MANCHANDA, Plaintiff, v. ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE CHIEF ABIGAIL REARDON, STAFF ATTORNEY REMI SHEA, CHIEF COUNSEL JORGE DOPICO, JUDGE ROLANDO ACOSTA, NYPD, and FBI NYC FIELD OFFICE,Defendants.

No. 23 Civ. 9292 (JPC) (KHP)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

December 22, 2023

ORDER

JOHN P. CRONAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff Rahul Manchanda, an attorney who is admitted to practice in this Court and the courts of the State of New York, brings this pro se action against Abigail Reardon, Esq. the Chairwoman of the Attorney Grievance Committee of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department (“First Department”); Remi Shea, Esq., an attorney with the First Department; Jorge Dopico, Esq., the Chief Attorney of the First Department's Attorney Grievance Committee; Justice Rolando Acosta, the Presiding Justice of the First Department (Reardon, Shea, Dopico, and Justice Acosta, collectively, the “Individual Defendants”); the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); and the “NYC Field Office”^[1]of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Dkt. 15 (“Am. Compl.”). While hardly clear, Plaintiff appears to allege violations of federal and state law arising from actions taken by the First Department's Attorney Grievance Committee, presumably in proceedings concerning attorney disciplinary charges against him.

For the reasons that follow, the Court sua sponte dismisses any claims that seek to initiate a criminal prosecution of Defendants or others, as a private citizen lacks standing to cause a criminal prosecution. The Court also sua sponte dismisses claims against the United States of America-including the FBI-on sovereign immunity grounds other than any claims brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-80. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert any claims against the United States under the FTCA, he is ordered to show cause in writing within fourteen days of this Order that he has complied with the administrative exhaustion requirements of the FTCA and further is on notice that his failure to do so will result in dismissal of such claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court similarly puts Plaintiff on notice of its intent to sua sponte dismiss any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1, because that statute lacks a private right of action, as well as any claims for damages against the Individual Defendants under federal law because they appear to be entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint. The Court also puts Plaintiff on notice that it intends to dismiss any federal claims against the NYPD, as that agency is not a separate entity that can be sued, and against the City of New York, because it appears Plaintiff has not stated a legally cognizable claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor has he articulated any basis for the City's liability under the other federal causes of action pleaded in the Amended Complaint. The Court also provides notice that it, in the event all federal claims are dismissed, it does not intend to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state claims, including any state claims against the City. The Court will afford Plaintiff the opportunity to address the viability of his Section 2000ee-1 claims and of any of his federal causes of action against the Individual Defendants, the NYPD, and the City of New York. No later than fourteen days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff must show cause in writing why any of these claims should not be dismissed. Similarly, by that date, Plaintiff also must show cause in writing why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state claims in the event the federal claims are dismissed.

Lastly, the Court also gives Plaintiff notice that it intends to deny him leave to replead any of the claims that are the subject of this Order for futility reasons. He too may address in writing within fourteen days of this Order why he disagrees with that assessment and believes he should be granted leave to replead.

I. Background

The nine causes of action listed in the Amended Complaint cover a broad range of alleged violations of federal and state law. The first cause of action alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights under color of law, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22; the second cause of action purports to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(e) for retaliation, id. ¶¶ 23-24; the third cause of action alleges violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, id. ¶¶ 25-26; the fourth cause of action alleges violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, id. ¶¶ 27-28; the fifth cause of action alleges abuse of process, id. ¶¶ 29-30; the sixth cause of action alleges malicious prosecution, id. ¶¶ 31-32; the seventh cause of action alleges computer trespass, id. ¶¶ 33-34; the eighth cause of action alleges conversion of computer data, id. ¶¶ 35-36; and the ninth cause of action alleges judicial bias and prejudice, id. ¶¶ 37-38. For each cause of action, Plaintiff seeks “actual and punitive damages in the amount of $20,000,000.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38. Plaintiff additionally may be seeking to hold Defendants criminally liable, as the Amended Complaint has a section titled “CRIMINAL ACTS” and alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242, id. ¶¶ 10-15, and further alleges violations of “civil and criminal RICO,” i.e., the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, Am. Compl. ¶ 3, as well as other statutes that allow for criminal liability, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, id. ¶ 5, the ECPA, id. ¶¶ 5, 25-26, and the CFAA, id. ¶¶ 6, 27-28.

The factual underpinnings of Plaintiff's claims are rather unclear, but appear to relate to attorney disciplinary proceedings before the First Department's Grievance Committee. He summarizes that his case

concerns the non-stop malicious prosecution, aggravated harassment, abuse of process, vexatious litigation, forum shopping, judicial corruption, judicial bias, civil and criminal RICO, judicial misconduct, public corruption, unlawful trespassing into computer networks, conversion/theft of computer data, illegal electronic surveillance and wiretapping, committed jointly by codefendants since at least 2021 all the way to the present day, directly and proximately contributing to and causing Plaintiff Rahul Manchanda's heart attack and cardiovascular problems, as well as now his spouse['s] . . . colloidal cyst/brain tumor problems, further bankrupting plaintiff[] by co-defendants['] coordinated legal onslaught going on many years now, with no basis in fact, evidence, or substantiation of claims.

Id. ¶ 3. He further alleges that Defendants

are weaponizing the judicial and legal system, abusing their position and power to remove Plaintiff's law license of 21 years, “soft kill” the plaintiff on behalf of Jewish Organized Crime, Extremist Jewish Zionist donors, financial contributors, oligarchs, within their orbit and sphere of influence, simply for Plaintiff expressing his political views that go against hardcore extremist Jewish and Zionist domestic and foreign policy.

Id. ¶ 4.

Plaintiff proceeds to allege corruption on the part of Reardon, the Chairwoman of the First Department's Attorney Grievance Committee, that resulted in her “going after . . . [Plaintiff] and [his] law license and law firm.” Id. ¶ 19. And he alleges that Shea, Dopico, and Justice Acosta “have been actively aiding and abetting Abigail Reardon's crazed and ruthless crusade against . . . Plaintiff for many years, breaking numerous laws and ethics along the way.” Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff's allegations also reach law enforcement. He contends that the FBI has “virtually never provided assistance, protection, or guidance to [Plaintiff] when he was a victim of serious crime, including but not limited to death threats, extortion, blackmail, aggravated harassment, and other crimes by organized crime or individual criminals, most notably [J]ewish organized crime, that is the subject of this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 20a. As to both the FBI and the NYPD, he alleges that “most times[,] . . . [they] would turn on . . . [Plaintiff] when he reported crime, rather than go after the criminals themselves,” Id. ¶ 20b, and that the agencies have a policy of “allowing criminals to attack, terrorize, threaten, harass, and otherwise victimize [him],” Id. ¶ 20c.

II. Applicable Law

A district judge has the authority to dismiss a complaint sua sponte, even when, as here, the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss a frivolous appeal)), or that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, Ruhrgas AG v Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). A district judge additionally “has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard,” Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam). To adequately state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pl...